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Abstract 
 
In this thesis I defend the principle of global egalitarianism. According to this 
idea most of the existing detrimental inequalities in this world are morally 
objectionable. As detrimental inequalities I understand those that are not to the 
benefit of the worst off people and that can be non-wastefully removed. 
To begin with, I consider various justifications of the idea that only those 
detrimental inequalities that occur within one and the same state are morally 
objectionable. I identify Thomas Nagel’s approach as the most promising 
defence of this traditional position. However, I also show that Nagel’s argument 
does not even justify the elimination of detrimental inequalities (that is to say: 
egalitarian duties of justice) within states. A discussion of the concept of 
political legitimacy rather shows that egalitarian justice is not a necessary 
condition of the justifiability of the exercise of coercive political power. 
I, then, consider other, more Rawlsian approaches to the question of 
detrimental inequalities. These views appear more plausible than Nagel’s 
position and argue that egalitarian duties also arise in certain international 
contexts. But also these more global theories of distributive justice suffer from 
shortcomings. Since they make the application of duties of justice dependent on 
the existence of social practices they cannot adequately account for the justified 
interests of non-participants that are affected by these practices.  
The counter-intuitive implications of practice-dependent theories lead me 
to investigate the plausibility of a theory that does not limit  justice to existing 
practices and that argues for the inherent value of equality . This theory is global 
egalitarianism. I defend global egalitarianism by debilitating three objections 
that opponents of this idea frequently (but often not clearly) present in the 
relevant literature.  
Finally I also address two particular objections to the idea that global 
egalitarian duties are institutionalizable with the help of coercive global 
authorities. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is an essay on the issue of the blatant socio-economic and political 
inequality that exists in our world and is to the detriment of innumerable 
people. Gopal Sreenivasan points out that, 
In Malawi, for example, life expectancy at birth is a mere 41 years for 
men and 42 years for women. Twenty-seven countries, all but one in 
sub-Saharan Africa, have both male and female life expectancies at 
birth (at or) below 50 years. By contrast, global life expectancy at 
birth, combining male and female rates, is 66.75 years. In the USA, 
life expectancy at birth is considerably higher still, nearly double that 
in Malawi, at 75 years for men and 80 years for women.1  
  
Ultimately, the thesis is a defence of the idea of global egalitarianism, conceived 
as a moral answer to this problem. John Rawls counts some of the worst effects 
of the existing inequality, such as oppression, poverty, and starvation, among 
the “great evils of human history.”2  And Thomas Pogge points out that due to 
this inequality “there are surely enough poverty deaths for a full-sized crime 
against humanity: as many every seven months as perished in the Nazi death 
camps.”3  As these remarks make clear, it seems implausible to argue that the 
existing global inequality is not an urgent moral issue. Thus, in the face of this 
problem we need to think about and identify our moral responsibilities and 
stringent duties of justice. 
The philosophical discussion of the moral problem of global inequality 
began comparatively recently. However, in particular within the last ten years 
there has been a real outburst of newly produced literature on this topic. The 
                                                                 
1  Gopal Sreenivasan, “Health and Justice in our Non-Ideal World”, Politics, Philosophy & 
Economics 6(2) (2007): pp. 218-236, pp. 218, 219. 
2 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  Press, 1999), pp. 6, 7 .  
3 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights. Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and 
Reforms (Cambridge: Polity  Press, 2002), p. 25. 
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authors of these texts approach the issue from various moral points of view. It is 
the aim of this thesis to (1) clarify the philosophical treatment of the subject of 
global inequality and to (2) provide positive arguments for a particular response 
to it. The argument developed here also endeavours to be ecumenical. Thus, in 
addressing all those who think that inequality matters morally at least 
sometimes, the discussion takes into account ideas from the currently dominant 
moral perspectives (for example, deontology and consequentialism). 
Furthermore, it takes into consideration the work of some opponents of global 
egalitarianism such as John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, Ronald Dworkin as well as 
proponents of globally ambitious views, including those of Derek Parfit, Thomas 
Christiano, and Aaron James. At the outset, then, it may be helpful to orientate 
the reader by locating my overall argument in the context of the (by now) quite 
extensive literature on global inequality and distributive justice.    
In their introduction to the subject of global inequality and justice Christoph 
Borszies and Henning Hahn helpfully distinguish three stages of the 
development of philosophical thought on the topics of global inequality and 
justice.4  In the first stage, philosophers like Charles Beitz argued for an 
extension of the central principles of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (the ‘Liberty 
Principle’ and the ‘Difference Principle’) to the global sphere.5  During the 
second stage of the discussion, philosophers like Thomas Nagel6  focused on 
Rawls’s idea that “justice is the first virtue of social institutions.”7  In the wake of 
                                                                 
4 See Christoph Broszies, Henning Hahn (eds.), Globale Gerechtigkeit. Schlüsseltexte zur 
Debatte zwischen Partikularismus und Kosmopolitismus  (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2010) , pp. 18-26. 
5 See Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations  (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), also Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1989). 
6 See Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 33(2) (2005): 
pp. 113-147, also John Rawls, The Law of Peoples; Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human 
Rights. 
7  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  Press, 197 1). 
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this ‘institutional turn’ the debate centred around the theoretical question of 
what exactly generates duties of justice to eliminate inequality and the empirical 
question whether the features that trigger such duties are also present outside of 
states. After this, the debate about global inequality developed into a third stage. 
Here philosophers like James, Darrel Moellendorf, and Allen Buchanan8  discuss 
the issue in light of the insight that there are structures of economic and 
political power that are unlike nation states but that nonetheless have harmful 
effects on people around the globe. Their argument is that these transnational 
effects of power also require justification and can lead to duties of distributive 
justice – despite not fitting with Rawls’s understanding of his Theory of Justice 
as applicable only within self-contained societies.9   
The argument advanced in this thesis starts out discussing a number of 
approaches of the second stage (Chapter One) that focus on the discontinuities 
between states and the international area. As the argument progresses it moves 
on to the third stage that Broszies and Hahn describe (Chapter Three). 
However, the second part of the thesis will also go beyond this third stage and 
not only debate existing economic and political power relations and their effects 
on people. Rather, on the basis of Thomas Christiano’s conception of 
egalitarianism,1 0  the thesis will finally defend the idea of the global importance 
of the value of equality independently from any existing practices and 
                                                                 
8 See Aaron James, “Distributive Justice without Sovereign Rule: The Case of Trade”, Social 
Theory and Practice  31(4) (2005): pp. 533-559; Darrel Moellendorf, Global Inequality 
Matters (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009); Allen Buchanan, “Reciprocal Legitimation: 
Reframing the Problem of International Legitimacy”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics  10(1) 
(2011): pp. 5-19. 
9 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice , p. 7 . 
1 0 Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and its Limits  
(Oxford: Oxford University  Press, 2008); Thomas Christiano, Will Bray nen, “Inequality , 
Injustice, and Levelling Down”, Ratio  21(4) (2008): pp. 392-420. 
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institutional structures (Chapter Four). The thesis will therefore explore a 
fourth stage in the philosophical discussion of global inequality and justice.  
 
Outlines of the Chapters 
The discussion in the first chapter identifies what is generally morally 
problematic or objectionable about the globally existing inequality.  It will then 
turn toward the question why until recently political philosophers traditionally 
have thought that only harmful inequalities that occur within states trigger 
duties of justice to eliminate them. As an answer to this question a first view 
about distributive justice emerges. This (a) ‘actual practice view of justice’ is 
advocated by a number of philosophers that consider egalitarian concern as 
inseparably bound up with certain authoritative institutions that only exist 
within states. The work of Nagel is widely considered to be one of the main 
instances of this perspective, and is therefore analysed in detail. 
In the second chapter the core element of Nagel’s view, the assumed 
necessary connection between the legitimate exercise of coercive authority and 
equal concern, will be tested and finally rejected. In this way the argument of 
this thesis undermines the plausibility of the first position on distributive justice 
and global inequality that Nagel champions.  
In the third chapter the discussion will focus on a second understanding of 
distributive justice that grounds the idea of the value of distributive equality not 
on the justification of authority but on Rawls’s notion of the need to justify the 
effects of human practices. As a result, this (b) ‘reformed practice view of 
distributive justice’ extends the circumstances in which existing inequality 
should be considered unjust, or morally objectionable, beyond the borders of 
nation states. My discussion will show that also this second interpretation of 
17 
 
egalitarian distributive justice is flawed since it has counterintuitive 
implications. At this point, the analysis of the first two views about distribution 
will suggest that a coherent notion of distributive justice needs to assume a third 
perspective, namely a (c) ‘practice-independent view of justice’. 
The argument advanced in the fourth chapter, then, constitutes an 
endorsement of a particular version of the practice-independent perspective, (d) 
the idea of global egalitarianism. To partially defend the idea I attempt to 
undermine three crucial objections to global egalitarianism. The thought here is 
that, since it can be shown that none of these counter-arguments is valid, the 
supporters of perspectives (a) and (b) have failed to establish any reasons for 
thinking that global egalitarianism is implausible. What we are instead left with 
is the positive argument of the moral equality of people, an ideal that 
proponents of all interpretations of distributive justice accept. This ideal 
justifies the idea that harmful inequalities among people on this planet are 
generally morally objectionable.  
In the fifth chapter the discussion will finally turn to some objections about 
the feasibility of institutionalizing global egalitarianism. Here I will consider 
and dismiss two arguments that claim that global institutions are not desirable 
or feasible and that therefore global justice is not institutionalizable. One of 
these objections is based on a particular understanding of democracy, the other 
one derives from the Kantian theory of political authority and law. What the 
debate will demonstrate is that, contrary to what these two objections assert, 
global egalitarianism can demand of us to create more global authoritative 
institutions that have the purpose of promoting global equality and justice. 
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Chapter I. Global Inequalities and Authority-based 
Egalitarian Duties 
 
“We do not live in a just world,”1 1  Thomas Nagel candidly asserts. One of the 
most dramatic features of this world is the fact that human beings have severely 
unequal shares of the things that make their lives go well. But are these 
inequalities on a global scale unjust? In this chapter we will explore Nagel’s own 
position on this matter according to which only domestic socio-economic 
inequalities are objectionable from the perspective of justice. His argument has 
been very influential on recent philosophical debates about global distributiv e 
justice. It is therefore a natural starting point for our investigation of the 
question of how we can make our world more just. 
 
1. Identifying the Subject Matter  
Political philosophers argue about what types of inequalities are of relevance 
from the perspective of justice – whether they are best understood in terms of, 
for instance, primary social goods, resources, capabilities, or opportunities for 
welfare.1 2  John Rawls describes those inequalities in terms of “things which it is 
supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants.”1 3  We all want the goods 
that give us the opportunity to lead worthwhile lives and maybe even to find 
                                                                 
1 1  Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 33(2) (2005): pp. 
113-147 , p. 113. 
1 2 Discussions of these metrics can be found in respectively  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice  
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 197 1), Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue. The 
Theory and Practice of Equality  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), Martha 
C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development. The Capabilities Approach  (New Y ork: 
Cambridge University  Press, 2000), Gerald A. Cohen, “On the Currency  of Egalitarian 
Justice”, Ethics 99(4) (1989): pp. 906-944, and Harry  Brighouse, Ingrid Robey ns (eds.), 
Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities  (New Y ork: Cambridge University  
Press, 2010). 
1 3 John Rawls, ibid., p. 7 9. 
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happiness. This is why no one can be completely indifferent to how these goods 
are distributed among us. According to the First Article of the United Nations’ 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights “all human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights.”1 4  The idea of universal equal moral status of all 
persons stated in this Article expresses the basic premise of various discourses 
in contemporary political and moral philosophy. And it is this idea that renders 
the question of what share of goods each of us has access to a matter of justice. 
As moral beings that possess equal worth we all are owed a certain treatment 
and respect by others. The way available beneficial resources are divided among 
us is a central part of this treatment for the following reasons.   
Of the many goods that are conducive to our lives a special importance 
inheres in economic resources like wealth and income. As Nagel explains, such 
resources normally impact on other things we have reasons to want.1 5  This is 
hardly surprising given the very purpose of money as a medium that enables us 
to compare, exchange, and influence all kinds of material and immaterial goods. 
We can understand the powerful force material resources have on human lives 
when we consider how they affect the distribution of two exemplary 
fundamental goods. Political influence, for example, is something we all have 
reasons to deeply care about since it allows us to determine the rules of the 
communities we live in (and therefore the ways we can live our lives) and the 
aims we collectively strive for. But even in democratic political association, in 
which everyone has nominally one vote in the collective decision-making 
processes, unequal economic possessions can lead to differences in effective 
political sway. In this regard, Ronald Dworkin points out that, without 
                                                                 
1 4 http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml (Retrieved from the World Wide Web 
on May , 2nd, 2011). 
1 5 See Thomas Nagel, “Equality ” in Matthew Clay ton, Andrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of 
Equality (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002): pp. 60 -80, p. 60. 
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countervailing measures, in a liberal society “any group’s political success is so 
directly related to the sheer magnitude of its expenditures, particularly on 
television and radio, that this factor dwarfs others in accounting for political 
success.”1 6  This means that, if we have reasons to care about having political 
influence, we also should be concerned with the distribution of economic 
resources or the attenuation of their impact on the political process. 
A second exemplary good that is affected by how many material resources 
we can utilize is health. Health is of fundamental importance to us since it is the 
condition for most other opportunities in our lives. Our health, though, does not 
alone depend on how much medical care we can afford. According to Norman 
Daniels, what is even more important for our physical well-being is the social 
environment we live in. However, it is a well-established fact that the quality of 
these social determinants is to a large extent dependent on the material 
resources we can invest in them. For this reason, Daniels is convinced that 
“inequality is strongly associated with population mortality and life 
expectancy.”1 7  Therefore, if we care about our health we ought to also take a 
strong interest in how the resources that shape our social environment are 
distributed among us.  
With a view to the two goods of political influence and health we might thus 
say that, while it is true that material resources cannot guarantee happiness, 
they certainly can be enormously beneficial to our efforts to achieve well-being. 
This explains the importance of the moral idea of distributive justice that is 
concerned with the question how institutions ought to allocate resources among 
                                                                 
1 6 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue , pp. 366, 367 . 
1 7  Norman Daniels, “Justice, Health, and Healthcare”, The American Journal of Bioethics  1 (2) 
(2001): pp. 2-16, p. 7 . 
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people.1 8  According to John Rawls, duties of justice are particularly stringent 
and forceful moral requirements that apply to social institutions.1 9  They differ 
from other moral requirements applicable to institutions (such as, for instance, 
charity and humanitarian assistance) in two ways.  
Firstly, we have duties of justice because there are persons who have 
regarding enforceable entitlements that trigger these duties. Secondly, failure to 
respect these entitlements by not fulfilling duties of justice can have severe 
consequences for an institution. For our discussion this difference is crucial in 
the following way: if helping foreigners who suffer from the effects of inequality 
is a moral duty and not a duty of justice of a political institution, then these 
foreigners lack enforceable entitlements. In this case, an institution that fails to 
deliver such aid simply does not act as virtuously as it might. However, if 
helping suffering foreigners were to be a duty of justice, an institution that does 
not provide such aid is disrespecting enforceable entitlements. It thus may 
jeopardize its own moral justification for exercising political power. The 
institution is, then, subject to a much stronger and deeper sort of criticism than 
would be appropriate were it merely not to be as virtuous as possible.  
Any common-sense meaning of justice contains at least two basic ideas 
which, following Thomas Christiano, we can call the principle of propriety and 
the generic principle of justice.2 0  The principle of propriety tells us to ensure 
“that each person has what is due to him or  what it is fitting that that person 
have. What is due a person is grounded in some quality of the person that gives 
                                                                 
1 8 See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness. A Restatement  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  
Press, 2001), pp. 50-52.  
1 9 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice , p. 3. 
20 See Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and its Limits  
(Oxford: Oxford University  Press, 2008), p. 20  
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the person a certain status or merit.”2 1  The generic principle in addition 
demands that we “treat relevantly like cases alike and relevantly  unlike cases 
unlike.”2 2  However, it would be hasty to infer from these two principles that 
everyone who accepts the thought that all human beings have equal moral 
standing also holds that all people must be treated the same when it comes to 
the distribution of those goods that are conducive to our lives. By itself, the 
notion of the universal moral equality of people does not explain which 
inequalities among persons are morally objectionable from the standpoint of 
justice. 
The kind of inequalities among people that are thought by many 
philosophers to be problematic from the standpoint of justice are inequalities 
that are detrimental to the less advantaged. According to Rawls, inequalities are 
detrimental when they are not mutually advantageous for all relevant people.2 3  
Rawls’s famous Difference Principle tell us that, to be just, “social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to 
be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and office open to 
all.”2 4  The idea behind this notion of ‘detrimental’ is that everyone should 
benefit from the goods our institutions have to distribute but that we should not 
pursue an equal distribution of these goods at all costs. Furthermore, though, 
for Rawls, Nagel, and many other egalitarian philosophers our social 
institutions must treat their subjects equally. This centrally includes that our 
state must see to it that (as far as possible) as free and morally equal persons all 
of the citizens benefit equally from the fruits of their social cooperation. 
                                                                 
21  Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality , p. 20. The idea of justice as giv ing people 
what is due to them is associated with Aristotle, see his Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University  Press, 2000), ch. 5.  
22 Thomas Christiano, ibid., p. 20. 
23 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice , p. 65-7 3. 
24 John Rawls, ibid., p. 53. 
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Importantly, the disparities Rawls has in mind are of a relative kind since 
their effects occur not only when we absolutely lack certain goods. Rather their 
negative ramifications already take effect when we have less of the things that 
benefit human life relative to others.2 5  However, as a matter of fact, many of 
these detrimental inequalities could be beneficially removed – if people where 
inclined to do so. As beneficial we have to understand efforts that do not simply  
level interpersonal inequalities in the distribution of goods. Rather, beneficially 
removing disparities means that such removal actually benefits (at least) the 
ones who were previously disadvantaged by the inequalities. This is the reason 
why modern democracies have established social security systems whose 
function it is to redistribute resources among their members so that they benefit 
everyone more equally. The social state is based on the ideas that (a) all human 
beings possess equal moral worth and (b) that as individuals we are not self-
sufficient human beings.2 6  As citizens we are therefore members of an 
interdependent community and have to contribute to every other member’s 
opportunities and well-being. However, the question is to what extent such 
beneficial redistribution is a matter of justice.   
 
2. The Traditional View: Distributive Justice as an Agent-Relative 
Obligation 
Interpersonal detrimental inequalities with respect to social goods (like, for 
instance, political influence and social status) and economic resources are found 
within all societies. However, in our world the disparities in the distribution of 
socio-economic goods that exist across societies are often larger than the ones 
                                                                 
25 Thus, subsequently  the term ‘detrimental inequalities’ will be used in this thesis to denote 
relative inequalities among persons.  
26 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice , p. 13. 
25 
 
that occur within one country. These inter-societal inequalities can be expressed 
in staggering figures. Daniels, for instance, tells us that  
Life expectancy in Swaziland is half that in Japan. A child unfortunate 
enough to be born in Angola has seventy-three times as great a 
chance of dying before age five as a child born in Norway. A mother 
giving birth in southern sub-Saharan Africa has 100 times as great a 
chance of dying in labor as one birthing in an industrialized country.2 7  
 
Remarkably, though, until quite recently most philosophers have thought that 
only those inequalities that occur within the same society  are a problem from 
the moral perspective. For them an equal distribution of goods only matters 
among those who are members in the same political community, which in our 
world primarily regards states. According to this position, as co-citizens we 
might owe it to non-members to have our state ensure that non-members do not 
suffer from absolute inequality, that is to say: that they do have enough to 
survive or even live a decent life.  
 However, since these duties are thought to be moral duties (and not duties 
of justice) and do not have to aim at achieving an equal distribution of benefits 
among co-citizens and non-citizens, they are morally less demanding and 
controversial.2 8  The general idea motivating this traditional view is that, as 
members of a democratic community, we determine the policies according to 
which socio-economic goods are distributed among us. We are thus responsible 
for this allocation in a way that we are not for the distribution of valuable things 
outside our society. Consequently, if I happen to be born in Germany it is not 
unjust that my life has (in general) the potential to go a lot better than the life of 
                                                                 
27  Normal Daniels, Just Health. Meeting Health Needs Fairly  (New Y ork: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), p. 333. 
28 Instances of a defence of this position include John Rawls’s A Law of Peoples (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University  Press, 1999), David Miller’s National Responsibility and Global 
Justice  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Michael Blake’s “Distributive Justice, State  
Coercion, and Autonomy ”, Philosophy & Public Affairs  30(3) (2002): pp. 257 -296, and 
arguably  Thomas Nagel’s “The Problem of Global Justice.”  
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someone born in Swaziland due to the different levels of affluence that prevail in 
these two societies. Our world (for the most part) still functions according to 
this rationale.  
However, there is an obvious problem with this perspective. It is a further 
crucial and widely shared idea among philosophers that morally arbitrary 
factors (such as a person’s gender, skin colour, talents or social origin) are not 
supposed to determine what opportunities we have within our political 
community. By ‘morally arbitrary’ we should understand those facts that are 
not reasons for something else. With respect to the distribution of goods that 
are beneficial to the lives of persons, all aspects are morally arbitrary which can 
influence this distribution but that no one can be thought to be entitled to. 
Rawls for this reason states that “there is no more reason to permit the 
distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural 
assets than by historical and social fortune.”2 9  These aspects constitute what 
Dworkin calls “brute luck”3 0  since we cannot choose them or how they affect our 
chances in life.  
However, our citizenship certainly is also a morally arbitrary fact about us 
and part of the brute luck we face. So, if we believe with Dworkin that we should 
bear the costs of our choices, but not be the victim of the circumstances we find 
ourselves in, the current status quo in the distribution of goods on the planet is 
puzzling. Given that states differ so greatly in wealth and that we (normally) do 
not choose our nationality it is surprising that philosophers traditionally have 
thought that detrimental inequalities occurring outside of political communities 
do not generate duties of justice for the members of these communities. In this 
                                                                 
29 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice , p. 64. 
30 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue , p. 7 3. 
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sense, the inequalities among two societies that detrimentally affect people can 
give only rise to moral, humanitarian duties, but not do duties of justice to 
achieve a more equal distribution of goods. Thus, given the arbitrariness of the 
natural distribution of natural resources and our citizenship, we need to look for 
a justification of the traditionally assumed moral difference between intra-
societal and extra-societal inequalities. This first chapter is dedicated to 
scrutinising justifications various philosophers have suggested for this 
presumed moral difference.  
It seems that, if we cannot find a justification for why distributive justice 
should end at the borders of our country, this distinction would be as repugnant 
as other forms of unsubstantiated discrimination (like racism, sexism, or 
nepotism). We have to ask why our citizenship should be allowed to have such 
huge effects on our life chances while other arbitrary factors are not supposed to 
matter. Nagel, as a prominent supporter of the traditional view, offers the 
following justification for the distinction between domestic and international or 
global distributive inequalities:  
My relation of co-membership in the system of international trade 
with the Brazilian who grows my coffee or the Philippine worker who 
assembles my computer is weaker than my relation of co-
membership in U.S. society with the Californian who picks my lettuce 
or the New Yorker who irons my shirts.3 1   
 
But in what morally relevant sense are our ties of co-membership in states 
stronger than the relations we entertain to outsiders? In order to explain this 
morally relevant difference philosophers have highlighted certain features of 
modern states. These characteristics, they argue, are absent in the international 
sphere. They then go on to take these dissimilarities to justify a normative 
                                                                 
31  Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice”, p. 141  (emphasis added).  
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distinction between our co-citizens and foreigners. On this view, the supposed 
morally relevant features of states are therefore necessary and sufficient 
conditions of the application of distributive justice. 
It is not a novel or modern philosophical idea to differentiate between the 
domestic sphere of political community and what lies beyond its borders with 
respect to justice. However, what has to be a modern strategy (given the 
relatively recent appearance of the nation state in human history) is to base this 
difference on certain features that are particular to states. This becomes clear 
when we compare the argument from state characteristics to Aristotle’s 
justification of the distinction between domestic and extra-communal 
obligations of justice. As Fred Miller explains, for Aristotle it is “the widely 
different circumstances, different populations with different aptitudes and 
different resources and geographical settings”3 2  that made necessary a 
discontinuity in our thinking about what justice requires. While contemporary 
philosophers attempt different justifications they agree with Aristotle on the 
scope of justice: obligations of justice do not generalise from our own political 
community to people who are not our fellow members. 
It is helpful to think about the emphasized characteristics of states as to 
provide people with agent-relative reasons for action. Agent-relative reasons 
are reasons that are characterized “in terms of a sort of back-reference to the 
person for whom the consideration is a reason.”3 3  This is to say that these 
reasons do not apply to just everyone but only to specific persons in particular 
positions. As an example, we can think of the responsibilities a parent has 
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toward her child. She has these special responsibilities by virtue of the relation 
she stands in with her child. And it is the lack of a similar relation to her 
neighbour’s child that explains why she does not have the same obligations 
toward the latter’s child.3 4  Different relationships (for instance family, friends, 
neighbour, co-citizen) in this way generate different responsibilities for the 
participants and these obligations normally are the stronger the closer the 
relationship among them is. Agent-relative reasons can become what Thomas 
Scanlon calls generic reasons when we abstract from particular people. Generic 
reasons are those that we can think of as applying to all persons, irrespective of 
their other morally relevant individual characteristics. While generic reasons are 
still relational reasons they derive from an abstraction of particular 
relationships. As such they are “reasons that we can see that people have in 
virtue of their situation, characterized in general terms.”3 5   
Agent-neutral reasons, in contrast, are independent from relations among 
people and derive their normative force rather from values and considerations 
that are not tied to particular persons. An instance of an agent-neutral reason is 
the ban on unjustifiable injuries to others. Such obligations of non-interference 
are duties that virtually everyone agrees we owe to all persons regardless of their 
personal ties.  But according to the traditional perspective we do not owe it to all 
people to contribute to their quality of life with our resources. On this view, such 
redistributive obligations are taken to be agent-relative obligations we only have 
toward people we stand in a certain relationship with. Thus, on the traditional 
view membership in certain political associations (like states) is seen as a 
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necessary, agent-relative reason for distributive duties of justice. Traditional 
theories are thus properly classified as associational conceptions of justice.  
 
3. Blake’s and Sangiovanni’s Failed Accounts of Associative 
Justice 
The features highlighted by philosophers that are supposed to establish 
membership in states as a necessary, agent-relative condition of egalitarian 
distributive justice generally consist of two components. These writers, firstly, 
aim to single out an empirical aspect that is particular to the domestic sphere of 
states. This empirical aspect is then, secondly, taken to justify the thesis that 
duties of distributive justice can only occur within states. Obviously such 
justification attempts are unsuccessful if either the premise or the conclusion 
fails. 
Michael Blake has suggested that the characteristic that is exclusive to states, 
and thus limits the scope of distributive justice, is the fact that the state coerces 
its citizens.3 6  To defend this conclusion, Blake argues that autonomy cannot be 
curtailed without good reasons. For Blake, being an autonomous agent means 
that we are “part authors of [our own] lives; the autonomous person is able to 
develop and pursue self-chosen goals and relationships.”3 7  Otherwise, he 
explains, a state would merely coerce and dominate its citizens by sheer threats 
of punishment as is the case in despotic regimes.3 8  On the other hand, though, 
Blake is aware that we all require a coercive system enforced by the state in 
order to realize this very autonomy.3 9  Thus, in this situation a conflict arises 
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from our need for the coercive force of the state and the simultaneous limitation 
of our autonomy by this coercion. For Blake there is but one solution of this 
conflict: since “the legal system coercively defines what resources flow to which 
activity [we need to justify this system to all it coerces through their] 
hypothetical consent.”4 0  However, the only justification that seems acceptable to 
all coerced by the state is that the system aims to establish “material equality”4 1  
among its subjects. This is Blake’s key normative claim. In addition, however, he 
is convinced that “only the sorts of coercion practiced by the state are likely to 
be justified through an appeal to distributive shares.”4 2  What he has in mind 
here is a state’s legal system that “defines how we may hold, transfer, and enjoy 
our property and our entitlements.”4 3  We can, thus, identify the existence of a 
coercive legal order and property regime as Blake’s necessary and sufficient 
condition for the applicability of principles of distributive justice.4 4  To him the 
redistribution of goods is of instrumental importance for the justification of the 
coercively enforced rules governing our society. Since Blake thinks that neither 
suchlike rules nor a similar form of enforcement exists at the international level 
he believes he has shown that distributive obligations of justice only arise within 
states. 
However, both Blake’s empirical and normative claims have received 
scathing criticism. Christiano, for instance, argues that Blake has not provided a 
solid argument “for the idea that hypothetical consent will not be forthcoming 
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unless a set of highly ambitious distributive principles are put into place.”4 5  As 
citizens, we could instead be willing to accept other offers than distributive 
equality in return for accepting our government’s claim to our obedience.4 6  We 
might, for example, be risk-loving people who prefer societal arrangements that 
guarantee only minimal means of subsistence but also facilitate numerous 
opportunities for lottery-like distributions of wealth. Blake’s appeal to 
hypothetical consent does not substantiate his contention that people would 
demand a redistribution of goods as a justification for being coerced by the 
state. 
What is worse, though, is that, as Arash Abizadeh points out, “Blake’s 
empirical premise […] that no on-going state coercion exists at the international 
level”4 7  is clearly untenable. When we look at what is going on in the world it is 
plain to see that states coercively limit the options and entitlements of outsiders. 
They do this by keeping outsiders from entering their territory and enjoying the 
benefits of associational membership. The immigration restrictions of states 
thereby not only deny non-members a share of the goods they dispose of but 
also often practically condemn these outsiders to live in circumstances in which 
they can hardly realize their agency. Thus, Blake’s claim, that the lack of an 
international private property law limits distributive concern to the domestic 
level, seems to put the cart before the horse. The dire straits many people live in 
at present might lead to thinking that private law should instead be reformed to 
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alleviate their situation. However, Blake’s empirical premise is undone by yet 
another observation. 
The international sphere is not exactly a coercion-free zone itself. 
International institutions like the United Nations, World Trade Organization, 
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank are known for coercively 
interfering with the political self-determination and important interests of 
states and their members. However, we do not normally think that, for example, 
since the UN bars some countries from constructing atomic bombs it therefore 
owes distributive concern to the citizens of the countries so coerced. The 
criterion of state coercion consequently appears to be over-inclusive in that it 
cannot be used to distinguish domestic coercion from coercion in other domains 
in the way Blake intends. In light of these criticisms, the empirical and 
normative components of Blake’s view both appear to be implausible. His 
argument therefore does not successfully explain why there is a moral difference 
between detrimental inequalities inside and outside states. 
Andrea Sangiovanni takes a different approach to explaining the moral 
asymmetry of domestic and trans-national detrimental inequalities.4 8  For 
Sangiovanni, what makes distributive obligations necessary is the fact that we 
depend on each other for the generation of the basic collective goods we all 
need.4 9  However, to him the relevant reciprocal cooperation that requires that 
we share a part of our resources with others exists only within states. 
Sangiovanni’s fundamental thesis about distributive justice does not derive from 
a concern that everyone can lead a good life. Rather, “the basis [of equal 
concern] is fair, rather than narrowly self-interested, reciprocity: others are 
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owed a fair return for what they have given you, just as you are owed a fair 
return for what you have given others.”5 0  Thus, for Sangiovanni the idea that we 
owe it to each other to care about how well we are doing in life is a “relational 
ideal.”5 1  As such it applies only “among those who support and maintain the 
state’s capacity to provide the basic collective goods necessary to protect  us from 
physical attack and to maintain and reproduce a stable system of rights and 
entitlements.”5 2  Internationally, Sangiovanni admits, people also cooperate with 
each other to produce things that are beneficial to them. Nonetheless, he thinks 
that global forms of cooperation are unlike domestic reciprocal schemes for the 
following reason: only the latter, but not the former, has as its aim this 
“reproduction of a legal-political authority that is ultimately responsible for 
protecting us from physical attack and sustaining a stable system of property 
rights and entitlements.”5 3   
However, the thought that a common politically-organized reciprocal 
scheme of cooperation is a necessary condition of distributive justice has its own 
problems. For one thing, we can question Sangiovanni’s normative conclusion 
that the need to reciprocate implies that cooperating citizens have to accept that 
they are under obligations of distributive justice at all. Richard Arneson warns 
that reciprocity, taken by itself, is merely a strategic idea.5 4  If I treat you fairly 
because you have been treating me fairly this can be as much a calculation about 
how to best assure future benefits for me as it can be a moral notion. Arneson 
therefore thinks that we first have to determine what reciprocity properly has to 
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consist in. This is to say that we first need to know what morality demands of us 
to know in what form we have to reciprocate. In this regard the mere fact that 
we cooperate with our co-citizens for mutual benefit provides insufficient 
evidence what the demands of morality are. We could view this cooperation as a 
mere self-interested coordination game. We might, then, think that it is enough 
to not deceive each other when cooperating. We do not therefore also have to 
think that we owe it to each other as a matter of justice to share our resources to 
make sure everyone has the goods to lead a worthwhile life. If you are starving 
or do not have enough to contribute to our joint project but I am on my own less 
productive I might be willing to help you out so as to increase simply my own 
benefits by keeping you in business.5 5   
What is worse, though, is that, secondly, Sangiovanni’s normative conclusion 
seems problematically under-inclusive: we normally think that people who lack 
the capacity to contribute to collective efforts are still owed equal respect and 
protection from various forms of inequality they might suffer from. Children, 
disabled people, sick people, and old people are often unable to add significantly 
to the production of collective goods. However, it is precisely their unequal 
position and handicaps – and not their contributions – that give us reasons to 
think they have a claim-right to our help. Concerning these cases Sangiovanni 
remarks that non-contributing persons have claims of justice to distributive 
shares that “derive from their equal worth and dignity as human beings.” 5 6  It 
seems, though, that Sangiovanni is not entitled to make this argument on the 
basis of the general justification of distributive equality that he gives. His 
explanation of this notion, we saw, rests on the idea that people contribute to 
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the generation of public goods. Rather, the fact that unproductive persons, too, 
need certain goods to live points at some more universal grounds of the 
importance of distributive justice that Sangiovanni’s account is unable to draw 
on.  
But even if we would agree with Sangiovanni that necessary reciprocal 
cooperation requires an equal return as a matter of justice, his empirical 
premise is highly questionable. As various philosophers have pointed out there 
already exist international institutions (including, for instance, the Bretton-
Woods institutions) that fulfil important services for the citizens of states. From 
the perspective of their creators, the modern nation states, the services these 
institutions perform do not seem to be merely optional but rather 
indispensable.5 7  Although Sangiovanni denies that the existing supra-national 
institutions create “the kind of interdependence that I  have argued triggers 
obligations of justice as reciprocity”5 8 , the fact that these institutions also have 
coercive power and enforce rules and property regimes (through, for instance, 
the much criticized TRIPS agreement) is a serious problem for his view. The 
coercive quality of certain global institution makes it questionable whether 
Sangiovanni’s criterion of reciprocity can determine which inequalities are 
morally objectionable and which are not. It either restricts the sphere in which 
detrimental inequalities matter too much. In this case, we saw that the result of 
applying the criterion of reciprocity as the sole reason for distributive justice is 
an exclusion of non-contributing persons. If more loosely interpreted the 
criterion of reciprocity is incapable of rendering the domestic sphere of states as 
morally special. 
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4. Thomas Nagel’s Three Conditions of Egalitarian Justice 
In his article “The Problem of Global Justice”5 9  Thomas Nagel suggests a more 
complex and promising explanation of why detrimental inequalities are only 
concerns of egalitarian justice within states. Here Nagel argues that the 
necessary and sufficient condition providing the agent-relative reason for 
distributive equality is the existence of a common coercive authority of a certain 
kind. He names three major requirements for the application of egalitarian 
justice: 
 (1) Nagel’s first claim is an instrumental one. He argues that for egalitarian 
justice to be possible there needs to be a coercive authority to enforce it in the 
first place. Although this is an instrumental condition and not an inherent 
justification of distributive justice, Nagel attaches great importance to this 
constraint that is historically associated in particular with Thomas Hobbes’s 
arguments in his Leviathan.6 0  This is because Nagel thinks that: 
Without the enabling condition of sovereignty to confer stability on 
just institutions, individuals however morally motivated can only fall 
back on pure aspiration for justice that has no practical expression, 
apart from the willingness to support such institutions should they 
become possible.6 1   
 
However, it is important to understand that in making this observation Nagel – 
unlike Hobbes – is concerned with the special issue of distributive justice. He 
does not mean to say that due to the lack of a common international authority 
no issues of justice can arise beyond the state at all. To him “standards 
governing the justification and conduct of war and standards that define the 
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most basic of human rights”6 2  are integral parts of what justice requires 
internationally.  
With respect to the more particular question of the distribution of goods, 
though, Nagel is convinced that the lack of a common global authority renders 
the administration of such a distribution impossible. To support this idea Nagel 
emphasizes the special capacities of the state to determine and realize justice, to 
which Immanuel Kant, for example, calls attention. Kant argues that the crucial 
function of sovereign government (which confers on it its special moral role and 
status) does not only consist in its administration of justice. For Kant we also 
need the government to determine what people’s just entitlements requiring 
protection are in the first place.6 3  Understood in this way the enabling role of 
the governing authority seems indeed crucial to the realization of any form of 
distributive justice.  
(2) However, Nagel’s explanation why a common coercive authority in the 
form of the state is the necessary and sufficient condition of egalitarian justice is 
not exhausted by his claim about enabling conditions. After all, if this would be 
all there is to the application of distributive justice it seems that any form of a 
common coercive authority (including hierarchically organized sport clubs, and 
membership in regulated markets) would generate obligations for people to 
redistribute resources among each other.6 4   
According to Nagel, though, we can have an obligation to care about the 
inequalities that others suffer from only if we all are non-voluntarily members 
in the same association that affects our highest-order interests. And in Nagel’s 
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view the only sort of association that fulfils this condition is the state. This is his 
crucial empirical claim. Unlike clubs or other associations in which membership 
is optional we cannot merely opt out of our society as “the system in which we 
arbitrarily find ourselves.”6 5  But non-voluntary associations like the state, we 
saw in Nagel’s first argument about government as an enabling condition, 
require coercive structures to work. Given that the services provided by the state 
regard our fundamental interests and that membership in such communities is 
non-optional we can see why the question how our association is run is of the 
utmost importance to us. The essential nature of the basic structure a state 
secures also constitutes Rawls’s motivation for formulating his principles of 
justice.6 6  In his explanation of what justice requires of the authority that 
governs a non-voluntary association Nagel appeals to Dworkin who thinks that: 
A political community that exercises dominion over its own citizens, 
and demands from them allegiance and obedience to its laws, must 
take up an impartial, objective attitude toward them all […]. Equal 
concern [is hence] the special and indispensable virtue of 
sovereigns.6 7  
 
In Nagel’s view, non-voluntary membership in common associations is 
therefore an important reason to think that distributive inequality is unjust. 
Nagel and Dworkin think that it is the role of the state, and not of individual 
members, to discharge the collective responsibilities of distributive concern. 
Consequently, a result of their accounts is that the government has to care about 
detrimental inequalities among its members in a way that it does not with 
respect to disparities that exist among others who are not its non-voluntary 
subjects.  
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(3) However, in Nagel’s view coercive authority and non-voluntary 
membership are as such not sufficient to generate obligations of egalitarian 
justice. As a third condition of the application of duties to reduce detrimental 
inequalities he points at “a special involvement of agency or the will that is 
inseparable from membership in a political society.”6 8  This is to say that for 
Nagel not just any kind of coercively ruled non-voluntary association qualifies 
as a trigger of egalitarian obligations.  
We can consider the plausibility of this claim if we bear in mind what sorts of 
regimes would otherwise have to be thought to generate duties to redistribute 
goods. We do not think that, for instance, the rule of a tyrant is the reason why 
his subjects should have duties to support each other. Likewise, racist regimes 
normally deny exactly that such concern is due to all its subjects rather than 
embracing the thought that they owe egalitarian justice to all their subjects in 
return for their rule. This is to say that on Nagel’s account only certain forms of 
collective authorities governing non-voluntary associations generate duties of 
distributive justice and concern for detrimental inequalities. To him the 
spectrum of such authorities, though, is not limited to democratic regimes. 
Instead, in Nagel’s opinion “a broad interpretation of what it is for a society to 
be governed in the name of its members”6 9  leads him to think that colonial 
rulers and regimes of military occupation as well can generate duties of 
egalitarian justice among its subjects. But such non-democratic regimes only do 
so if they fulfil strict requirements with respect to their governing of its subjects. 
A regime of this kind has to purport to not  
Rule by force alone. It [must be] providing and enforcing a system of 
law that those subject to it are expected to uphold as participants, 
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and which is intended to serve their interests even if they are not its 
legislators. Since their normative engagement is required, there is a 
sense in which it is being imposed in their name.7 0  
 
In summary, the formal structure of Nagel’s argument for considering common 
coercive authority as the agent-relative reason that generates the necessary and 
sufficient condition for the application of egalitarian justice looks like this: 
(1) If people are by birth non-voluntarily members of a political association, 
and 
(2) If the only way for people to ensure the production of indispensable 
collective goods is to entrust a common governing authority with coercive 
power, and 
(3) If therefore these people owe obedience to this authority and are not 
merely liable to being coerced by the latter, 
(4) Only then do duties of egalitarian justice arise among the members of 
this association. It is, then, the job of their ruling authority to pursue a 
reduction of the detrimental inequalities that exist among the members. 
Egalitarian justice must apply in these circumstances since “what is 
objectionable is that we should be fellow participants in a collective 
enterprise of coercively imposed legal and political institutions that 
generates […] arbitrary inequalities.”7 1   
At this point, we can summarize certain aspects of Nagel’s argument for the 
state as the exclusive domain in which detrimental inequalities can become 
matters of justice. To Nagel equal distributive concern is not an independent or 
universal value. Like Blake and Sangiovanni, Nagel thinks that this obligation is 
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of an associative nature. However, Nagel’s conception of egalitarian justice is 
more complex than both Blake’s and Sangiovanni’s in that it differs from theirs 
in crucial respects. Pace Blake, Nagel does not argue that just any form of 
coercion generates distributive duties. For Nagel only collective coercive 
authorities over non-voluntary associations that involve the will of their 
members possess this feature. Pace Sangiovanni, Nagel does not think that the 
reciprocal production of collective goods is sufficient to trigger obligations to 
reduce detrimental inequalities since “a sovereign state is not just a cooperative 
enterprise for mutual advantage. The societal rules determining its basic 
structure are coercively imposed: it is not a voluntary association.”7 2  
 
5. Rebutting Liberal Scepticism about Distributive Obligations 
There are liberal philosophers who are more cautious than Rawls, Nagel, and 
Dworkin about the possibility of deriving much more than formal egalitarian 
duties from associative accounts of egalitarian justice.  
The minimalist idea of political liberalism these sceptics advocate could be 
thought to raise a problem for our discussion about Nagel’s and other 
egalitarians’ associative conceptions of justice. The worry here is that minimalist 
liberals could be right to claim that, while Nagel might be right to limit the scope 
of distributive obligations to particular political communities, he might be too 
optimistic about the case for substantive egalitarian duties within such 
communities. And this could affect our investigation of which globally occurring 
detrimental inequalities are morally objectionable. If it is true that (as the 
minimalists hold) very little that can be said in favour of egalitarian duties prior 
to public debates within political communities, this seems also to undermine 
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many substantive egalitarian duties to remove globally existing detrimental 
disparities. It is therefore necessary to understand how egalitarian liberals react 
to minimalist liberal scepticism.  
Gerald F. Gaus, who advocates the minimalist liberal position, places great 
emphasis on the core liberal idea that “no one [...] has a basic moral right to 
impose norms on another through legislation.”7 3  It is indeed an indispensable 
element of any contemporary moral or political theory to start from the 
assumption that, from a moral perspective, we are all equally important and 
that no one has a natural right to rule others. It took mankind almost all of 
human history to arrive at this premise although it is still not universally 
endorsed. But among political philosophers it is now common sense that, 
without further justification, none of us is naturally entitled to an ascription of 
greater moral worth and powers to rule others than anyone else; thus, 
philosophers reject, for instance, the idea of a divine right of kings. Yet, Rawls 
and Gaus hold that what can function as a moral justification of an authoritative 
scheme of common rules is that the latter meet a “certain publicity condition,”7 4  
which means that rules must be publicly justifiable and recognized.7 5   
However, people disagree about most things and, in particular, on the 
question what justice demands. As Rawls points out, “the fact of reasonable 
pluralism [is] the inevitable result of the powers of human reason at work 
within enduring free institutions.”7 6  Gaus belongs to a group of liberals who 
think that, due to this unavoidable disagreement, it is not possible to specify 
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more than a minimally demanding conception of distributive justice prior to a 
public debate about what our common rules should be. Gaus basically disagrees 
with Rawls and other egalitarians “about what [of the idea of justice] has been 
victoriously justified [that is: sufficiently well supported7 7 ] and what remains 
inconclusive.”7 8  A comparison between Rawls’s and Gaus’s position on the social 
conditions relevant for realizing basic liberties can exemplify this disagreement. 
In A Theory of Justice Rawls argues that any plausible conception of justice 
cannot rely exclusively on formal rights and duties (such as everyone’s equal 
standing with respect to the law or formal equality of opportunity ). He rather 
thinks that if we are to ensure the “fair value of [basic] liberties”7 9  we also have 
to take into account and mitigate certain factors that affect people’s exercise of 
basic liberal rights (factors, we saw at the outset of this chapter, such as health 
and wealth). Rawls’s solution to this problem is his idea of ‘democratic equality’ 
that combines the ‘principle of fair equality of opportunity’ and the ‘Difference 
Principle’.8 0  Both principles demand the guarantee of the material conditions to 
make use of basic liberties and, for this purpose, a substantive redistribution of 
material resources.  
However, Gaus is not convinced that such extensive egalitarian duties are 
justifiable. This is because, on the one hand, he is sceptical about normative 
conceptions of interpersonal equality that bypass public discussion and call for 
substantive socio-economic redistributive duties of justice.8 1  To Gaus, Rawls’s 
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Difference Principle is one such principle that rests on a contentious conception 
of equality. This conception is in turn based on particular and contentious 
notions of moral arbitrariness and moral personhood. Rawls makes the case for 
his Difference Principle by arguing that  
The higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if 
they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the 
least advantaged members of society. The intuitive idea is that the 
social order is not to establish and secure the more attractive 
prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of 
those less fortunate.8 2  
 
For Gaus, what is of crucial importance for Rawls’s principle  are normative 
assumptions of debatable cogency. So, the first reason why minimalist liberals 
like Gaus are sceptical about the possibility of justifying egalitarian duties is that 
they have their own opinion about what normative philosophical reasoning can 
achieve. While Rawls holds that such normative argument can lead us to 
plausible interpretations of what equality, arbitrariness, and personhood can 
mean independently of public discussion, Gaus believes that this way of arguing 
cannot establish many details of what these terms have to encompass prior to a 
public debate about them.   
On the other hand, though, Gaus thinks that there are justified liberal ideas 
(such as the right to private property and freedom of speech8 3 ) which constrain 
the pursuit of substantive egalitarian objectives. Gaus, for instance disagrees 
with Rawls about the status of private property. To Rawls, no definite notion or 
form of private property is part of the constitutional essentials or “the first 
principles of justice.”8 4  Gaus, on the other hand, is convinced that we can 
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philosophically justify a quite robust idea of private property that limits what 
distributive justice can demand.8 5  Consequently, for Gaus, 
The equality of moral persons is their equality qua free moral 
persons: it is not a substantive principle of moral equality but a 
presupposition of the practice of moral justification. [...] This is a 
modest conception of moral equality.8 6  
 
Egalitarians reply to liberal minimalism about distributive duties by drawing the 
following distinction. They agree, on the one hand, that the fact of reasonable 
disagreement makes it necessary to follow certain equality-respecting decision 
procedures when it comes to selecting and implementing collective rules. 
Egalitarians like Thomas Christiano think that  
When there are pervasive disagreements about justice, […] there is a 
way in which decisions can be made that treats each citizen publicly 
as an equal that nevertheless respects these disagreements. 
Democratic decision-making is the unique way to publicly embody 
equality in collective decision-making under the circumstances of 
pervasive conscientious disagreement in which we find ourselves.8 7  
 
On the other hand, though, egalitarians disagree with minimalist liberals 
about the relevance of disagreement if this scepticism has the point of 
denying that we can identify more and less plausible conceptions of 
distributive justice. For Rawls, there is a family of traditional “reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines”8 8  of justice that people can hold and that are 
combinable with a freestanding conception of public rules of justice. A 
freestanding conception is one that people can affirm without any 
reference to their more comprehensive views of what is good in life.8 9  
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Thus, since they constitute intelligible positions these notions of justice are 
morally inoffensive to us even if we do not agree with all their particulars.  
However, the fact that there is a whole family of justifiably enforceable 
views about justice does not preclude us from reasoning about them and 
accepting one of them as the best or most reasonable one. Rawls, for 
instance, thinks of his own conception of justice as fairness (that rests on a 
combination of the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the 
Difference Principle) as the most plausible conception of a theory of 
justice. But since we can distinguish between the most reasonable, 
reasonable, and unreasonable conceptions, we can also criticize the results 
of democratic elections as not delivering the outcome that seems most 
plausible to us. We can therefore find ourselves in a situation in which we 
hold conception A of distributive justice to be the best one we know of. At 
the same time, though, the majority of our fellow citizens votes for 
implementing conception B, that is also a member of the family of 
reasonable views about justice. We therefore have reasons to accept this 
decision but we can criticize it and lobby for an alternative notion of 
justice. There is furthermore some conception C (that involves calls for 
racial discrimination or slavery) that it would not be justifiable to enforce 
even if the majority of our group would vote for it.  
The point of this egalitarian response to reasonable disagreement is 
that, as philosophers – while we cannot forestall a public debate and 
selection about conceptions of justice – we can reason about which one is 
the best or most reasonable formulation of this concept. We therefore have 
to understand Rawls’s, Dworkin’s, and Nagel’s formulations of egalitarian 
theories as their attempts to describe the best possible account of what 
48 
 
egalitarian justice has to encompass. If sceptical liberals want to criticize 
such conceptions they have to enter into a normative debate about what 
implications the moral equality of persons has for our thinking about  
justice, and not merely legitimacy. Recurrence to existing disagreement 
among people cannot serve them as a way to deny the possibility or 
relevance of determining what our distributive obligations are in light of 
globally existing inequalities.  
 
6. The Core of the Associative Perspective: the Actual Practice 
View of Distributive Justice 
The most famous formulation of the egalitarian perspective is certainly Rawls’s 
Difference Principle. According to this principle, most inequalities are 
detrimental and morally objectionable and require correction via a 
redistribution of resources within a society.  
In his essay “The Diversity of Objections to Inequality”,9 0  Thomas Scanlon 
summarizes five different reasons that explain why it is important for us to 
ensure substantive interpersonal equality with respect to socio-economic goods, 
as he identifies them in the arguments of egalitarians like Rawls and Nagel. For 
Scanlon, 
The elimination of inequalities may be required in order to: 
(1) Relieve suffering or severe deprivation 
(2) Prevent stigmatizing differences in status 
(3) Avoid unacceptable forms of power or domination 
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(4) Preserve the equality of starting places which is required by 
procedural fairness. 
In addition, 
(5) Procedural fairness sometimes supports a case for equality of 
outcomes.9 1  
However, the crucial characteristic of Nagel’s view is the importance he 
attributes to existing institutions. Nagel describes the constitutive relationship 
he holds exists between actual institutions and obligations of egalitarian justice 
when he asserts that  
Sovereign states are not merely instrumental for realizing the 
preinstitutional value of justice among human beings. Instead, their 
existence is precisely what gives the value of justice its application, by 
putting the fellow citizens of a sovereign state into a relation that they 
do not have with the rest of humanity, an institutional relation which 
must then be evaluated by the special standards of fairness and 
equality that fill out the content of justice.9 2  
 
Since in his defence of egalitarian justice as an associational idea Nagel refers to 
Dworkin’s claim about equal concern as the price to pay for ruling, it is 
instructive for us to take a look at Dworkin’s own view of egalitarian duties.  
Dworkin understands the idea of distributive justice as an “interpretive 
concept”.9 3  He argues that the obligation to display equal concern for the 
material situation and political choices of persons is not separable from the 
political communities in which these obligations are accepted. However, in 
contrast to other institutions that provide agent-relative reasons (like family or 
friendship) Dworkin emphasizes that political communities are not based on 
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“emotional bonds”9 4  or “a psychological property of some fixed number of the 
actual members.”9 5  Rather political associations like the modern state in his 
view generate special obligations due to “certain attitudes”9 6  that their members 
mutually take toward each other. Dworkin clarifies these attitudes by naming 
four features associative obligations like distributive equality must be thought to 
have by its members: 
(1) Associative obligations have to be understood as special in the sense that 
they do not apply to just anyone, for example by virtue of everyone’s 
common humanity.9 7  
(2) These obligations also have to be seen as personal so that each individual 
is thought to have these obligations towards all other members.9 8  
(3) They must furthermore consist in a general “concern for the well-being of 
others in the group.”9 9    
(4) And, finally, obligations of the associative kind have to be seen as giving 
reasons to make sure that the association’s policies show “equal 
concern”1 00  for all members. 
This is why Dworkin and Nagel think that distributive obligations presuppose a 
“shared history”1 01  among people. For them “the question of communal 
obligation [like distributive justice] does not arise except for groups defined by 
practice as carrying such obligations.”1 02  In their understanding, goals like the 
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elimination of harmful inequalities are not practice-independent or pre-
communally fixed concepts that merely require implementation in a particular 
society. By the term practice, we can understand with Rawls “any form of 
activity specified by a system of rules which defines offices, roles, moves, 
penalties, defenses, and so on, and which gives the activity its structure.”1 03  This 
is the reason why for philosophers like Nagel, Dworkin, Blake, and Sangiovanni, 
membership in a political community is not a morally arbitrary factor.  
We certainly do not choose or deserve to be the member of a particular 
society. In any event, the modern nation states as the political communities we 
are organized in merely present contingent historical developments. But as 
members of such existing political communities we have to organize our 
communal life with the help of coercively enforced rules. And such coercive 
enforcement must be justifiable to the ones who are coerced if their status as 
free and equal persons is to be respected. But the only way to justify such 
coercion, Dworkin and Nagel agree, is for the coercing institution to “show 
equal concern for the fate of every person over whom it claims dominion,” 1 04  
and such equal concern includes an equal distribution of goods. This is why 
Nagel holds that “justice is something we owe through our shared institutions 
only to those with whom we stand in a strong political relation.”1 05  What Nagel 
adds to Dworkin’s approach is the claim that citizens are twice involved in the 
egalitarian justice-requiring coercion: once as authors and once as subjects.  
Given the connection philosophers like Nagel, Dworkin, Blake, and 
Sangiovanni think exists between existing political structures and the 
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application of egalitarian justice, their approaches can be properly be thought of 
as instances of an actual practice view of distributive justice. According to the 
latter, what justice demands and how far it extends depends on actual, existing 
social practices.1 06  This consideration lies at the heart of all the associative 
theories we have canvassed so far. It is this idea Dworkin alludes to when he 
asserts that “we treat community as prior to justice and fairness in the sense 
that questions of justice and fairness are regarded as questions of what would be 
fair or just within a particular political group.”1 07  Also for Gaus, the need for 
common political structures therefore warrants “a bias toward the actual.” 1 08  
This bias is ultimately the reason why the theories we discussed limit the scope 
of egalitarian justice to the domestic sphere of states.  
 
7. Nagel’s Pessimistic Outlook on Global Distributive Justice  
The feature about the state that Nagel highlights (that it is a community in 
which common moral rules have to be justified and enforced by a common 
authority) is a condition of distributive justice that cannot as easily be dismissed 
as the criterions offered by Blake and Sangiovanni. This is important to our 
investigation about which detrimental inequalities are morally objectionable 
since Nagel’s approach constrains our understanding of what justice can 
demand. His actual practice view of distributive justice has, for instance, far-
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reaching implications with respect to trans-nationally occurring detrimental 
inequalities.  
As we saw, Nagel thinks that “the kind of all-encompassing collective 
practice or institution that is capable of being just in the primary sense can only 
exist under sovereign government. [And that] it is only the operation of such a 
system that one can judge to be just or unjust.”1 09  Consequently to him the 
distributive obligations members of one community can be thought to owe to 
persons outside their association are limited to “humanitarian duties.” 1 1 0  But for 
Nagel, this crucially also implies that states cannot be forced or reasonably 
required to establish international authorities that would generate duties to 
reduce detrimental international inequalities. Nagel is unambiguous about this 
point, which becomes clear with his assertion that “there is no obligation to 
enter into [an egalitarian justice-triggering] relation with those to whom we do 
not yet have it, thereby acquiring those obligations toward them.”1 1 1  As Darrel 
Moellendorf puts it, Nagel “is denying both that the moral duties that exist in 
virtue of global poverty require reforming current international institutions or 
building new global ones and that any moral duties exist at all in virtue of deep 
global inequality.”1 1 2  Nagel’s position is therefore similar to the one that has 
been attributed (for instance by Leif Wenar) to Rawls and his rejection of global 
egalitarian duties that he pronounces in his Law of Peoples.  
Since “global citizens” cannot be presumed to view themselves as free 
and equal individuals who should relate fairly to each other across 
national boundaries, we cannot legitimately build coercive social 
institutions that assume that they do. Indeed such coercive 
institutions would be illegitimate even in a world populated only by 
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liberal peoples all of whom accepted justice as fairness, so long as in 
that world (as in our world) the public political culture does not 
emphasize that the members of different peoples ought to relate 
fairly to one other.1 1 3  
 
While there certainly exists much on-going cooperation and various treaties 
among states, for Nagel these agreements are voluntary acquired obligations of 
states. This means that states would have to consent to taking on obligations to 
care about an equal distribution of goods beyond their own borders. On the 
actual practice view “there is a big difference between agreements or consensus 
among separate states committed to the advancement of their own interests and 
a binding procedure, based on some kind of collective authority, charged with 
securing the common good.”1 1 4  To Nagel this is even true when it comes to 
combating collective global problems like global warming and free trade. 
Although all states would “benefit from increased international authority”1 1 5  
whose job it was to overcome such issues, on the actual practice view the 
creation of global authorities cannot be thought to be mandatory for states. 
Otherwise states would acquire “increased responsibilities”1 1 6  that in his view 
need to be voluntarily acquired by the citizens of states.  
Unsurprisingly, Nagel’s outlook on the distribution of what is good for 
humans in our world is quite a pessimistic one. He holds that there is a natural 
path from an “increase and deployment of power in the interests of those who 
hold it, followed by a gradual growth of pressure to make its exercise more just, 
and to free its organization from the historical legacy of the balance of forces 
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that went into its creation.”1 1 7  This is accordingly also the development that we 
should expect the fight against global poverty and climate change to take. At this 
point, however, it seems advisable to step back from Nagel’s argumentation to 
contemplate the consequences of his view. To him the fact that 50,000 people 
die each day due to poverty-related causes1 1 8  is a “disaster from a more broadly 
humanitarian point of view.”1 1 9  However, we might want to be sceptical of 
Nagel’s undemanding view of what distributive justice requires of us in the face 
of the staggering inequalities that exist worldwide. We might instead want to 
assess the lack of a common coercive authority in the global sphere in another 
way. Why should we not think that, given that existing inequalities among 
people in this world are so harmful to many, this lack of authority constitutes 
itself a gross injustice? 
 
8. Why We have to take Nagel’s Three Premises Seriously  
Since Nagel highlights important aspects about distributive justice and its 
connection with political authority we have to evaluate his argument that 
distributive justice is an agent-relative obligation exclusive to co-citizens of 
states. But even when we are willing to accept Nagel’s three premises as points 
of departure we have to note that they are not uncontroversial. In what follows 
we will briefly consider some objections other philosophers might want to raise 
against Nagel’s three conditions of the application of distributive principles of 
justice.  
Sangiovanni, for instance, argues against Nagel’s claim that (1) distributive 
justice requires sovereign government as an enabling condition. He thinks, to 
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the contrary, that “coercion is not a necessary condition for equality as a 
demand of justice to apply.”1 2 0  In his hypothetical scenario, in which an attack 
has disabled all coercive mechanisms of a state, Sangiovanni claims that the law 
would be upheld by the citizens of that state since it would “still earn most 
people’s respect”1 2 1  if it would continue to safeguard essential public goods. 
This, however, is to assume that the production of collective goods does not 
require “the coordinated conduct of large numbers of people, which cannot be 
achieved without law backed up by a monopoly of force”1 2 2  in the first place, a 
claim for which it is hard to find empirical evidence.  
In a similar vein, Darrel Moellendorf refers to Rawls’s account of institutions 
(among which he counts et al. parliaments and markets but also promises, 
games and rituals1 2 3 ) to argue that “a public system of rules need be neither 
written nor legislated by an official body.”1 2 4  To Moellendorf legal coercion is 
but one sort of arrangement that can force people to behave in certain ways. 
Referring to Karl Marx’s critique of political economy 1 2 5  he wants to raise 
awareness of the fact that social relations that involve unequally distributed 
bargaining power can also limit our options as agents and therefore require 
justification. While this observation is certainly correct it does not show that 
coercive authority is not necessary for the realization of distributive justice. It 
seems difficult for us to imagine any larger group of people that could 
coordinate their common efforts without some entity that guarantees 
compliance with the rules of cooperation. Rawls hence points out that “by 
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enforcing a public system of penalties government removes the grounds for 
thinking that others are not complying with the rules. For this reason alone, a 
coercive sovereign is presumably always necessary.”1 2 6   
Voluntarist philosophers like A. John Simmons argue against Nagel’s 
thought (2) that special obligations arise from membership in non-voluntary 
associations. Simmons holds that even in circumstances in which we are 
dependent on cooperating with each other we cannot be thought to have other 
than stringent negative obligations of non-harming to one another. As a 
voluntarist, he is convinced that we have to consent to duties that go beyond 
obligations of non-interference. Any more demanding duties would only “injure 
my natural freedom and so be impermissible.”1 2 7   
However, we can get a sense of the importance that Nagel ascribes to the 
non-voluntary nature of certain communities if we consider Serena Olsaretti’s 
discussion of the concept of voluntariness.1 2 8  Much of Nagel’s argument for 
limiting distributive justice to coercively organized associations like states 
hinges upon his claim that “an institution that one has no choice about joining 
must offer terms of membership that meet a higher standard [than the terms of 
voluntary associations].”1 2 9  In her paper Olsaretti argues that, contrary to the 
assumptions of many voluntarist and libertarian philosophers, freedom is 
neither necessarily related to, nor sufficient for, voluntariness.1 3 0  Rather, what 
she thinks is really at stake with respect to the voluntariness of a choice or 
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membership in an association is whether there exists an “acceptable alternative 
to it.”1 3 1  In this sense David Hume famously criticizes John Locke’s idea that 
membership in society rests on tacit consent by employing the following 
metaphor. A passenger has been involuntarily taken aboard a ship and now is 
expected to follow the orders of its commander. Formally, the involuntary 
passenger still enjoys the freedom to leave the ship in mid-Ocean by jumping 
overboard. But this option cannot be seen as a viable alternative for him.1 3 2  
Thus, with Olsaretti we can understand that it is the “absence of an acceptable 
alternative [to membership]”1 3 3  that characterizes states as non-voluntary 
associations.  
However, there are reasons to think that the absence of acceptable 
alternatives does not make a choice problematic by itself. This becomes obvious 
when we consider a counter-example: if a society is struck by disaster and 
another one comes to its rescue, the latter’s aid does not appear to be morally 
problematic merely because the disaster-stricken people have no alternative to 
accepting the help offered.1 3 4  This would seem to be true even if the aiding 
society would ask a reasonable price for the help they deliver. In contrast, let us 
assume I offer someone a very low price for their product and no one is willing 
to offer more for it. At the same time, though, the lack of alternative offers is the 
result of my manipulation of the conditions of the exchange. Now this lack of an 
alternative seems negatively to affect the fairness of our exchange. It 
consequently seems plausible that a lack of reasonable alternatives is morally 
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problematic when the party benefitting from this situation also is responsible 
for this lack of alternatives. Within a democratic state, citizens who benefit from 
uneven arrangements are (as Nagel says) with their will implicated in the 
creation of this inequality. In such an association, everyone plays a part in 
determining how the state is run. But the state provides its citizens with 
important goods (like the rule of law, protection from outside aggression, social 
security systems, health care and educational systems, different available ways 
of life) that are vital for the citizens. It is therefore plain that the question of how 
the association is run is of fundamental importance to every member.1 3 5   
Finally, Nagel assumes (3) that it would be objectionable if our non-
voluntary association is designed by us in a way that produces arbitrary 
inequalities with respect to our material circumstances and political influence. 
This last premise, which is based on the equal moral worth of all persons, is 
Nagel’s positive argument for the application of distributive equality within 
states. Egalitarian thinkers like Rawls, Nagel, and Dworkin attribute great 
importance to the thought that “no one deserves his place in the distribution of 
natural assets any more than he deserves his initial starting place in society.”1 3 6  
If we accept their call for non-arbitrariness it becomes clear why substantive, 
and not merely formal, distributive equality is a crucial claim of egalitarian 
theories. Egalitarian theories of distributive justice are designed to address both 
the consequences of detrimental inequality and the arbitrariness of certain 
factors that influence the life prospects of persons. Nagel’s demand for 
distributive equality is one expression of these two ideas. 
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9. Rebutting a Possible Reply: Why Global Authorities do not act 
in the Name of their Subjects 
Nagel’s three premises constitute the normative element of his claim that 
distributive justice is limited to the domestic context of states. As we just saw, 
we have good reasons to take the features of the state (that in his opinion give us 
agent-relative reasons for the application of distributive justice) seriously. As an 
example demonstrates the multi-facetted structure of Nagel’s argument gives 
him various ways to defend his view and to object to non-associative views of 
justice. 
Various commentators have criticized Nagel’s empirical premise that states 
are the only coercive authorities that govern non-voluntary associations in the 
name of their subjects. These critics, such as, for example, Joshua Cohen and 
Charles Sabel, argue that existing international institutions like the World Bank, 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) are instances of such coercive authorities.1 3 7  Others, like Peter Singer 
(who points to the WTO), hold that membership in some of these institutions is 
only formally a voluntary matter. Singer holds that once a state joins one of 
these organizations, exit is no longer a reasonable option.1 3 8  According to these 
philosophers, Nagel’s principle of distributive equality should apply  not only to 
political communities like states. They argue, contrary to Nagel, that in our 
world certain economic associations also constitute non-voluntary and 
coercively imposed authoritative institutions. If sound, objections of this kind 
would show that Nagel would have to accept that his account of distributive 
                                                                 
1 37  See Joshua Cohen, Charles Sabel, “Extra Rempublicam, Nulla Justitia?”, pp. 164 -169. 
1 38 See Peter Singer, One World (New Haven: Y ale University  Press, 2004), p. 7 1 .  
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equality also applies to the participants in these economic associations.1 3 9  We 
might then think that Nagel’s argument suffers from the same empirical flaw as 
Blake’s account, namely, that his criterion of the scope of distributive justice is 
either over-inclusive and identifies contexts of application in the global sphere 
as well. However, this would be a premature conclusion. 
We saw that unlike the approaches of Blake and Sangiovanni, Nagel’s 
argument builds on a connection of separate features of the state. He is well 
aware of the on-going international cooperation in this world.1 4 0  Nagel thinks, 
though, that these global interactions do not exhibit the same quality or 
magnitude of interdependence that characterizes the relations of co-citizens of a 
particular state.1 4 1  But what looks like a dispute about mere empirical facts 
between Nagel and his critics turns out to be a disagreement that has important 
normative implications. According to Nagel, what is missing in the global arena 
is the involuntary engagement of the will of people in a sovereign trans-national 
authority. Consequently, the role of states cannot be equated to that of 
international institutions. International institutions, Nagel claims, 
Lack something […] crucial for the application and implementation 
of standards of justice: They are not collectively enacted and 
coercively imposed in the name of all the individuals whose lives they 
affect; and they do not ask for the kind of authorization by 
individuals that carries with it a responsibility to treat all those 
individuals in some sense equally. Instead, they are set up by 
bargaining among mutually self-interested sovereign parties. 
International institutions act not in the name of individuals, but in 
the name of the states or state instruments and agencies that have 
created them. Hence the responsibility of those institutions toward 
individuals is filtered through the states that represent and bear 
primary responsibility for those individuals.1 4 2  
                                                                 
1 39 See Darrel Moellendorf, “Equality  o f Opportunity  Globalized?”, Canadian Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence  19(2) (2006): pp. 301 -318; Aaron James, “Distributive Justice without 
Sovereign Rule: The Case of Trade”, Social Theory & Practice 31(4) (2005): pp. 533-559. 
1 40 See Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice”, p. 137 -140. 
1 41  See Thomas Nagel, ibid., p. 137 . 
1 42 Thomas Nagel, ibid., p. 138. 
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Therefore, in his view international institutions – unlike states, military 
occupational forces, and colonial regimes – do not purport to ask for the 
authorization of those they coerce. All we can therefore ask from such global 
organizations in Nagel’s view is to respect the negative rights of the people they 
affect. He thinks of these negative rights as valid independently of people’s 
membership in political communities. Positive obligations like distributive 
justice, though, do not generalize beyond the individual state to these joint 
ventures of mutual advantage. For Nagel we are not authors of the rules that 
organize international cooperation and are therefore also not owed equal 
concern by whoever engages in these global enterprises. 
Nagel’s other claim, that international institutions do not involve the will of 
those they coerce and do not purport to act in their name, has been rejected by 
Cohen and Sabel.1 4 3  Cohen and Sabel argue that we should interpret, for 
example, cases in which the IMF forces debtor countries to open up their 
markets as instances of this institution acting in the name and interest of the 
citizens of this country. In such cases “IMF officials insist emphatically, and are 
indeed wholly convinced, that both sets of measures will enhance the freedom 
and well-being of citizens in the borrower country.”1 4 4   
We might ask, though, if this apparent attitude of IMF officials is really 
sufficient for us to count the measures taken by the IMF in these cases as signs 
that they are acting in the name of the citizens of these counties. In Nobel 
laureate Joseph Stiglitz’s Globalization and its Discontents,1 4 5  we learn that this 
attitude often was, at best, a case of self-delusion. Stiglitz explains that the IMF 
indeed “never wanted to harm the poor and believed that the policies it 
                                                                 
1 43 See Joshua Cohen, Charles Sabel, “Extra Rempublicam, Nulla Justitia?”, pp. 166 -168. 
1 44 See Joshua Cohen, Charles Sabel, ibid., p. 167 .  
1 45 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents  (London: Penguin Books, 2002). 
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advocated would eventually benefit them.”1 4 6  The entire policies of the IMF 
during the last decades, though, were based on a “narrow ideological 
perspective – privatization was to be pursued rapidly.”1 4 7  The economies of 
many debtor countries that were forced to accept the policies recommended by 
the IMF in exchange for financial help were badly damaged by this abrupt 
opening of their markets to foreign investments. More than anything else, the 
IMF in this way served “the interests of global finance” 1 4 8  - instead of helping 
those countries that asked it for financial aid. Stiglitz therefore believes that we 
can only see “the IMF as an institution pursuing policies that are in the interests 
of creditors.”1 4 9  However, if Stiglitz is correct it is difficult to interpret the 
attitudes of IMF officials as proof that they acted in the name or interest of the 
citizens of the borrower countries when enforcing the IMF’s policies in those 
states.1 5 0  
But even if global institutions like the IMF do not act in the name of those 
they coerce we might want to ask another important question. We might ask 
whether there exists a duty on the part of the states dominating global 
institutions to make these organizations fairer to all the individuals they 
                                                                 
1 46 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, p. 208. 
1 47  Joseph Stiglitz, ibid., p. 54. 
1 48 Joseph Stiglitz, ibid., p. 207 . 
1 49 Joseph Stiglitz, ibid., p. 210. 
1 50 Nagel’s claim that colonial regimes acted in the name of their colonized subject certainly  
seems difficult to accept in light of the history of oppression and neglect that characterized 
the colonial history  of Western countries. The rule of the post Second World War military  
regime in Germany , though, clearly  seems to have been of a different quality  than the 
imposition of policies in debtor states by the IMF or the rule of colonial regimes. Post World 
War German society was left without a government after the Nazi leadership had died in the 
war or was imprisoned for having ordered crimes against humanity. While some of the goals 
of the v ictorious allies aimed to keep Germany  from arising as a future threat to other 
counties y et another time, they  saved the occupied population from  starvation and 
reinstalled the rule of (non-Nazi) law. Already for y ears after the catastrophe of the Second 
World War that was started by  Germany  the allies returned sovereign power to a German 
government. Nagel can therefore plausibly hold that after the end of the Second World War 
the allies ruled the occupied German population in its name and interest.  
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profoundly affect.1 5 1  Nagel, though, thinks that global institutions like the IMF, 
WTO, and the UN are “voluntary associations [despite the] natural 
incentives”1 5 2  to join and participate in them. While Nagel certainly would not 
want to allow for global institutions to enact policies that are harmful to people 
he clearly states that to him the distribution of the benefits these institutions 
generate is entirely subject to the bargaining process among their members. A 
demand for a harmonization of the bargaining powers of members, such as 
called for by for instance Kok-Chor Tan,1 5 3  does not advance matters here either 
since it presupposes what Nagel denies: that egalitarian justice applies outside 
the state. To him international institutions are voluntary associations that 
definitely do not act in the name of all their members.  
 
10. A Possible Instability in Nagel’s View: Egalitarian Global 
Justice via Sufficientarian International Obligations 
So Nagel limits duties of egalitarian justice to the boundaries of states because 
he thinks these obligations only arise in the course of justifying the state’s 
coercive imposition of a duty of obedience on its citizens. Nagel is not alone in 
seeing the issue that way since Dworkin agrees that  
No government is legitimate that does not show equal concern for the 
fate of all those citizens over whom it claims dominion and from 
whom it claims allegiance. Equal concern is the sovereign virtue of 
political community – without it government is only tyranny.1 5 4  
 
However, if immediate international egalitarian duties are out of the 
question, there might be yet another way for us to show that Nagel’s own 
                                                                 
1 51  For an affirmative argument to this question see, for instance, Peter Singer’s One World.  
1 52 Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice”, p. 140.  
1 53 See Kok-Chor Tan, Justice without Borders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
p. 17 6. 
1 54 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue , p. 1 . 
65 
 
view is unstable. This instability might ultimately commit him to accept 
such transnational egalitarian justice. What might put Nagel under 
pressure is reference to a presently quite widely accepted idea: that we 
have duties of justice to ensure that people have enough to secure some 
minimally decent standard of living.    
While Nagel is explicitly rejecting the idea of international egalitarian 
duties he is markedly taciturn about the other sort of obligations he thinks 
we do have toward people outside our political community. Nagel states 
that he assumes “there is some minimal concern we owe to fellow human 
beings threatened with starvation or severe malnutrition and early death 
from easily preventable diseases, as all these people in dire poverty are.”1 5 5  
He thinks that the regarding obligations, that he calls “humanitarian 
duties [,] hold in virtue of the absolute rather than the relative level of 
need of the people we are in a position to help.”1 5 6  However, what is 
unclear is whether Nagel thinks these humanitarian duties are duties of 
justice or some other type of less stringent, non-enforceable moral duties. 
Given Nagel’s rejection of duties to establish international institutions, 
which would arguably be needed to ensure global sufficiency of goods for 
everyone, it is natural for us to assume he thinks of humanitarian duties 
not as enforceable distributive obligations. In any case, though, there are 
good reasons to think a rejection of global sufficientarian duties of justice 
is an implausibly permissive and undemanding position to hold. 
This becomes clear when we look at the recent literature on the issue 
of global distributive justice. Here we find that even philosophers who 
                                                                 
1 55 Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice”, p. 118.  
1 56 Thomas Nagel, ibid., p. 119. 
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accept a view as restrictive as Nagel’s and reject global egalitarian duties 
accept such global sufficientarian obligations as a matter of distributive 
justice. David Miller, for instance, holds that “human beings are social as 
well as biological creatures, and they can be harmed by being denied the 
conditions of social existence. […] A person is harmed when she is unable 
to live a minimally decent life in the society to which she belongs.” 1 5 7  And 
Jon Mandle asserts that “if we accept that there is a human right to a 
share of resources necessary for a decent level of human functioning, this 
obviously implies that we all have a duty not to deprive people of those 
resources. But it also implies that there is a duty to assist them in securing 
such necessities.”1 5 8  Also Blake is convinced that “liberal principles can 
condemn some forms of poverty regardless of institutional relationship; 
some forms of poverty deny the very possibility of autonomous agency, 
and so can be condemned by an impartial liberalism committed to the 
autonomous agency of all.”1 5 9  Thus, regardless whether we put them in 
terms of positive or negative duties, there is a popular consensus among 
political philosophers that it would be unreasonable to deny global 
sufficientarian duties of justice.1 6 0   
If we assume that Nagel has to accept global sufficientarian duties of 
distributive justice his rejection of a duty to establish global institutions 
becomes questionable. Since Nagel’s claim that (a) “justice […] requires 
                                                                 
1 57  David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice , p. 181.  
1 58 Jon Mandle, “Distributive Justice at Home and Abroad” in Thomas Christiano, John 
Christman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy  (Oxford: Wiley -Blackwell, 
2009): pp. 408-422, p. 409. 
1 59 Michael Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy ”, p. 259.  
1 60 Global sufficiency  duties of distributive justice are also popular among researchers who 
address the complex problem of intergenerational justice. See, for example, Lukas H. Mey er, 
Dominic Roser, “Enough for the Future” in Axel Gosseries, Lukas H. Mey er (eds.), 
Intergenerational Justice  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): pp. 219-248 and Edward 
A. Page, “Justice between Generations. Investigating a Sufficientarian Approach”, Journal of 
Global Ethics 3(1) (2007 ): pp. 3-20.  
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government as an enabling condition”1 6 1  is hard to deny and, (b) we have 
global duties of (sufficientarian) justice, we therefore also have (c) duties 
to create institutions that can help us fulfil our obligations. Since Nagel’s 
position on global justice crucially depends on his denial of duties to 
establish common international institutions,1 6 2  his view becomes unstable 
as soon as we can justify trans-national distributive duties that entail 
duties to create such institutions. But if it is the case that 
(a) Institutions are necessary for the administration of justice, 
(b) We have distributive duties of justice to ensure global sufficiency, 
(c) And therefore must establish common coercive global institutions, 
It obviously follows from Nagel’s own premises that  
(d) Once these common international authorities exist its subjects owe 
each other egalitarian concern.1 6 3   
So, does Nagel after all have to accept that (even on the basis of his own 
position) existing global inequalities ultimately call for global egalitarian 
duties of justice? In the next chapter we will see that the above argument 
is not sustainable. However, the reasons the argument does not succeed 
are not ones that can provide solace for Nagel. Instead, what we shall see 
is that there are sound reasons to question the validity of Nagel’s and 
Dworkin’s fundamental claim that justified political authorities must 
display equal concern for their subjects. This observation, thus, threatens 
Nagel’s and Dworkin’s justification of egalitarian justice even within 
states.  
                                                                 
1 61  Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice”, p. 114.  
1 62 See Section Seven of this chapter. 
1 63 This conclusion is also accepted by  Jon Mandle (see Jon Mandle, “Distributive Justice at 
Home and Abroad”, p. 419). However , like Nagel, Mandle denies we have duties to create 
global institutions.  
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Chapter II: Against the Right to Rule View of 
Legitimate Authority  
 
Is Thomas Nagel correct to limit egalitarian principles of distributive justice to 
states? Do we have to accept that the pursuit of international distributive justice 
can be obligatory only when voluntarily accepted as such by states? Or could the 
idea of enforceable global sufficientarian obligations include a demand for 
regarding administrative institutions that, ultimately, have to treat their 
subjects according to egalitarian principles? 
In this Second Chapter we will discover that the core claim of Nagel’s 
argument against egalitarian global justice is flawed. The substantive 
connection, which Nagel thinks exists between equal concern and the justified 
exercise of political legitimacy, is less plausible than he thinks. Once we contrast 
the idea of equal concern as a necessary condition of political legitimacy (which 
is expressed in the phrase of the ‘right to rule’) with another notion of justified 
authority (the service conception or the ‘power to command view’ of authority), 
we will find that there are important reasons to accept the latter interpretation 
as fundamental. 
However, this insight has drastic consequences for Nagel’s actual practice 
view of distributive justice. On the one hand, the service conception of authority 
undermines the argument that global egalitarian principles follow from the 
acknowledgement of enforceable sufficientarian duties. On the other hand, the 
service conception shatters Nagel’s and Ronald Dworkin’s entire explanation 
and justification of egalitarian justice: as we will see, equal concern is not a 
necessary condition of the justification of political authority. Consequently, 
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Nagel and Dworkin cannot even ground egalitarian duties within states and we 
need to find another explanation for why distributive equality should in general 
be a duty of justice. 
 
1. What Nagel Owes Us: A Conception of Legitimate Political 
Authority  
If Nagel is right that global institutions authorized to show equal concern and 
enforce egalitarian justice can only come about voluntarily, a look at the present 
world and its recent history shows that there are reasons for pessimism.  
Existing international institutions are dominated by the interests of their 
powerful members; international agreements like the Kyoto Protocol, that are 
designed to constrain leading economies, have been opposed by these states; 
rich countries only spend a negligible part of their resources on development 
aid; the IMF recently declared that the UN Millennium Goals will almost 
certainly not be reached.1 6 4  The European Union (that is thought to be based on 
a consensus regarding certain core values) presents one of the few cases where 
some trans-national distributive responsibilities have been accepted – and these 
are much debated compromises. Is Nagel therefore correct to think that unjust 
and illegitimate institutions serving the interests of the powerful are “the 
necessary precursors [of realizing some version of global justice] because they 
create the centralized power that can then be contested, and perhaps turned 
into other directions without being destroyed?”1 6 5   
When we take into account how international institutions are dominated by 
the interests of powerful states and how much harm they have brought upon 
                                                                 
1 64 See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey /so/2010/RES042910A.htm (retrieved 
from the World Wide Web on August 15 th, 2011. 
1 65 Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 33(2) (2005): 
pp. 113-147 , p. 146. 
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poor societies,1 6 6  this seems a tragic conclusion. It would mean we could not 
directly aim at creating a more just world. Instead, we would have to accept that 
many people have to die or suffer for the self-interested motives of the powerful 
before we can hope to have the means to make the poor better off as a matter of 
justice. Since for Nagel egalitarian distributive justice is not an inherent moral 
value but the price to pay for the exercise of common coercive authority, to him 
most detrimental global inequality in this world is of moral (humanitarian) 
concern but not a matter of enforceable distributive (egalitarian) justice.1 6 7  This 
means that, if we or the governments of our rich societies fail to help the poor, 
we are not as virtuous as we should be. However, we would not act unjustly and 
our governments would not lose in legitimacy for their refusal to send gifts of 
charity to those who are badly off. 
As we discussed, it is possible for us to interpret Nagel’s argument against 
global justice in more charitable way. Nagel uses the term justice in an 
idiosyncratic way to refer only to egalitarian justice. Thus, on a more charitable 
view of Nagel, his restriction of duties of distributive justice to associations that 
are ruled by one authority can be read as merely limiting the concern for 
equality to these associative contexts. This would leave open the possibility that 
Nagel endorses a sufficiency principle of global distributive justice and only 
rejects the idea of global egalitarian justice. It would then be the case that 
                                                                 
1 66 For a description of such harm see Allen Buchanan, O. Robert Keohane, “The Legitimacy  of 
Global Governance Institutions” in Allen Buchanan, Human Rights, Legitimacy, and the Use 
of Force  (Oxford: Oxford University  Press, 2010): pp. 105 -133, pp. 119, 120. 
1 67  Nagel believes that “whatever v iew  one takes of the applicability  or inapplicability  of 
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well-off to those in extremis is clearly  called for quite apart from any  demands of justice, if 
we are not simply  ethical egoists” (Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice”, p. 118).  
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Nagel’s argument requires us to ensure that everyone, in Harry Frankfurt’s 
words, “have enough,”1 6 8  whatever that means in concreto.1 6 9   
However, the charitable view would merely make Nagel’s rejection of global 
justice somewhat less tragic. The demand of guaranteeing a distribution of 
resources sufficient for living a decent life still leaves much normative space for 
allowing huge inequalities among people that are far from being mutually 
advantageous. These disparities can have momentous consequences for people’s 
well-being and life-chances without keeping people from living decent, but not 
very rich, lives. If the charitable interpretation of Nagel’s argument is sound,1 7 0  
the question about the possibility of a plausible conception of global justice 
might lose some of its normative urgency. But, given the enormous differences 
in levels of affluence and life-chances in our world this question would not lose 
its moral importance. Nagel admits that “it may be impossible to fulfill even our 
minimal moral duties to others without the help of institutions of some kind 
short of sovereignty.”1 7 1  Still he is clear that, even if creating such emergency -
relief institutions would be a stringent duty (a thought he does not explicitly 
endorse), “there remains a clear line, [on the actual practice view], between a 
call for such institutions and a call for the institutions of global socioeconomic 
justice.”1 7 2  Detrimental inequalities, this is Nagel’s conclusion, are not and 
cannot (except voluntarily) become subject to considerations of global 
distributive (egalitarian) justice. 
                                                                 
1 68 Harry  Frankfurt, “Equality  as a Moral Ideal”, Ethics 98(1) (1987 ): pp. 21 -43, p. 21 . 
1 69 For a discussion of the shortcomings Frankfurt’s sufficientarian approach suffers from see 
Casal, Paula, “Why  Sufficiency  is Not Enough”, Ethics 117(2) (2007): pp. 296-326 and 
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economy [are] a disaster from a more broadly humanitarian point of v iew,” (Thomas Nagel, 
“The Problem of Global Justice”, p. 118) and do not establish enforceable sufficientarian 
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1 7 1  Thomas Nagel, ibid., p. 131. 
1 7 2 Thomas Nagel, ibid., p. 132. 
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However, even if we accept Nagel’s three normative premises (as well as his 
empirical claim that states currently are the only entities that exhibit the 
features necessary for the application of egalitarian distributive justice), it 
would be premature for us to end the argument about global distributive justice 
at this point. This is because, as we will see short ly, Nagel’s argument contains 
an important gap. This weak spot becomes apparent when we look closely at 
Nagel’s discussion of the state as a political authority that is crucial for the 
application of distributive equality.  
Nagel’s central argument against the idea of global egalitarian justice is that 
there is a fundamental link between the justifiability of political authorities (that 
is to say: their legitimacy) and equal concern or egalitarian justice and 
democracy. For him, this connection runs both ways. On the one hand, equal 
treatment and concern (that ideally includes giving the subjects an equal say in 
the collective decision-making process) is the price authorities have to pay to be 
morally entitled to create duties and wield power to enforce them.1 7 3  On the 
other hand, though, the implication of this condition is that, where a coercive 
political authority does not or cannot display equal concern for its subjects, it 
cannot count as morally justified.  
However, what Nagel is virtually silent about is the explanation for why we 
vest a political entity with authority in the first place, and under what 
circumstances such authority is not only morally justified but required. We can 
recall that Nagel attributes three primary functions to the state. The lat ter 
                                                                 
1 7 3 To substantiate this claim Nagel quotes Ronald Dworkin who asserts that “a  political 
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functions as: (a) the administrator of justice in a non-voluntary context, (b) the 
executor of the will of its subjects acting in their name, and (c) as the provider of 
collective goods that the subjects cannot easily forgo. At one point Nagel does 
describe the benefits he has in mind more concretely.1 7 4  However, none of these 
functions that authorities like states perform explain per se why a state needs to 
treat all its citizens with equal concern to be morally acceptable.1 7 5   
Thus, what we require to evaluate Nagel’s argument about the particular 
role of coercive authority that acts in the name of its subjects is an 
understanding of the concepts of political legitimacy, authority, and obligation. 
These three concepts are interrelated. However, the philosophical debate about 
how they are related is as old as the awareness of philosophers that these ideas 
are interconnected. In fact, the explanation of how political authorities can 
legitimately obligate their subjects is arguably as central as any question in 
political philosophy. The validity of Nagel’s rejection of the idea of global 
distributive justice therefore depends crucially on his view about what renders 
political authorities legitimate. If it can be shown that equal concern is not a 
necessary condition of legitimate political authority then this would give us 
some normative ‘leeway ’ to theorize about global justice in the following ways.  
On the one hand, equal concern and egalitarian justice would become 
normatively less important. Since authorities can be legitimate for reasons other 
than displaying equal concern, we could begin to think whether coercive (but 
non-egalitarian) authoritative institutions are morally possible (or even 
                                                                 
1 7 4 See Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice”, p. 127 . Here Nagel names “a right to 
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necessary) in the global sphere. Maybe considerations of justice demand of us to 
create them in order to promote justice globally. On the other hand, though, 
egalitarian justice might become normatively more significant. After all, equal 
concern would no longer be inseparable for existing coercive authority (as part 
of the latter’s justifiability). However, if equal concern would not be a necessary 
condition of morally justifiable political authority, we would first of all have to 
find another explanation of the moral relevance of egalitarian justice. However, 
on the basis of a new justification the significance of equal treatment might not 
necessarily be confined to the domestic rather international political arena. 
   
2. The Idea of Political Legitimacy 
When asking whether some political institution is legitimate we want to know 
two interrelated things. On the one hand, we are interested in whether this 
political authority is justified in coercively enforcing laws, authoritative 
directives, and rules in general. This “agent-justification question”1 7 6  therefore 
asks why anyone should in general be allowed to command others. 
Furthermore, we need to know whether the authority’s subjects thereby have a 
weighty moral obligation to comply with these authoritative instructions. This 
second problem, the “reasons-for-compliance question,”1 7 7  is important since 
general reasons for an authority’s legitimacy might not justify its use of coercive 
power against any particular person. As A. John Simmons points out, “if the 
[general] virtues/justifiability of institutions made by others gave those 
[particular] institutions power over me, they would “injure” my natural freedom 
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and so be impermissible.”1 7 8  The answer to one of these questions helps to 
answer the other one and vice versa. 
In the contemporary philosophical literature on this topic political 
legitimacy is often identified with a “right to rule, where this is understood as 
correlated with an obligation to obey on the part of those subject to the 
authority.”1 7 9  As will become clear shortly, Nagel’s conception of legitimate 
authority (that is based on the authority displaying equal concern for its 
subjects) is one instance of political legitimacy understood as a right to rule. 
However, in the course of this chapter we will see that there is a rarely noticed 
price to pay for accepting the right to rule as the basic or primary notion of 
political legitimacy. This price is that the right to rule conception of legitimacy 
tends to bias our thinking about legitimacy. It focuses on the interests of the 
holders of this right to rule (in particular on their interest to be treated equally 
by the authority they authorize) and thus favours democratic forms of authority . 
This notion therefore considerably constrains the range of possibly legitimate 
institutions, thereby unnecessarily limiting our discourse about the morally 
acceptable exercise of political power.  
We can see the problem most clearly in formal terms. The shortcoming of 
the Right to Rule Approach to Legitimate Authority is that it makes it 
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includes promulgating rules and attempting to secure compliance with them by  attaching 
costs to noncompliance and/or benefits to compliance”  (Allen Buchan an, O. Robert 
Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions”, p. 105) and John Tasioulas: 
“Legitimate authority  [...] is the ‘right to rule’, the exercise of which ‘binds’ its subjects by  
imposing duties of obedience” (John Tasioulas, “The Legitimacy  of International Law” in 
Samantha Besson, John Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law  (Oxford: 
Oxford University  Press, 2010): pp. 97 -118, pp. 97 , 98). 
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impossible for us to hold jointly three claims, all of which seem prima facie 
plausible. Thus, roughly stated, if we accept that 
(a) The legitimate exercise of political authority rests on a right to rule 
As well as the widely held view that 
(b) All rights are grounded in some interest of the right-holder, 
Then we preclude the possibility that 
(c) There can be non-democratic (that is to say: not equal concern showing) 
political authorities that are nonetheless fully legitimate in that they are 
able to obligate their subjects. 
We will find that there is instead a different understanding of the idea of 
political legitimacy. This alternative view sees the exercise of political authority 
as defensible primarily via appeal to a power to command. We will see that we 
can justify such a power to command when we focus on the interests of the 
subjects of an authority instead of the holders of a right to rule. What we should 
ultimately accept is that the ‘Power to Command View’ of political legitimacy 
gives us a more plausible explanation of this idea than the currently dominant 
‘Right to Rule View’.  
For Nagel’s actual practice view of justice this conclusion means that 
egalitarian distributive justice is not a necessary condition of legitimate 
authorities even within states. Therefore, the ‘Power to Command View’ forces 
us to look for an alternative justification of the importance of distributive 
equality. If we could come up with such a different explanation of the 
significance of egalitarian justice, the latter (in contrast to Nagel’s opinion) 
might not be limited to the domains of existing states.   
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3. The Right to Rule as the Standard View of Political Legitimacy 
Before we scrutinize claims (b) and (c), we need to understand why the Right to 
Rule View is such a popular characterization of the idea of political legitimacy.  
Philosophers normally think about the justification of political authority in 
terms of the effects it has on people. In this respect, it is one of Joseph Raz’s 
central insights into political authority that the exercise of political authority in 
some way changes the normative situation of those subject to the authority.1 8 0  
We can see why the right to rule is such an attractive way to understand political 
legitimacy when we consider Wesley Hohfeld’s1 8 1  well-known explanation of the 
nature and functions of rights. According to Hohfeld, every right includes at 
least one of four legal or moral advantages. Furthermore, each of these 
advantages correlates with a disadvantage of another person who is bound by 
that right. On Hohfeld’s view, then, we arrive at the following four ‘incidents’:  
(1) If you possess a claim-right this gives me a regarding duty to respect or 
fulfil that claim. 
(2) If you have a privilege or permission then this means that I have no right 
to hinder your exercise of this privilege.  
(3) If you possess a power, then I am liable to having to follow your 
instructions.  
(4) Finally, if you possess an immunity I have a correlative disability in this 
respect.  
These four possible correlations seem to show that the advantage of having a 
claim-right causes the most severe disadvantage on the part of those bound by 
                                                                 
1 80 See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University  Press, 1986), p. 99. 
1 81  Wesley  N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Juridical Reasoning 
(Clark: The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2010).  
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this right. If your right gives me a duty then I am not merely liable to be affected 
by the exercise of your right. I also am under the obligation to do or not do what 
the related duty demands of me. It is this appearance of being binding on others 
that explains why the right to rule has become popular as a defence of coercive 
political authority. When it is justified by a right to rule we can defend the 
exercise of political power against familiar charges of philosophical anarchism: 
if it is possible for an authority to oblige us to follow its instructions, we cannot 
think that it is not justified in enforcing rules on us. The stronger the obligation 
that thus arises for us the more powerful this justification of political authority 
becomes. The frequent distinction between ‘the right to rule’ and what it means 
‘to rule rightly’, on the other hand, is intended to reflect the thought that 
legitimate authority does not always have to be perfectly just to be justified. As 
John Rawls holds, “legitimacy is a weaker idea than justice and imposes weaker 
constraints on what can be done […]. [It] allows an indeterminate range of 
injustice that justice might not permit.”1 8 2  
For present purposes, it is of paramount importance that we are aware of 
and clarify a possible ambiguity of the term ‘right to rule’. According to Hohfeld, 
every advantage that has as its aim a regarding correlative disadvantage 
constitutes a right. Thus, we can speak not only of claim-rights but also of 
privileges, powers, and immunities in terms of Hohfeldian right-incidents. 
However, the Right to Rule View we are about to criticize rests on (1) the notion 
of the right to rule as a Hohfeldian claim-right that generates stringent duties of 
compliance, coupled with (2) a Hohfeldian permission-right to enforce rules. 
This Right to Rule View does not advocate a “weaker sense of the right to 
                                                                 
1 82 John Rawls, Political Liberalism  (New Y ork: Columbia University  Press, 1993), p. 428. 
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rule”1 8 3  which identifies this right with a privilege, power, or immunity 
advantage of the authority. So whenever we consider the Right to Rule View in 
this essay we are dealing with that interpretation which sees political authority 
as legitimate if it possesses a claim-right to the obedience its subjects that 
renders effective its permission to enforce rules on them.  Furthermore, as will 
be explained later, the fact that Hohfeld thinks of all four correlative incidents 
as rights does not contradict the validity of claim (b) that all rights are grounded 
in some interest of the right-holders. 
 
4.  The Problem with the Right to Rule View 
The problem with the Right to Rule View is that it biases our understanding of 
what kinds of political institutions can possess legitimacy. This becomes 
apparent as soon as we combine the right to rule, which is exemplified by claim 
(a) with the widely-held position (b) that all claim-rights are grounded in some 
interest of those holding that right. Of course, the interest theory of rights is not 
universally believed to be correct.1 8 4  However, it is not too bold a claim to point 
out that the interest theory, which asserts that “rights ground requirements for 
action in the interest of other beings,”1 8 5  presents the contemporary dominant 
interpretation of what is involved in the possession of rights. When we think of 
right-holders as the intended and entitled beneficiary of the duties of another 
person1 8 6  the interest theory of rights withstands many familiar criticisms.1 8 7  
                                                                 
1 83 Allen Buchanan, “The Legitimacy of International Law” in Samantha Besson, John Tasioulas  
(eds.), The Philosophy of International Law  (Oxford: Oxford University  Press, 2010): pp. 
7 9-96, p. 81 . 
1 84 See Hillel Steiner’s “Working Rights” in M. H. Kramer, N. E. Simmonds, H. Steiner, A Debate 
over Rights. Philosophical Enquiries  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): pp. 233 -301, 
pp. 283-301. 
1 85 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 180. 
1 86 See David Ly ons, “Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries”, American Philosophical Quarterly , 
6(3) (1969): pp. 17 3-185, p. 182. 
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Despite the existence of critics, then, it is not unreasonable to believe claim (b) 
to be correct.  
However, if we hold claim (b) alongside the idea (a) that justified political 
power depends on having a right to rule then we also have to accept that 
legitimate authority is democratic authority, a claim that leads to a denial of 
claim (c) that there can be fully legitimate non-democratic authorities. This 
becomes plausible once we consider who those people are that can be thought to 
(a) have a right to rule and (b) have a rights-grounding interest in the exercise of 
political authority.  
One group of people who do not qualify in these respects are the persons 
holding public offices of government. Gone are the days when people thought 
that certain qualities of individual persons, such as their noble birth, naturally 
gave them a claim-right to exercise power. It is no more acceptable to think that 
our elected democratic representatives have personal interests in holding their 
offices in any normatively relevant sense that could justify a claim-right of theirs 
to rule and be obeyed. It is certainly the case that our legislators personally 
benefit from the salaries and pensions attached to their offices. They also might 
enjoy being able to give orders to others. But these advantages that are 
conferred on people that hold public positions are not the reasons why we 
maintain such offices in the first place. Instead, as democratic theorists like 
Thomas Christiano point out, in a democracy it is the citizens who have an 
interest in (and thus claim-right to) their equal moral standing being publicly 
expressed, and their political opinions respected. For this reason, the citizens 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
1 87  Such as, for example, H. L. A. Hart’s objection that the interest theory  cannot account for 
cases in which a benefit is bestowed on a third party by the right of another. One example of 
this would be a situation, in which I promise to take care for y ou of y our sick child during a 
weekend that y ou have to be out of town (See H. L. A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?”, 
Philosophical Review , 64(2) (1955): pp. 17 5-191, p. 180). 
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vest their democratic assembly with the authority to enforce laws in their name 
so that they consequently owe it to each other to obey these rules.1 8 8  Thus, 
Christiano explains, it is “because all citizens have rights to an equal say and 
because the democratic assembly is the institutional method by which these 
equal political rights are exercised, [that] the democratic assembly has a right to 
rule.”1 8 9  Our interest in having our equal moral status publicly expressed cannot 
be satisfied by just any political institutional arrangement. Rather, “democracy 
constitutes a unique public realization of equality in collective decision-
making.”1 9 0   
This particular function of democratic authority tells us why holding claims 
(a) that political legitimacy depends on having a right to rule and (b) that all 
rights are grounded in some interest of the right-holders lead to a rejection of 
claim (c) that there can be fully legitimate non-democratic authorities. If our 
justification of the exercise of political power centres on the interests of the 
holders of the right to rule then only democratic citizens are plausibly thought 
to possess such a right. By casting their vote in public elections they empower an 
assembly of people who officially represent them to rule in their name and 
stead. No king, class of people, or party could, morally speaking, have a similarly 
justified interest in exercising political power. As a result, on the standard 
interpretation of political legitimacy “the idea of a right to rule [...] seems to be 
the primary notion of legitimacy while [other accounts] are dim reflections of 
this primary notion. To inquire about the legitimacy of an authority is in the 
first instance to inquire into its right to make decisions for others.” 1 9 1   
                                                                 
1 88 See Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and its Limits 
(Oxford: Oxford University  Press, 2008), p. 252.  
1 89 Thomas Christiano, ibid., p. 248. 
1 90 Thomas Christiano, ibid., p. 252. 
1 91  Thomas Christiano, ibid., p. 241. 
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What is crucial for us to understand with respect to Nagel’s account of 
political legitimacy is that, according to the latter democratic participation is 
part of what it takes for authorities to treat their subjects equally and to display 
equal concern for them.1 9 2  This becomes clear when we consider that Nagel 
mentions as one of the benefits members in legitimate political associations can 
demand from their rulers, a right to democracy.1 9 3  What this means is that the 
plausibility of Nagel’s view of political legitimacy (as well as of egalitarian 
distributive justice and possibly his rejection of global justice) is tied up with the 
invalidity of claim (c) that there can be fully legitimate non-democratic 
authorities. If claim (c) would be correct (that is to say: if non-democratic 
institutions could be fully legitimate) then equal concern is not a necessary 
condition of the legitimate exercise of coercive authority. 
But is democratic authority really the only justified way to exercise political 
power on the Right to Rule View? Democratic theorists like Christiano normally 
do not accept this strong claim. To them there also can be other forms of 
justified coercive authorities like the bureaucracy of democratic states or even 
hostile but justified occupational forces.1 9 4  However, on the Right to Rule View 
the justification of these other forms of authority can only be understood against 
the background of the full legitimacy of a democratic authority. The latter is 
based on the interests of the citizens as the real holders of the right to rule. 
                                                                 
1 92 As was already  mentioned in Chapter One (Chapter One, Section Nine) , Nagel’s claim, that 
also colonial regimes can be considered to have shown equal concern for their colonial 
subjects, is highly  problematic. Nagel’s other examples of non -democratic but legitimate 
exercises of coercive power regard the rule of post -war occupational forces. However, it 
seems questionable whether the victorious allies that occupied Germany  or Japan after the 
Second World War intended to display such equal concern, whether they  actually  did show 
such concern, and whether they even should have done so. The v ictorious powers certainly  
had moral duties toward their subdued enemies (such as not to haphazardly  kill them or let 
them starve), who waged war and brought suffering to so many  corners of the world. This, 
though, is not the same as to say  that the occupational powers had the same obligations to 
the defeated populations as to their own ones.  
1 93 See Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice”, p. 127 .  
1 94 See Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality , p. 241. 
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Other forms of justified political power, in contrast, can only be considered 
partially legitimate or justified in enforcing rules within limited respects. They 
do not possess a right to rule and must therefore be justified by reference to 
other aspects. The bureaucracy of democratic states in this sense is justified 
because it helps to realize the decisions of the actual authority – the democratic 
assembly, which is justified because it possesses the right to rule. 
 
5. Why the Notion of Derivative Rights cannot save the Right to 
Rule View 
At this point some readers are likely to object that there is another sort of right 
that could explain why political authorities might possess a genuine claim-right 
to rule after all. They might argue that as those acting in the name of their 
subjects officials possess a derivative claim-right to rule. This seems implied by 
Raz point that “some rights are held by persons as the agents, or organs of 
others.”1 9 5  We can think, for example, of cases in which a guardian acts on 
behalf of her ward.  
If such derivative rights could be shown to be authentic claim-rights that are 
not merely the transferred rights of original right-holders we might think that 
also non-democratic authorities can possess a right to rule. They could 
vicariously hold such a claim-right right to rule for their subjects even if the 
latter are not organized as a democratic people. In this way, the notion of 
derivative rights could be used to loosen the connection between democratic 
citizens as interested right-holders and coercive political authorities as justified 
in enforcing rules. Just as a ward is often not able to choose her guardian the 
subjects of non-democratic authorities as well could be thought to be obligated 
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by the claim-right to be obeyed of an authority they did not democratically 
authorize but that acts in their interest. We could then consistently hold claims 
(a), (b), and (c) at the same time and would not face the problem this chapter 
tries to solve. But how germane is the talk of derivative but genuine claim-rights 
in the context of the exercise of political power? Can we really think of the 
authority that political institutions claim to have in terms of a genuine claim-
right to rule? 
When we take a closer look at this question we find that the option of 
invoking a derivative right to rule is not a tenable one. As Raz points out, 
derivative rights are not morally fundamental rights. Instead, the latter require 
justification “on the ground that it serves the right-holder’s interest in having 
that right inasmuch as that interest is considered to be of ultimate value, i.e. 
inasmuch as the value of that interest does not derive from some other interest 
of the right-holder or of other persons.”1 9 6  Thus, the reason why we cannot 
conceive of derivative rights as genuine claim-rights is that we cannot think of 
them independently of the interests of others.  
We can better appreciate this point by drawing on Leif Wenar’s critique of 
the interest theory of rights. In his article “The Nature of Rights”1 9 7  Wenar 
argues that what speaks against claim (b) that all rights are grounded on some 
interest of the right-holder is that this theory cannot account for the rights of 
“occupational roles”1 9 8  like those of a judge. After all, Wenar claims, judges 
possess rights, such as the right to sentence criminals that cannot be grasped by 
the interest theory of rights. However, Wenar adds to this that the supposed 
                                                                 
1 96 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 192. 
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right of a judge is really a “power-right”1 9 9  that comes with this office. Hereby 
Wenar already indicates that what we deal with here is not a genuine claim-right 
of the judge. This is to say that the notion of a right is not primary to our 
understanding of the mandate of the judge. We can draw the following 
comparison: I certainly can be said to have the right to a fair trial since this 
entitlement is supposed to directly benefit me. I might be convicted at the end of 
the trial but I benefit from the fairness of the trial in contrast to being subjected 
to a show trial.  
On the other hand, when we ask why (to use Wenar’s terms) the judge has 
the right to sentence a criminal it is not enough to refer to a regarding power 
vested in him. Instead, we furthermore need to know why the judge has this 
power in the first place to understand the characteristics and authority of this 
office. In case of the judge, the answer to this question seems connected to the 
fact that it benefits society and its members to entertain a legal system that 
features authoritative office like that of a judge. In light of this comparison, we 
can see that talking about the authority of offices like guardians or judges does 
not add much to the discussion. At best, speaking of rights might highlight the 
fact that someone acts in the interest of another person. This, however, does not 
contradict but confirms the interest theory of rights. So, while public offices do 
not function on the basis of their own claim-rights they arguably work by means 
of the exercise of certain powers to change the normative situation of people.  
This is not to say, though, that agents who act in the name of others cannot 
possess their own genuine claim-rights.2 00  When I, for instance, hire a real 
estate agent he then exercises my right to buy property on my behalf. 
                                                                 
1 99 Leif Wenar, “The Nature of Rights”, p. 242. 
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Furthermore, the real estate agent possesses certain rights, such as the right to 
not be deceived by me or not to have his records manipulated by one of his 
competitors. And these rights, we can plainly see, are genuine claim-rights of 
the real estate agent who exercises a right of mine on my behalf. However, the 
justification of the agent’s claim-rights is based on his own interest qua real 
estate agent and not on my interest to acquire property. And when we ask 
further why the position of real estate agent should come with these kinds of 
rights we will have to refer to the interest of all of us as members of our society 
to have the services of such a position available to us. This is why the fact that 
agents that exercise the rights of others can have genuine claim-rights of their 
own does not contradict the interest theory  of rights, that is to say: claim (b) 
that all rights are based on some interest of the right-holder.  
All rights incidents that come with offices are grounded in a second-order 
justification: the real estate agent possesses certain claim-rights because this 
office cannot properly function without certain protections. But the reason why 
we should think it to be valuable that offices like those of a real estate agent, a 
judge, or even the President are protected in this way can only be found in the 
interest of all of us in benefiting from the services these offices provide for us. 
No one ever holds or exercises the rights of another and benefits directly from 
this exercise. If my money is lost by the real estate agent in a property fraud that 
the agent was unable to foresee, then it is I, not him, who is in a position to sue 
the fraudsters. If, on the other hand, the records of my real estate agent are 
manipulated he, and not I, is entitled to take the one who harmed him to court. 
The rights we hold qua property buyer and qua real estate agent are thus 
separate and do not benefit the other person. They only protect their holders 
because they are based on our interests as right-holders. 
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At this point, we can see why the fact that Hohfeld considers all four 
correlative incidents as instances of rights does not contradict claim (b) and the 
interest theory of rights. We cannot refer to the authority of judges or guardians 
in the same way we can to our rights as customers, citizens, or human beings. 
Instead, Hohfeldian power-advantages require reference to the interests of 
someone else other than the judge, the guardian, or in general the one 
possessing the power. It seems that we therefore have reasons not to think of 
the powers of public officeholders as genuine rights in the standard sense of this 
idea. We should instead conceive of these powers as the exercise of moral or 
legal powers. To talk about the non-fundamental, derivative rights of 
officeholders, on the other hand, leads to the following two problems. First, this 
kind of talk obscures what is really at work with respect to these forms of 
authority: the guardian’s or the judge’s authority has to be explained in terms of 
a moral power and not a claim-right. Second, we risk missing what ultimately 
justifies the exercise of authority: it is not the interest of the right-holder but 
some other consideration. To avoid confusion between claim-rights and powers, 
and between the interests of right-holders and other justificatory reasons we 
should therefore not refer to this authority as a right to rule and to be obeyed.  
This means, though, that we cannot appeal to the notion of derivative rights 
to solve the problem that holding claims (a) and (b) must lead to a rejection of 
claim (c) that non-democratic authorities can still be fully legitimate. Since it is 
not correct to think that public officials derivatively hold genuine claim-rights to 
be obeyed that render effective their permission to instruct people, non-
democratic authorities cannot possess a right to rule. The right to rule instead 
presupposes the existence of a democratic people whose members have an 
interest in having their moral equality publicly realized that gives them reasons 
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to empower some persons to rule them. The relation between democratic 
citizens and their representatives is not that of a ward to her guardian. Rather 
democratic officials possess the right to rule insofar as their citizens by vote vest 
them with this right. Thus, “the democratic assembly pools the equal political 
[claim-] rights of all the citizens into one decision-making body.”2 01   
Once we realize that there is this strong link between the right to rule as the 
justification of political authority and democratic authorization procedures we 
understand why this standard view biases our discourse about political 
legitimacy in a particular way. According to the Right to Rule View non-
democratic authorities cannot constitute primary instances of justified political 
power. They can never be as fully and inherently legitimate as democratic 
authorities that operate on the basis of a right to rule that is grounded in the 
interest of the citizens as the actual right-holders. But this shaping of the 
discussion about political legitimacy is problematic, as Nagel’s use of the Right 
to Rule View shows. If democratic legitimacy and equal concern is necessary for 
political institutions to be justified then there currently is indeed very little we 
can do about the lack of coercive international institutions. But where they are 
missing, Nagel holds, detrimental inequalities cannot be concerns of egalitarian 
justice. This is why the Right to Rule View’s narrowing of our discourse about 
legitimate authority is particularly worrying.  
 
6. The First Problem: the Denial of Legitimate Pre-Democratic 
Authority 
We just saw that an acceptance of claims that (a) political legitimacy rests on a 
right to rule and (b) all rights are grounded in some interest of the right-holder 
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bias our thinking about legitimate authority. This is because holding these two 
claims leads to a rejection of claim (c) that there can be fully legitimate non-
democratic authorities. The Right to Rule View presupposes a democratic 
people whose members actually possess such a claim-right. Non-democratic 
institutions, on the other hand, cannot vicariously hold a claim-right to rule 
because they do not embody the claim-rights of their subjects. Such institutions 
can therefore not be justified by reference to any normatively relevant interests 
– which alone can justify a right to rule. They do not realize the interest of 
people to have their moral equality publicly expressed.  
But why does the resulting rejection of claim (c) constitute a problem for the 
Right to Rule View? Could we not accept that the only fully legitimate 
authorities are democratic ones that show equal concern for their subjects and 
possess the right to rule? 
There are at least two considerations that count against thinking of 
democratic authority as the primary and uniquely inherent form of political 
legitimacy. The first problem is that a view that identifies the justified exercise 
of political authority with a right to rule rejects the very idea of fully legitimate 
non-democratic authorities. The problem with this position is that it commits us 
to saying that before the founding of the first real democracy there had never 
been any political authority that was legitimate in an unqualified sense. But if 
that was the case then previous authorities must have ruled on the basis of some 
less comprehensive and piecemeal notion of political legitimacy. As their 
subjects, we would therefore not have been under a comprehensive and general 
obligation to obey their instructions. As David Hume notices, this is quite an 
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odd thought. In his essay “Of the Original Contract”2 02  Hume aims to criticize 
the philosophical idea that makes obedience dependent on the subjects’ consent. 
He points out that throughout human history, even without consent and 
democratic authorization procedures, people have been obedient to the ruling 
authorities. Hume then goes on to say that it seems unlikely that all of these 
people were wrong to think that they ever were under a general duty to comply 
with the orders of their rulers. With respect to the supposed necessity of consent 
for the legitimate exercise of power, he notes that 
It is strange, that an act of mind, which every individual is supposed 
to have formed, and after he came to the use of reason too, otherwise 
it could have no authority; that this act, I say, should be so unknown 
to all of them, that, over the face of the whole earth, there scarcely 
remain any traces or memory of it.2 03   
 
Of course, from a moral perspective pre-democratic authorities were always 
liable to at least one criticism: they failed to express publicly the moral equality 
of their subjects and respect their opinions. This, though, is not the same as the 
claim that such non-democratic authorities were unable generally  to obligate 
their subjects.  
If we reject claim (c) that also non-democratic authorities can be fully 
justified in instructing the ones they coerce, we would have to accept the 
following: prior to the existence of democracy it was always morally permissible 
for people both to refuse to surrender their judgement to their non-democratic 
rulers and to treat their rulers’ commands as authoritative. Such subjects could 
still have acted wrongly. However, the wrongness of their actions would have 
been due to errors in their judgment. They would not have been wrong merely 
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by disobeying the instructions of their non-democratic rulers. Thus, only threats 
of punishment, and not a moral duty to obey authoritative commands, gave the 
subjects in this pre-democratic age reasons to comply with prohibitions on 
murder, theft, and fraud.  
Of course, the citizens of non-democratic states can also be thought to have 
authority-independent moral obligations to refrain from such acts. Still, the 
point here is that on the Right to Rule View, authoritative directives of non-
democratic authorities that disallow such offenses cannot be morally binding – 
which seems quite a counter-intuitive thought. So the first problem of the right 
to rule notion of political legitimacy is that a rejection of claim (c) commits us to 
the thought that fully legitimate and binding authority did not exist prior to the 
establishment of the first real democracy that showed equal concern for its 
citizens.  
 
7.  The Second Problem: Ruling out Service Conceptions of 
Authority 
The second issue is that the right to rule tends to exclude from the start other 
highly plausible and relevant accounts of what grounds political authority by 
framing the issue in a way biased in favour of democratic theories of authority. 
These alternative characterizations of authority ground the justification of the 
exercise of political power not in the interests of the right-holders but in the 
interests of those subject to an authority. What views like those of Joseph Raz 
establish is a “service conception”2 04  of political authority that is not based on a 
right to rule or democratic authorization procedures. It seems hard to deny that 
their explanations of authority offer important insights. Thus, we cannot simply 
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dismiss their importance merely because they do not square nicely with the 
Right to Rule View.  
Raz’s theory of legitimate authority has been influential and – despite the 
above quotation (in which Raz talks about political legitimacy in terms of a right 
to rule) – can be interpreted as not depending on construing legitimacy by 
appeal to the right to rule. According to his normal justification thesis: 
The normal way to establish that a person has authority over another 
person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to 
comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged 
authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged 
authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather 
than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.2 05  
 
Raz’s crucial thought here is his description of the way authorities change the 
normative situation of their subjects. The normal justification thesis, of course, 
does not sit well with the Right to Rule View since it makes no reference to the 
interests of right-holders that justify the authority. Raz’s thesis works by 
focusing on the needs of people as subjects to an authority. These interests may, 
but do not necessarily include, the subjects’ interest in having their moral 
equality publicly respected and being treated equally.2 06  This is reflected in 
Raz’s account of how authority functions.  
According to Raz, authority works by giving us “content-independent 
reasons”2 07  for action. This means that the fact that the authority is the source of 
an instruction is a reason to comply with it irrespectively of the content of that 
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order. We might, for instance, think that we have reasons to hide some of our 
money from the tax office to save it for the education of our children. However, 
since it is a legitimate government that instructs us to pay taxes, we ought to 
take the state’s instruction as giving us a sound reason to pay, and refrain from 
acting on the countervailing consideration. Raz summarizes this effect of the 
exercise of authority in his pre-emptive thesis. This holds that “the fact that an 
authority requires performance of an action is a reason for its performance 
which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, 
but should exclude and take the place of some of them.”2 08  Raz thinks that in 
this way authoritative instructions ought to replace our own reasoning about an 
issue.  
A simultaneous, secondary feature of content-independent reasons is that 
they act as “exclusionary reason[s],”2 09   which is to say that they tell us to not act 
on other reasons we might have. As the normal justification thesis explains, the 
exclusionary and content-independent force of authoritative directives is 
ultimately justified by the fact that conformity with these instructions enables us 
to do better what we have reasons to do anyway.  
Content-independent reasons, though, can take the form of exercising moral 
powers as they can play a role in invoking claim-rights. In general, we can note 
that Raz’s account tells us that an authority is usually justified in coercing its 
subjects because these instructions benefit them in some way. So on the 
characterization of authority that grounds its justification in the exercise of a 
moral power to command what counts is not that citizens exercise their rights to 
have their moral equality respected. Rather, on this alternative view, the 
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exercise of such power is legitimate because it helps realize more basic interests 
of those subject to the authority. The Power to Command View can thus accept 
claim (c) and explains why also subjects of non-democratic authorities are 
obliged to obey those rules that help to satisfy their fundamental needs.  
 
8. Why the Legitimacy of Service Authorities is not Based on 
Epistemic Superiority 
However, Raz’s account of authority (that motivates the Power to Command 
View) is not unchallenged. According to one familiar objection, which is 
presented by Christiano, the normal justification thesis is implausible because it 
relies on the assumption of a superior epistemic position that the authority 
occupies. The thought here is that, while “the theorists, whose standards are 
used to evaluate the political institutions, are also ordinary persons,”2 1 0  they 
must somehow better know the reasons that independently apply to people in 
order to make these people conform better to those reasons. For Christiano, Raz 
has to think that it is only because the authority claims to know better what 
reasons apply to us as subjects that it can claim to permissibly enforce rules on 
us. If appropriate this would certainly constitute a major problem for Raz’s 
account since such a superior standpoint would have to lie “outside the normal 
constraints and problems of human cognitive activity.”2 1 1  But given that we all 
occupy a subjective standpoint and that our point of view never rests completely 
on objective reasons it is difficult to imagine a person capable of impartially 
knowing all the reasons that apply to other persons. 
                                                                 
21 0 Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality , p. 235. 
21 1  Thomas Christiano, ibid., p. 236. 
96 
 
Jerry Gaus’s notion of public authorities as umpires2 1 2  can help us disarm 
this charge that the service conception of legitimacy has to operate on the 
assumption of authorities’ superior epistemological capacities. Gaus’s umpire 
model of authority shows that appeal to epistemic reasons (reasons for or 
against believing that something is the case) plays a secondary role (if at all) in 
the justification of political authority. What will become clear instead by 
considering Gaus’s account is that, what primarily justifies the exercise of 
authority on both the service conception and the umpire model, is that 
authorities provide coordination we cannot do without. In order to understand 
this point it is helpful for us to think in terms of (a) the situation of the people in 
an authority-free state, and (b) the services that the exercise of authority 
provides for the people once they are subjects to an authority.  
With respect to collective decision-making and law enforcement in politics, 
Gaus distinguished between two general situations we find ourselves in: 
indeterminacy and inconclusiveness of reasons.2 1 3  In both circumstances we 
require the impartial coordinating functions of political authorities acting in our 
name, although our epistemic situation as subjects is slightly different in each 
situation.  
The need for authoritative coordination that is not based on an assumption 
of epistemological superiority is particularly obvious in cases of indeterminacy. 
As Gaus explains, these situations are characterized by a “lack of 
information.”2 1 4  Unfortunately, though, the phrase ‘lack of information’ is 
ambiguous. It might either mean that the subjects lack reasons for forming 
beliefs about reasons for actions, but that such reasons might nonetheless exist. 
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These are cases of epistemic indeterminacy. Alternatively, the subjects might 
not have reasons for action because no such reasons actually exist. We can call 
this phenomenon ontic or real indeterminacy (because there really are not any 
applicable reasons). We have to analyse these cases separately to understand in 
what ways the exercise of authority changes the subjects’ situation. 
When we face epistemic indeterminacy we are uncertain about what to do 
because we do not know what we should believe is the right thing to do. As 
Dworkin points out,2 1 5  here we can believe that either option A or B is the right 
one to choose. What we lack, however, is the information required for being 
justified in decisively accepting or rejecting either option. We therefore can be 
worried that we might regret making either choice. Assuming that not choosing 
is not an option, a common authority can solve this deadlock by simply making 
either A or B a duty for us. In this way, the authority gives us content-
independent reasons to perform the option it enforces and thus coordinates our 
actions as a group.  
Cases of ontic or real indeterminacy show that such coordination can be 
required even if we know all the information relevant to a situation requiring a 
collective decision. In situations of real indeterminacy we know, for instance, 
that option A is the right goal for us to bring about. However, despite this 
knowledge we have two possible paths, φ or ψ, by which we can pursue A. We 
do not have any reasons to prefer doing φ over ψ or vice versa because there 
really are no reasons (despite our knowledge of the relevant information about 
the case) to prefer one over the other. Either way will do and the same costs are 
attached to both. In this situation, reasons, so to speak, run out. Here, as 
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Dworkin holds, neither option can be true or false.2 1 6  If we assume, though, that 
almost full compliance with either φ or ψ is needed to achieve A, then – despite 
all our knowledge – we need the decision of an authority to have reasons for 
action. By selecting and enforcing either φ or ψ an authority also in cases of real 
indeterminacy gives us indispensable content-independent reasons that 
coordinate our actions as a group. This coordination, like in the case of 
epistemic indeterminacy, does not work on the basis of epistemic reasons for 
belief about reasons for actions. It is the coordinating function itself that 
justifies the exercise of authority.  
However, as Gaus points out, there are indeed few, if any, cases of pure 
coordination games and indeterminacy.2 1 7  Instead, “our standard 
epistemological situation is an overabundance, not a paucity, of reasons.”2 1 8  
This is to say that, we normally try to decide what is best or the right choice with 
respect to a collectively important issue while being unable to take into account 
all the relevant information. It is difficult for us to arrive at a position at which 
all other alternative options have been conclusively rejected. So, normally we 
are in a situation of epistemic inconclusiveness. As individuals we are in 
addition likely to be biased by our subjective interest in our efforts to decide 
what is the best or the right choice.2 1 9  This does not preclude us from weighing 
applicable reasons and to determine one option to be the most reasonable or the 
right one for us. What the situation of epistemological inconclusiveness denotes, 
though, is the fact that normally there are a multitude of reasons available to us. 
It is therefore not unreasonable for us to arrive at different (yet defeasible) 
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conclusions (that might be overturned by other considerations we learn about) 
about the same issue.  
In such circumstances, people will argue for their selected choice because 
they think it actually to be the right or best one. But since they disagree about 
what option is the one to enforce and most of the time cannot decisively prove 
others’ opinions to be wrong, they need a kind of authority that does two things. 
It must (1) provide coordination among them by making and enforcing a 
decision on everyone, and it has to (2) justify this decision to them with 
reference to the reasons relevant to the issue.2 2 0   
Gaus thinks of such authorities as umpires2 2 1  that try optimally to apply 
rules applicable to a case. This might appear to be a primarily epistemological 
justification of authority: to apply best the rules presupposes knowledge of the 
rules and the ways in which they can be applied as well as of the probable 
consequences of applying each eligible rule. However, once we understand that, 
what we need also from umpire authorities is primarily (1) coordination, we see 
that (2) the justification requirement umpires must fulfil does not claim 
anything else than Raz’s ‘dependence thesis’. The authority is supposed to make 
decisions on the basis of “reasons which apply to the case.”2 2 2  We can expect the 
reasons that apply most definitely to the case to be the ones that are also the 
best ones relevant to the issue at hand. Thus, if the referee has to decide 
whether to award a penalty for a foul (that is to say: to decide whether and in 
what way the penalty rule applies in the situation), she is not supposed to 
instead award the team, whose member was fouled, a goal or simply to end the 
game. These options are not part of the rule that applies in this particular case. 
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However, nothing in the requirement of (2) justifiability or the ‘dependence 
thesis’ demands that the referee’s decision is an epistemically optimal one or 
one that is superior to the opinion of the subjects. Raz is clear that we also have 
weighty reasons to comply with decisions of legitimate authorities we think to 
be mistaken since otherwise the authority could not coordinate our collective 
behaviour as a group.2 2 3  Of course, if the authority keeps erring then it might 
become true that the normal justification thesis no longer applies to it, that is to 
say: that it does not make us comply better with reasons that independently 
apply to us. The authority then has lost its legitimacy. Still, also umpire 
authorities do not enforce rules on the basis that these are epistemically correct. 
As Gaus points out, even after an authoritative decision has been made, “the 
underlying epistemological controversy remains.”2 2 4  If the umpire authority 
would demand obedience with its calls on grounds of the claim that these 
decisions are the epistemically best ones possible, all dissenting subjects would 
not have reasons to comply with these instructions.  
Instead we have to understand also umpire authorities (that seek to 
adjudicate epistemic disputes) to be justified primarily because they provide 
coordinating services for their subjects. We should take this to mean that 
government can, for instance, order us to pay exactly fifteen percent income tax 
not because it necessarily knows that this is the right figure needed to finance 
our public social services. Instead we ought to pay fifteen and not fourteen or 
sixteen percent tax since in this way we can better coordinate our actions, 
thereby conforming with reasons we have independently of the authority’s 
decision (namely, to maintain public services). The overwhelming reason for 
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following an umpire’s decision is that “unless players are prepared to do so, they 
could not proceed with the game.”2 2 5  
 However, some subjects might want to risk not being able to ‘play on’ if they 
consider a decision made by an umpire authority to be morally appalling 
enough. It could be preferable for them to live in a state of anarchy than to abide 
by rules that they consider morally insufferable. On the other hand, it is 
conceivable that some people will obey political authorities for purely prudential 
reasons. They might not consider their political rulers legitimate but choose to 
obey them to avoid living in an anarchic state. But these people, we should 
think, do not follow the instructions for the right reasons. If we are to 
understand the real meaning of the service conception of legitimacy, we 
therefore have to be clear that this conception is a deeply moral notion giving us 
weighty moral reasons to go along with authoritative decision – even if we 
disagree with them on epistemic grounds. In this respect it is instructive for us 
to take a look at Rawls’s ‘principle of liberal legitimacy ’ as he outlines it in 
Political Liberalism.2 2 6   
For Rawls, people are justified in enforcing common rules on each other if 
they abide by the duty of civility  that holds that we must “be able to explain to 
one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies 
[we] advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public 
reason.”2 2 7  This is to say that, on the one hand, we have to be able to justify 
publicly the rules we enforce on others – and to refrain from simply imposing 
the rules on them. The flipside of this duty, though, is that – as long as a 
proposed principle, rule, or policy has been reasonably justified – we cannot 
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reject to comply with it on the basis that we do not agree with it. If a public 
proposal can count as reasonably justified then for Rawls we have a strong 
moral duty to go along with it even if we correctly think there is a superior 
alternative. Similarly, it seems plausible for us to think that – as long as 
authoritative service institutions choose from an evidently relevant set of best 
option – their subjects have weighty moral reasons to accept their decisions. 
And this duty applies to them even if the subjects think that there is a better 
decision to be had or that they could go on with their agenda without complying 
with the authority’s instructions.  
The important point to be taken from Gaus’s theory is that a service 
conception of authority, like Raz’s, does not need to rely on claims of epistemic 
superiority. What is central to the Power to Command View of political 
legitimacy is instead that authorities are justified if and because they solve 
important problems for us and thereby enable our collective social practices. 
Hume agrees with this explanation by asserting “if the reason be asked of that 
obedience, which we are bound to pay to government, I readily answer, because 
society could not otherwise subsist.”2 2 8   
Since maintaining many social practices is a fundamental interest we all 
share political authorities that help us in performing these tasks are not merely 
instrumentally valuable. They are rather of constitutive value for our social lives 
since without their coordinating services complex social enterprises like human 
societies would not be possible. This ‘enabling function’ of political authority 
also for Raz constitutes its primary justification. To him “a major, if not the 
main, factor in establishing the legitimacy of political authorities is their ability 
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to secure coordination.”2 2 9  It seems therefore that the Power to Command View 
is less restrictive in its justification of authority than the standard Right to Rule 
View: we all have basic interests in sustaining our social practices regardless of 
whether the authority that enables them also treats us as equals and is 
democratically elected. So, the second problem the Right to Rule Account faces 
by rejecting claim (c) is that it ignores these important and basic considerations 
that can plausibly justify the exercise of political power. 
 
9.  The Need for a New Standard Characterization of Political 
Legitimacy 
So what do the two shortcomings the right to rule view suffers from due to its 
rejection of claim (c) mean for our understanding of political legitimacy and for 
Nagel’s argument against the idea of global justice?  
As we saw, the denial of the thought that there can be fully legitimate but 
non-democratic authorities leads to serious problems. On the one hand, the 
Right to Rule View commits us to denying that before the creation of the first 
democracy anyone was comprehensively duty-bound to obey the instructions of 
their rulers. Furthermore, the Right to Rule View rules out important 
considerations that can justify political authorities that fall short of publicly 
embodying the moral equality of their subjects or treating them with equal 
concern. These problematic implications of the currently dominant 
interpretation of political legitimacy are reasons to change our understanding of 
what the concept must involve. As we saw, the Power to Command View allows 
us to take into account various important justifications of political authority that 
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the current standard view ignores. The Power to Command Account, on the 
other hand, does not commit us to a problematic rejection of claim (c). It thus 
constitutes a more plausible and superior interpretation of the idea of political 
legitimacy than the Right to Rule View.  
As a result, Raz’s service conception of authority, (and the Power to 
Command View to which it gives rise) renders implausible the connection that 
Nagel assumes exists between legitimate authority and treatment of its subjects 
with equal concern. As a consequence we are left to look for an explanation for 
why egalitarian concern matters morally even within one and the same society. 
However, it is important for us to note that the Power to Command 
Approach does not deny the validity of the claim that (a) there are democratic 
authorities that possess the right to rule. Instead it allows us to hold all three 
claims (a), (b), and (c) at a time. When they take up the Power to Command 
View, democratic theorists do not have to give up on their claim that democratic 
authorities have particular value. The only thing this view denies is that 
democratic authority is the primary notion of political legitimacy against which 
all other forms of justified authority must be measured. This latter role is the 
one that the power to command view assumes itself. It tells us that in many 
cases we can and even ought to end up with democratically authorized political 
institutions. The approach, though, does not start out with this particular way of 
justifying the exercise of political power by appealing to power-holders’ 
interests. Instead, the approach that justifies political authority by focusing on 
the interests of the subjects claims that, in order for us to make the right to rule 
a necessary condition of legitimate authority, we need to refer to further 
normatively relevant factors. These further aspects will often depend on the 
context we are considering.  
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In this sense Allen Buchanan, for instance, argues that only “where 
democratic authorization is possible (and can be pursued without excessive risk 
to basic rights) it is necessary for political legitimacy.”2 3 0  However, where such 
democratic procedures are not possible, but morally important tasks have to be 
performed, non-democratic authorities, too, can permissibly enforce rules to 
these ends. In summary, we should note that this argument provides some 
weighty considerations in favour of replacing the Right to Rule Notion with the 
Power to Command View as the standard picture of what constitutes political 
legitimacy.  
 
10. Conclusion 
With a view to Nagel’s actual practice view we can assert that equal concern and 
democratic authorization are not necessarily required for a common coercive 
institution (that acts in the name of its subjects) to be justified. This insight 
forces us to rethink entirely our position with respect to what detrimental 
inequalities are morally objectionable. Nagel’s account cannot even tell us why 
we should care about these disparities within our own societies that are ruled by 
common political authorities.  
However, this also means that the argument (proposed at the end of the 
First Chapter) for global egalitarian duties via the establishment of global 
institutions that ensure performance of global sufficientarian duties does not 
work. Even if we could show that, on his own account, Nagel should embrace 
such duties to guarantee all people resources needed to live decent lives such 
obligations would not ultimately force Nagel to accept global equal concern. The 
Power to Command View of authority explains that the required global 
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sufficientarian institutions could operate without owing their subjects equal 
concern because they enable us to fulfil important moral duties. Thus, Nagel’s 
view is not unstable – it does not collapse into a demand for global egalitarian 
duties. Matters are worse for Nagel: his justification of egalitarian concern as a 
necessary condition of legitimate authority is implausible. 
Still, this should not lead us to thinking that the only hope to justify 
stringent duties to reduce detrimental inequalities must derive from some sort 
of limited sufficientarian concern. As we will see in the next chapter, there are 
philosophers who criticize Nagel’s interpretation of egalitarian justice and the 
limitation of its scope on the basis of another explanation of the importance of 
distributive equality.   
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Chapter III: Three Views of Distributive Justice 
 
In the last chapter, we saw that Thomas Nagel’s interpretation of egalitarian 
justice as an aspect of the justification of common coercive institutions is 
implausible. Equal concern is not a necessary condition of legitimate authority. 
However, this does not mean that there are no other reasons to think that 
egalitarian duties should apply among persons. 
In this third chapter, we will take a look at the arguments of a group of 
political philosophers2 3 1  who think of egalitarian justice as an obligation arising 
for reasons other than the need to justify coercive authority. These critics 
propose a reformed practice view of justice. This view, though, stays within the 
same practice-dependent framework as Nagel’s position. Thus, their view also 
rests on the idea that the existence of some form of social practices is a 
necessary condition for the applicability of sound principles of distributive 
justice. However, as will be shown at the end of this chapter, the reformed 
practice view produces shortcomings that discredit the entire notion of a 
practice-dependence framework. We will come to understand that, for our 
conception of distributive justice to be coherent, we need to adopt a third 
perspective. According to the latter, people’s distributive entitlements must be 
thought of as being independent from existing interactions or practices. The aim 
of this chapter is thus to demonstrate that a critical examination of Nagel’s 
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restrictive view of global justice ultimately has to lead to embracing a much 
wider practice-independent view of distributive justice.  
 
1. Nagel’s Actual Practice View and Denial of Global Justice 
The service conception of political legitimacy we discovered in the last chapter 
makes it necessary for us to look for another justification of egalitarian duties of 
justice. Since equal concern is not a necessary condition of legitimizing the 
exercise of power we are at this point left with no concrete reason why equality 
in the distribution of goods should even matter within states. This does not 
mean that it can rule out in general that egalitarian justice is of importance 
globally. However, we first have to find a reason why it can be thought to matter 
at all. 
To recall, Nagel’s rejection of the idea of global egalitarian justice is based on 
the three necessary conditions of the application of distributive equality that 
make up his actual practice view of justice. The first requirement states that 
egalitarian justice requires a sovereign authority for its enforcement. The 
second one asserts that such obligations of justice can only arise among 
members of a non-voluntary association. Finally, the last condition tells us that 
the common authority of such an association has to enforce rules in the name of 
all its members. With a look to our real world, Nagel’s position regarding 
international distributive justice can then be stated as follows: 
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1. Egalitarian justice presupposes an association that members cannot leave 
at a reasonable cost and that is ruled by a common coercive authority 
that acts on behalf of its subjects.2 3 2  
2. Only existing nation states present such social contexts. Beyond the 
borders of these states all interactions constitute optional exchanges. 
This is to say that we cannot be forced to enter into international 
practices with others.2 3 3  Our transnational interactions therefore do not 
generate duties of egalitarian justice. We have of course also involuntarily 
acquired stringent duties to not harm, and moral duties to deliver aid in 
emergency situations toward people outside our political community.2 3 4  
At present there also do not exist any common coercive transnational 
institutions that act in the name of those they coerce. Nor does an 
international consensus on what distributive justice requires exist.2 3 5  
Nagel thinks that, consequently, we have to arrive at the following 
conclusions that amount to a negation of the idea of international 
egalitarian justice. 
3. There are no international authorities that could determine and 
administer transnational egalitarian justice. States do not require the 
help of any international institutions to fulfil their obligations towards 
their citizens. Furthermore, states cannot be forced to establish 
international institutions of socio-economic justice.2 3 6  Thus, greater 
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international equality has to come about voluntarily, and not through 
conformity to duties of egalitarian justice. 
However, as we saw, Nagel’s interpretation of egalitarian justice rests on a 
particular understanding of what triggers these obligations. The connection 
Nagel establishes between coercive authority and distributive equality is not 
only flawed (as the service-conception of authority shows). It also significantly 
differs from John Rawls’s understanding of what justifies egalitarian duties.  
For Rawls, egalitarian considerations are important since “they provide a 
way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they 
define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation.”2 3 7  On this Rawlsian view, there is no necessary limitation of the 
sort of social cooperation that is morally relevant to existing states.2 3 8  It is 
Rawls’s justification of equal concern that some egalitarian philosophers employ 
that, on the one hand, want to stay within the practice-dependent framework of 
justice but who, on the other hand, reject Nagel’s view of equality. We now need 
to examine their arguments to see whether these philosophers offer us a better 
explanation for why egalitarian justice matters and what detrimental 
inequalities it prohibits. 
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present an attempt to expand Rawls’s justification of egalitarian duties to the global sphere.  
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2. The Reformed Practice View of Distributive Justice  
We can understand one group of writers that raise this sort of criticism as 
advocating a reformed practice view of distributive justice. According to the 
latter, what distributive justice requires depends on what suitably reconstructed 
actual practices would look like. This line is taken by writers such as Arash 
Abizadeh, Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, Aaron James, Darrel Moellendorf, 
and Miriam Ronzoni. 
Proponents of the actual and the reformed practice view all agree on some of 
the basic essentials of the subject matter. They agree, for instance, with the 
claim that “duties of social and political justice do not exist between persons in 
virtue of their mere personhood. In absence of significant interaction, although 
other moral duties might exist, duties of justice do not.”2 3 9  Thus, the 
fundamental attitude of supporters of both views toward the particular ideal of 
equality in distribution is that the latter is an associative or practice-dependent 
ideal that presupposes existing practices among people. James expresses this 
point when he claims that  
Any principle of social (and therefore distributive) justice has as a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition of its application to the world 
some appropriate form of organizational control. Where states of 
affairs are beyond anyone’s control, individually or collectively 
principles of justice do not apply.2 4 0   
 
The flipside of this understanding of distributive justice is that in general 
distributive obligations of justice cannot arise where people do not currently  
“act in specific, coordinated ways in order to realize goods that would not 
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otherwise exist.”2 4 1  This emphasis on existing social practices is based on a 
particular reading of John Rawls’s distinction between natural duties (like the 
duty not to harm others or to support just institutions) and the associational 
duties of institutions (that include obligations of distributive justice) that he 
specifies in his A Theory of Justice.2 4 2  The former contrast with the latter, Rawls 
holds, in that they “have no necessary connection with institutions or social 
practices; their content is not, in general, defined by the rules of these 
arrangements.”2 4 3  According to the strict reading that practice-dependent 
theorists favour, all duties of distributive justice (and egalitarian justice in 
particular) presuppose existing social practices. 
However, proponents of the actual and the reformed practice views crucially 
disagree about what has to count as significant and relevant practices from the 
standpoint of distributive justice. For reasons we will encounter shortly, 
reformist writers argue that not only nation states present social contexts that 
generate distributive problems and require regulation by  principles of 
(ultimately) egalitarian justice. In order to show that there are such 
transnational interactions that must conform to higher standards than 
benevolence, reformists like James and Moellendorf employ Ronald Dworkin’s 
method for interpreting social practices.2 4 4   
According to the first step of Dworkin’s approach they aim to find “a 
common object of interpretation, by tentatively identifying a practice”2 4 5  in the 
global sphere (such as, for instance, international rule-governed bodies and 
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242 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 94. 
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cooperation). The second step of the interpretive method, then, tells us to 
determine a “purpose or aim in the practice […] that bears some rational 
relation to the structure identified.”2 4 6  Dworkinians think that in this way we 
can finally devise a way to improve the existing practice corresponding to those 
standards that “show the practice in the best light.”2 4 7  
For reformists, the main conclusion of applying Dworkin’s method to the 
world of global cooperative practices is that these create problems of 
distributive justice just like domestic social practices do. Again, it is James who 
states what (according to the reformed practice view) triggers duties of 
distributive justice. He refers to Rawls’s idea  
That an established social practice can be unjustly organized, because 
it distributes its benefits and burdens inequitably. The objection here, 
[…], is not to inequality as such but rather that a practice is not 
justifiable to those it affects when it creates inequalities among them 
while lacking the appropriate grounds for the difference in 
treatment.2 4 8  
 
The proponents of the reformed practice view therefore do not simply accuse 
Nagel of having picked the wrong social practices when explaining what our 
distributive obligations generally are. Rather (and more particularly), reformist 
writers think Nagel and other supporters of the actual practice view (like 
Dworkin) are wrong to deviate from Rawls’s justification of the very point of 
equality in distribution.  
For Rawls, equality in the distribution of the benefits and burdens of 
cooperation (where this does not waste benefits) is valuable since it is the only 
way to justly arrange the terms and condition of any cooperative efforts.2 4 9  This 
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is because “we do not deserve our place in the distribution of native 
endowments, any more than we deserve our initial starting place in society,”2 5 0  
and such arbitrary factors tend to influence our chances in life. What egalitarian 
justice is not primarily needed for in the Rawlsian theory, though, is the 
legitimization of the exercise of state coercion. So Rawls’s explanation provides 
an alternative to Nagel’s justification of egalitarian justice.  
But arbitrary factors that influence our chances in life are not present only 
within societies. In our globalized age our life chances are more than ever 
affected by what is going on outside our society and how relatively well off our 
own community happens to be. Reformist writers therefore contradict Nagel 
and condemn the existing international “institutional vacuum”2 5 1  as morally 
objectionable. In their view, the absence of coercive international authority 
causes a lack of background justice in the global sphere where our transnational 
interactions take place. Factors such as the economic power, technological 
know-how, availability of natural resources, and the geography of states 
determine the life chances of their members and allow for unequal 
opportunities to influence the terms of international practices. One simple way 
for us to understand this argument is to think of the familiar worry that the rich 
countries in our world use their might to impose their interests on the poorer 
nations. What makes this possible, reformist writers hold, is precisely the fact 
that there is no one to stop them from doing so.  
Ensuring background justice, in Rawls’s theory, is the task of a basic 
structure.2 5 2  Thus, the general idea behind the reformist critique of Nagel’s 
actual practice view is this: reformists want to demonstrate that some of our 
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transnational practices have effects on our lives as profound as domestic factors. 
However, much of this global cooperation is unregulated and therefore 
dominated by morally arbitrary factors (like the wealth or military power of 
states). They should, therefore, be regulated by international institutions that 
ensure global background justice by establishing something like a global basic 
structure. The current lack of global institutions and background justice, then, 
presents a serious moral problem and is not (as Nagel thinks) a hindrance to the 
application of egalitarian justice.2 5 3    
 
3. The Two Demands of the Reformist Critique 
The upshot of the reformed practice view consists in two crucial demands its 
advocates place on actual practice views like Nagel’s.  
The first claim of the reformists is that we have to extend the scope of 
distributive justice to all those on-going interactions that are of the same quality 
as the systematic domestic practices that require regulation by a basic structure. 
As Abizadeh puts it, “if a system of social interaction does exist, and if a basic 
structure could exist, then there ought to be a basic structure to which the 
principles of justice can be applied.”2 5 4   
Secondly, reformists consequently call for the creation of new (or the reform 
of existing) global governance institutions where these are needed to implement 
transnational distributive obligations of justice. After all, supporters of the 
reformed practice view accept Nagel’s claim that “justice […] requires 
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government as an enabling condition.”2 5 5  They merely deny that the form of 
government required has to be that of a sovereign state. James, for example, 
tells us that “we ought in some cases to create new practices as a matter of 
justice, on the grounds that existing practices require organizational 
supplementation in order to be just.”2 5 6   
This second crucial demand of the reformed practice view has potentially 
dramatic implications. James, for instance, states that “justice could well 
require global revolution.”2 5 7   And Moellendorf argues that “if distributive 
justice is addressing global inequality, redistribution within states alone is 
inadequate. […] Just global governance will require global institutions at least to 
insure that duties of distributive justice are fulfilled.”2 5 8  While all supporters of 
the reformed practice view generally disagree with Nagel on what justifies 
egalitarian duties and the need for international political authority, we find that 
this perspective comes in a weaker and a stronger version. 
 
4. The Stronger Version of the Reformist Critique 
Abizadeh, James, and Moellendorf argue for the more demanding 
interpretation of the reformed practice view. Their stronger interpretation of the 
reformist critique of Nagel is characterized by the claim that the reconstruction 
of many of our transnational practices reveals that these interactions directly 
call for authoritative regulation by standards of egalitarian distributive justice. 
Thus, on the strong version not only the scope of distributive concern but of 
egalitarian treatment is extended to certain international interactions. 
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Accordingly, it is not enough for us to ensure that internationally we interact 
with each other on justifiable terms and conditions. We furthermore have to 
equally share “the benefits of access, and the burdens of vulnerability”2 5 9  that 
come with our transnational practices. Abizadeh, James, and Moellendorf 
support this claim by pointing out that Nagel is in particular wrong about his 
empirical assumption that only states constitute non-voluntary associative 
contexts. This is to say, for these reformists, non-voluntary membership as such 
generates egalitarian duties, and not merely involuntariness in the context of 
existing coercive authorities.  
James, for instance, thinks that practices like maintaining a state and our 
global trading of raw materials, products, and capital are all undertaken for 
“common purposes, purposes that rationalize a form of regular coordination 
and its specific roles.”2 6 0  In international trade our interactions are not based on 
“mere coincidence of interests, [but on] coordinated action.”2 6 1  They therefore 
present “distinctive subject[s] of assessment”2 6 2  rather than loosely related 
exchanges. For James, it is these features of various transnational practices that 
make them the sort of systematic interactions to which standards of distributive 
justice apply. We cannot simply assess them in light of a “morality of [separate] 
transactions.”2 6 3  In James view, systematic interactions like trade (that are 
under our organizational control as participants) have to conform to the 
“morality of practices – the class of specifically collective responsibilities that a 
group organized as a practice has for the way it treats individuals.”2 6 4   
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From Rawls’s justification of the basic structure as the primary subject of 
justice we know why such associative duties include the obligations of 
reciprocity and equal concern: given the pervasive impact such social 
arrangements have on our lives and the fact that we have done nothing to 
deserve our talents or social starting position in life we ought to equally share 
the benefits and burdens of our joint ventures.2 6 5  However, contrary to Nagel’s 
assumptions, James also holds that we cannot consider many of our 
transnational interactions to be of a voluntary nature. James does not subscribe 
to the bold assumption that all national economies have already merged into 
one single global economy.2 6 6  Yet he holds that we nonetheless have to 
acknowledge that many of our transnational practices generate a “mutual but 
asymmetric dependence” among the participants.2 6 7   
Moellendorf, as well, thinks that we have to recognise normatively relevant 
affinities between our domestic and some of our transnational practices with 
others. To him these similarities mean that our systematic international 
interactions make us and our partners members of “common good 
associations.”2 6 8   In practices of this kind the rules of egalitarian justice must 
apply. Moellendorf carefully characterizes such associations as those “that 
coordinate and regulate the employment of the joint efforts of its members and 
that yield goods and powers useful to the members, goods and powers to which 
no person has a pre-associational moral entitlement.”2 6 9  For Moellendorf some 
of our interactions with foreigners resemble our relations as co-citizens in that 
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they are “(i) relatively strong [and not incidental or separate actions], (ii) largely 
non-voluntary, (iii) constitutive of a significant part of the background rules for 
the various relationships of [the participants’] public lives and (iv) [are] 
governed by norms that can be subject to human control.”2 7 0  Given these 
common features of domestic and international common good associations, 
Moellendorf thinks that both need to guarantee their participants procedural as 
well as some substantive equality, that is to say: egalitarian justice.2 7 1   
For the justification of his argument for transnational egalitarian obligations 
Moellendorf, too, relies heavily on the thought that (pace Nagel) often our 
international common good associations are non-voluntary joint ventures.2 7 2  He 
aims to convince us of this claim by asking us to imagine what realistic options a 
country in our world could have to completely isolate its economy and society 
from outside influences.  
For this purpose, Moellendorf canvasses and dismisses two potential 
isolationist strategies: de-linking and de-globalization. De-linking as an 
economic strategy “advises underdeveloped countries to de-link from 
international trade and investment relations (to whatever degree possible) as a 
means of erecting economies based upon the socialization of production.”2 7 3  The 
strategy of de-globalization, on the other hand, propagates “a world of relative 
self-sufficient states in which production is geared toward the sustenance of 
populations and adapted to the ecological constraints of local geography.”2 7 4  
Moellendorf concludes that no economic development is possible on the basis of 
either strategy.  
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However, we might think that there are important ecological reasons to not 
pursue unlimited economic growth: our planet offers a finite amount of 
resources and if we want to use them in a sustainable way there is certainly an 
upper limit to how many of its materials we can use for our economic 
development. But Moellendorf offers an additional point to show the necessity 
of a certain economic progress. To him it seems that even the richest and most 
potent economy will not be able to sustain its level of productivity and affluence 
if it chooses total isolation. It does not seem unreasonable to think that even 
having the largest single domestic market in the world would not prevent a 
society from losing a significant amount of its wealth if it is cut off from other 
markets.  
But we do not have to rely on this potentially inconclusive argument to see 
the value of economic progress. Moellendorf also points out that in a world of 
deliberately isolated societies it would be quite impossible for poor societies to 
escape poverty.2 7 5  So if we think that it is morally important to help people to 
live a life free from poverty and economic development is an effective way to 
achieve this goal we have moral reasons to value such progress. We can, then, 
agree with Moellendorf that not only from an economic but also from a moral 
perspective there is a certain unavoidability of many of our transnational 
practices.  
Abizadeh for his part arrives at the conclusion that egalitarian principles of 
justice ought to apply among all participants in some of our international 
practices by way of inference from three premises. He holds that (1) egalitarian 
justice is the standard according to which the basic structure of a community 
has to operate. Abizadeh then goes on to argue that (2) “the fact that a basic 
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structure is indispensable to background justice means that, where social 
interaction exists, there ought to be a just basic structure to secure background 
justice.”2 7 6  Finally he points out that (3) the only way for us to think that our 
own society alone is substantially affected by the effects of our practices is to 
rely on “dodgy empirical claims about the impact of foreign polities and 
nondomestic institutions on the life chances of human beings across the 
globe.”2 7 7  Thus, he concludes that in order for us to stay realistic we have to 
establish an authoritative international basic structure. The latter’s task would 
be to regulate our momentous transnational interactions and administer 
egalitarian principles among all participants.  
In summary, it is the pervasive effects that global practices have on the life of 
people nowadays plus the non-voluntariness of their participation in these 
practices that justifies global egalitarian duties for supporters of the strong 
version of the reformist view. The point of equal concern for them is (in Rawls’s 
spirit) to render actual practices justifiable to all people they affect. Its point is 
(pace Nagel) not merely the justification of existing coercive authority.   
Now that we have considered all these arguments for transnational 
egalitarian justice within intensely intertwined international practices, can we 
think of some real world instantiation of an international common good 
association? It appears that, as James suggests, the most obvious existing 
candidate example would be the European Union. The latter presents an 
integrated political community with a common law-making body (the European 
Parliament), a common executive (the European Commission), a common 
judiciary (the European Court of Human Rights), and a highly integrated 
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economy. The union thus fulfils all requirements of a common good association 
as outlined by Abizadeh, James, and Moellendorf – and arguably by Nagel. 
What the European Union lacks, at least currently, are common fiscal policies 
and schemes, common social security systems, and an equal distributive 
treatment of all citizens of its member states. At the moment numerous 
economists and politicians argue that in the wake of the debt crisis that started 
in 2010 the individual Euro-zone member states have to more closely 
coordinate their fiscal and budgetary politics. We certainly should not be blind 
to the fact that if such harmonization will take places it will do so on the basis of 
primarily (maybe even purely) economic considerations (for instance, with the 
aim to stabilize the common currency and save individual members states from 
speculations as to their bankruptcy at the international currency markets). But 
such developments would constitute a step toward greater pan-European 
egalitarian distributive justice that is required within the EU from a moral 
perspective.  
 
5. The Less-Demanding Interpretation of the Reformist Critique 
However, in order to acknowledge the force of the reformist critique of Nagel’s 
actual practice view of justice, we are not dependent upon accepting Abizadeh’s, 
James’s, and Moellendorf’s strong interpretation of this approach. There is also 
a less-demanding take on the reformed practice view that is defended by Cohen 
and Sabel as well as by Ronzoni.  
This weaker version features the core claim that our transnational common 
good practices ought to be regulated by common authoritative institutions but 
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not necessarily according to egalitarian standards of justice.2 7 8  It thus presents a 
sort of minimal interpretation of the reformed practice approach. Cohen, Sabel, 
and Ronzoni argue that the degree and kind of regulation should rather depend 
on the quality of the interactions in question. Their suggestion therefore 
corresponds with what Nagel rejects as the continuous view of justice. Nagel 
thinks the latter proposes that  
There is a sliding scale of degrees of co-membership in a nested or 
sometimes overlapping set of governing institutions. [To them] there 
is a corresponding spectrum of degrees of egalitarian justice that we 
owe to our fellow participants in these collective structures in 
proportion to our degrees of joint responsibility for and subjection to 
their authority.2 7 9  
 
Consequently, in their argument the supporters of the less-demanding 
interpretation do not focus as much on the potential unavoidability of our 
transnational interactions as proponents of the stronger version (to recall, for 
Abizadeh, James, and Moellendorf this non-voluntariness is an essential reason 
for the application of international egalitarian standards). Cohen, Sabel, and 
Ronzoni are rather concerned with the fact that our international practices 
create general interdependencies and have great effects on our lives as 
participants regardless of whether we can easily opt out of them or not. In this 
way they want to stay cautious and sensitive to the differing qualities of our 
transnational interactions.  
Ronzoni, for instance, tells us that “the mere fact of global international 
interaction does not necessarily give rise to unjust background conditions (this 
needs to be carefully assessed) and, even if it does, it does not ground the case 
that our principles of domestic social justice should automatically apply to 
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global institutions.”2 8 0  Cohen and Sabel for their part argue for an “idea of 
inclusion.”2 8 1  According to the latter, people should be able gradually to partake 
procedurally and substantially in the benefits and burdens of associations 
depending on the degree to which they are affected by, and involved in, these 
practices.2 8 2  
Just as the stronger one, the less-demanding version of the reformed 
practice view denies that the current lack of regulative international authorities 
is an obstacle to the validity of transnational distributive duties. Instead it 
focuses on the idea that justice requires us to ensure justifiable terms and 
conditions for our momentous global practices and on the moral inadmissibility 
of the existing global authority vacuum that allows for unjust terms and 
conditions. As Ronzoni remarks, “the absence of a basic structure [in form of 
international authorities] does not necessarily mean that no demands of 
socioeconomic justice apply, for they may indeed arise under the form of 
problems of background justice.”2 8 3   
Like advocates of the stronger interpretation moderate reformists are also 
convinced that the lack of a global public consensus on distributive justice does 
not preclude us from creating new or reform existing global governance 
institutions. Quite to the contrary, there are weighty reasons to think that when 
we engage in international interactions we always make normative claims on 
each other with the expectation that our partners are going to accept and respect 
these claims.2 8 4  While this attitude is ubiquitous in world politics, we also find it 
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dominating our international trade relations. One of the most strongly criticized 
normative claims in global trade (that has been given the form of a legal 
document) is the TRIPS Agreement that secures the technological advantage of 
the developed countries. And while we saw that we should resist Cohen’s and 
Sabel’s interpretation of the IMF as an agency that acts in the interest of those it 
coerced,2 8 5  the rules this institution imposed on weak economies presents a 
prime example of transnational normative claim making.  
The need to keep our normative claims and choices justifiable to each other 
provides us with further arguments in support of reformists’ call for increased 
international authority. A look in the history books and at the current global 
situation tells us that it is doubtful whether a voluntary self-monitoring of rich 
countries could guarantee that their claims on others are morally defensible and 
fair. This kind of task is best left to an authoritative authority that acts on behalf 
of those it commands. The service conception of authority shows that political 
authority is particularly necessary where people limit each other’s options but 
cannot ensure themselves that their actions are justifiable to others. It seems 
quite obvious that we should think similarly about the claims of states that 
should represent the collective choices of their citizens.  
 But the service conception of political legitimacy makes us aware of another 
shortcoming of the current global state of affairs. Reformist writers do not 
hesitate to point out that under current conditions nation states often are not in a 
good position to perform the tasks from which their authority may once have 
derived. So, when we apply Raz’s normal justification thesis to states themselves 
we find that, contrary to Nagel’s claim, the creation of new authorities is not 
merely an option for states.  
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Allen Buchanan has coined the term “reciprocal legitimation”2 8 6  for the idea 
that (given the international independencies we find ourselves in) nation states 
depend for their legitimacy (at least partly) on cooperating with certain 
international authorities that better enable them to fulfil their functions. 
Buchanan argues, for instance, that in cases in which yielding some authority to 
transnational authorities can improve a state’s performance this “state’s 
participation in international institutions can contribute to its legitimacy .”2 8 7  
However, this also means that in cases in which a state can no longer fulfil 
important services or duties without the help of international authorities its 
legitimacy as a whole “could depend upon whether it participates in particular 
international institutions.”2 8 8  Here the idea is not that global governance 
institutions would take over and away authority from nation states. Rather, the 
way we should think about this idea is that in areas where states ought to follow 
the instructions of international institutions they did not possess any effective 
authority in the first place. 
Buchanan presents some plausible instances of situations in which the 
subsidiary (that is to say: gap-filling, not replacing) authority of international 
authorities might be relevant to the legitimacy of states. One of these instances 
regards our human rights as citizens. Buchanan holds that for many states it 
might be true that they would better respect human rights if they subject 
themselves to the authority of a supra-state Human Rights Court. We can 
appreciate this example when we keep in mind that “even the most democratic, 
rights-respecting states sometimes fail to protect the rights that their own 
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constitutions accord to their citizens.”2 8 9  Here we can think of the European 
Court of Human Rights as a rather influential and successful regional example of 
such a supra-national judiciary authority. An even more powerful example 
Buchanan offers concerns states’ external legitimacy. The term regards the 
justifiability of effects of the exercise of political authority on people outside the 
authority’s jurisdiction. Buchanan’s example indicates that without proper 
checks also the most legitimate states might make choices that are unjustifiable 
to outsiders. As he points out, there is a general structural deficiency of 
democratic states in that  
The democratic commitment to the accountability of government to 
citizens tends to produce not just accountability, but near exclusive 
accountability: democratic processes and the constitutional structure 
of checks and balances create formidable obstacles to government 
taking into account the legitimate interests of anyone else. In other 
words, there is an inherent structural bias in democracy toward 
excessive partiality.2 9 0  
 
To accept this thesis we do not need to assume pure self-interestedness on the 
part of democratic citizens. The current global sphere is such a confusing arena 
that almost all individual citizens of any state will simply be in an inconclusive 
epistemic position (that is to say: they have too many relevant reasons to take 
into account for a decision) to comprehend what ramifications their actions and 
decisions as voters have on people outside their political community.  
In this fact (that democratic governments are largely hostage to the opinions 
of their voters who often do not appropriately factor in and respect the interests 
of outsiders when making their decisions) Buchanan sees a possible justification 
of certain coercive international institutions. He holds that particularly designed 
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international institutions could increase or even be constitutive of the legitimacy 
of states to the extent that they mitigate democratic partiality by ensuring fair 
international general conditions.2 9 1  This concern about the justifiability of 
political authority to people who are not subject to its rule confirms in concreto 
what the service conception model of political legitimacy already indicated in a 
more abstract way. It shows that we require impartial arbitration for the 
determination and enforcement of everyone’s justifiable interests and 
distributive entitlements - also beyond states.  
Ronzoni, as well, tries to raise awareness of certain global collective action 
problems that endanger the proper functioning (and therefore the legitimacy) of 
nation states and that call for a closing of the existing international authority 
vacuum. As she puts it, our states only possess the effective sovereignty to 
perform their tasks if they hold “both effective control over internal 
socioeconomic dynamics and reasonable freedom from external interference.”2 9 2  
However, according to Ronzoni we can detect multiple indications that in our 
present world many states have difficulties to assert their sovereignty within our 
interconnected and often interdependent global economy. This is because (at 
least in some cases) states have become almost incapable of solving the global 
collective action problems that endanger their performance of tasks that make it 
permissible for them to enforce rules and coerce people.  
Rich countries, on the one hand, suffer from the on-going uninhibited tax 
competition that occurs when they try to underbid each other ’s domestic taxation 
of companies.2 9 3  Poor states, on the other hand, are hampered in their efforts to 
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establish stable and diversified economies by the phenomenon of escalating 
tariffs.2 9 4  Since resource-rich but under-developed countries often do not possess 
the technology to process their raw materials nor the power to competitively 
develop and sell processed products in markets of affluent societies they are 
forced to specialize in selling unprocessed resources. Globally, tariffs levied on 
technology-intensive products are higher than those charged for raw materials 
since developed countries thus can defend their know-how and technological 
advantage. This keeps the economies of poor countries undiversified and 
vulnerable to economic shocks. As these examples show, the lack of authoritative 
regulation of the global economy generates dangers for the effective sovereignty 
and consequently the legitimacy of rich as well as of poor nation states. 
But even beyond these cases we find that there is no shortage of examples of 
the need to create international authorities that can ensure our justified interests 
and conditions of background justice for our transnational practices. We simply 
have to think back to the creation of the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank after the Second World War. At the time it was the most powerful 
states themselves that decided they require the help of supra-national authorities 
to stabilize their currencies and economies. Until today these institutions serve, 
among other things, these limited but vital purposes. A further instance of the 
need for increased international authoritative regulation is the organized 
international tax evasion schemes available in countries like Switzerland, 
Monaco, the Bahamas, and Liechtenstein, an issue that was left unaddressed for 
a long time. Rich people use the banker’s discretion in these counties to hide 
away their wealth from the tax authorities in their own countries by parking it in 
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bank accounts of these so-called tax havens.  Although international pressure has 
been exerted on tax haven countries it remains to be seen if trans-national tax 
evasion can be effectively stopped without the control of some agency responsible 
for monitoring and policing international private capital movements. 
Furthermore, the global financial crisis of 2008 revealed the problems of 
unregulated global capital flow and the uninhibited creation of ever more 
complex internationally mobile investment products. The danger that unchecked 
global financial speculations present for states became apparent again in the 
national debt crisis that started in 2010 (in the course of which financial 
investors bet against the solvency of whole countries, thus making it more 
expensive for them to finance loans at the international money markets) and that 
is currently threatening the existence of the Euro-zone as a whole. 
While we can consider all the aforementioned examples as supporting both 
the weaker and the stronger version of the reformed practice view we saw that 
the two differ in at least one important respect. Only the stronger interpretation 
argues for an extension of domestic egalitarian principles of justice to all our 
collectively organized and momentous transnational common good practices. 
Proponents of the weaker version, on the other hand, limit their demands to the 
establishment of conditions of background justice for our international 
interactions that do not necessarily require egalitarian concern. However, the 
weaker version also operates on the basis of the Rawlsian justification of 
distributive justice (that is about the terms and conditions of cooperation) 
rather than on Nagel’s (according to which distributions are part of what 
justifies the authority of the state). 
So, can we think of a context in which we can make sense of Cohen’s, Sabel’s, 
and Ronzoni’s demand for non-egalitarian international background justice? As 
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one such instance we could interpret the original idea behind the founding of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Much well-founded criticism has been 
levied against this institution, targeting its lack of transparency and its exclusive 
focus on the economic aspects of trade.2 9 5  These problems may even let the 
WTO appear as a failed enterprise from the moral point of view. However, the 
original idea behind this organization was that all states should be able to trade 
on formally equal terms without thereby assuming egalitarian commitments 
toward each other.2 9 6   
This original idea clearly appears more attractive from the standpoint of 
justice than a world in which trade is limited by bi-lateral trade agreements. The 
latter situation seems to resemble recent developments in world politics that see 
the WTO losing in importance. If the WTO would operate in accordance with its 
originally intended purpose it would indeed seem to contribute to an increase in 
fair background conditions for our transnational practices. The way it would 
achieve this is by institutionally enforcing what Rawls calls non-associational 
obligations such as fairness, non-harming, and mutual respect.2 9 7  We can 
therefore also make sense of Cohen’s, Sabel’s, and Ronzoni’s less-demanding 
interpretation of the reformed practice view of distributive justice as a critique 
of Nagel’s rejection of the idea of global justice.  
 
6. Why the Weaker Version approximates the Stronger Version  
However, once we take the weaker version of the reformed practice view to its 
conclusions it seems that it will ultimately have similar results as its more 
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demanding twin. That is to say that also Cohen, Sabel, and Ronzoni will have to 
acknowledge that a consistent application of their own view must in many cases 
lead to an endorsement of the demand for transnational egalitarian duties of 
justice.  
To recall, unlike Nagel, supporters of the reformed practice view of justice do 
not argue for the application of international egalitarian duties by appeal to the 
need to justify any coercive authority. Thus, even though Ronzoni argues that 
cases of background injustice “cannot be stopped by any rules of conduct that 
states can adopt; only supranational institutions can fulfil this task, by setting 
up appropriate incentives, sanctions, and counterbalances,”2 9 8  this does not 
mean that the creation of such global authorities would also generate egalitarian 
duties among their subjects. The service conception of authority explains that 
and why equal treatment is not a necessary condition of legitimate authority. So, 
just like the need coercively to enforce (possibly justified) international 
sufficientarian duties would not ultimately lead to global egalitarian obligation, 
neither do (as such) efforts to authoritatively ensure global background justice. 
Instead, at the outset out our discussion of the reformed practice view of 
justice it became clear that its proponents ground their calls for international 
distributive justice on Rawls’s explanation of this idea. We also saw that we 
should establish supra-national authorities so that they can perform morally 
vital purposes on behalf of and in the interests of those they coerce. If, as 
Buchanan and others suggest, even democratic societies have problems fulfilling 
such duties and if international authorities could help states to conform to 
them, we have weighty moral reasons to recognise that these authorities act in 
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our name.2 9 9  However, in a footnote Ronzoni rejects Abizadeh’s direct path 
from the need for a basic international structure to the transnational application 
of egalitarian concern.3 00  This is, as we saw, because she thinks that our present 
international practices are too diverse and of a differing quality so that they 
cannot all be thought to require egalitarian justice.  
Ronzoni might well be correct in thinking that (contrary to the view taken by 
Abizadeh, James, and Moellendorf) currently there exist few international 
practices that are integrated and momentous enough to warrant the application 
of this ambitious ideal. But the need to establish and ensure just terms and 
conditions for the participants in international cooperative interactions can only 
increase the degree of global interconnectedness among people from different 
countries. Many of our international practices might therefore soon actually 
require equal concern among their participants. As James asserts, 
Even if the globe is not fully integrated, […], independent or pre-
existing factors that were once relevant or non-arbitrary will 
inevitably become irrelevant or arbitrary over time. The value of local 
factors will become inseparable from the influences of global 
markets. As markets are increasingly opened, the moral trajectory is 
toward ever greater positive claims to fair gains. As integration 
increases, such claims will only increase – and perhaps increase 
quickly – over time.3 01    
 
If James is right about the development of global interactions, it is to be 
expected that in the not too distant future the demands of the stronger and the 
weaker version of the reformed practice view will all but align. 
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At this point it is worth pausing to spell out the important consequences of 
the critique that reformist writers levy against Nagel’s actual practice view of 
distributive justice. Here it is crucial for us to keep in mind that both camps 
subscribe to the idea that distributive justice is an exclusively associational or 
practice-dependent ideal that presupposes certain interactions among people. 
Supporters of both the actual and the reformed practice view therefore agree 
with Ronzoni’s claim that 
Conceptions of justice depend on the nature of the practices that they 
regulate, and therefore no state of affairs can be judged just or unjust 
unless we refer to a specific practice within it. People come to hold 
obligations of justice in virtue of the relationships they stand with 
respect to one another in specific social practices with particular aims 
and regulated by rules; and the very content of these obligations 
depends on the aims and rules of said practices.3 02  
  
Background justice is a very general idea but to everyone who holds an 
associative view of justice it is thus an empty concept in absence of on-going 
interactions among people. If our actions have no effects on other people, the 
practice-dependent perspective tells us, we have no reasons to believe that we 
owe each other anything as a matter of distributive justice. Nonetheless, 
reformist writers disagree with Nagel about the purpose and justification of 
distributive obligations and egalitarian duties in particular. As we have seen, 
this lets the reformed practice view at least avoid the shortcomings that Nagel’s 
view on global justice suffers from.  
But, as was pointed out, even if we do not agree with Abizadeh’s, James’s, 
and Moellendorf’s direct route to international egalitarian justice it is plausible 
to think that also a weaker take on the reformist critique eventually will have to 
endorse the demand for transnational distributive equality. What that means is 
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nothing less than the falsification of Nagel’s claim that “the idea of global justice 
without a world government is a chimera.”3 03  Morality does not demand of us to 
create a world state.3 04  What it does make mandatory for us, though, is the 
creation of new international political authorities that, in accordance with the 
service conception of legitimate authority, help states better to perform vital 
functions and to ensure background justice. This is because only coercive supra-
state authorities seem to be able to guarantee conditions of background justice 
for our sometimes unavoidable transnational practices. If we fill the existing 
global authority vacuum in this fashion, then (according to the reformed 
practice view) we can expect egalitarian duties of justice to arise within 
commonly organized and regulated social contexts. 
 
7. The Practice-Independent View of Justice as a Critique of the 
Reformist Position 
The revisions that proponents of the reformed practice view of distributive 
justice require of Nagel and his actual practice view are fundamental and far-
reaching. James, Moellendorf, and Ronzoni criticize the actual practice view for 
restricting any duties of distributive justice (background justice and egalitarian 
treatment) to the purpose of legitimizing coercive authority within states. On 
the basis of their own Rawlsian view of the purpose of distributive justice they 
are therefore able to establish an argument for egalitarian justice that is not 
                                                                 
303 Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice”, p. 115.  
304 The reformist critique is thus also a reply to Amartya Sen’s recent explanation of the idea of 
justice in which he holds that „perfect global justice [...] would certainly demand a sovereign 
global state, and in the absence of such a state, questions of gl obal justice appear [...] 
unaddressable.” (Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University  Press, 
2009), p. 25). With their demand for egalitarian justice beyond the state without the creation 
of a world state reformist writers deliver a serious blow to Sen’s argument that conceptions of 
justice that operate with perfect standards are unable to deal with the problem of detrimental 
transnational inequalities. 
136 
 
affected by the service conception of authority. However, we now have to ask 
whether the reformed practice view does itself capture everything that is 
important about distributive justice.   
So far both the approaches toward distributive justice we have canvassed 
(the actual and the reformed practice view of justice) are based on the 
fundamental assumption that distributive equality in all its shapes is an 
exclusively associational, practice-dependent value. This is to say that these 
views rest on the notion that conditions of background justice, and egalitarian 
duties in particular, are owed only among persons that entertain strongly 
interdependent social practices (that are unavoidable or at least have the aim to 
produce benefits while creating burdens for all involved) with each other. On 
this view, equality in the distribution of goods is not valuable as such. Rather, 
we have to aim for reducing detrimental inequalities since this is the only way to 
justify our common practices to each other. For practice-dependent theorists, 
the importance of egalitarian duties is derivative from something else, namely 
the need to justify the distribution of benefits and burdens among those affected 
by a practice who are all equally morally valuable human beings. As James 
asserts with respect to demanding egalitarian duties, “the idea is not that equal 
distribution has value as such, but rather that each participant, as a moral equal, 
has a presumptively equal claim to the fruit of the joint effort, in light of his or 
her contribution to that venture.”3 05   
However, the focus on existing practices creates problems of its own kind for 
the reformed practice view of distributive justice. This is because our organized 
interactions can (and often do) have detrimental consequences for people who 
do not take part in them. As non-participants we have to understand all those 
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people who are not members of organized social practice and are not subject to 
the purposeful rules of such cooperation. Thus, the question that needs to be 
asked is: what does the reformed practice view say about such negative 
externalities that affect non-participants in on-going practices? Do the ones 
involved in practices have obligations to those outside of their scheme?  
The following case, that we can term ‘the pollution example’, can illustrate 
the urgency of this question for us. We imagine a world that consists of only two 
islands each of which is inhabited by a distinct society, A and B respectively. 
While both societies are aware of each other’s existence they choose to not 
engage in any interaction with each other. Unfortunately , the waste of the 
industrial production of society A (of which is disposes in the sea) is carried by 
ocean currents to the waters and shores of the island inhabited by society B 
where it kills the local fish and pollutes the beaches. Can the reformed practice 
view find something morally objectionable about this damage that occurs 
outside the practice that produces it? 
James is the proponent of the reformed practice view who addresses the 
issue of detrimental effects that practices can have on non-participants most 
extensively. For James, non-participants can be thought to have one of four 
possible standings. “They may have:  
(i)  no moral claim; 
(ii)  some moral claim, but not a claim of social justice; 
(iii) claims of justice, but no special claim to equal (or otherwise fair) 
shares in comparison to participants; or 
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(iv) claims of justice, and the same claims as participants to equal 
shares.”3 06  
James thinks that from within the reformed practice perspective only the third 
option is plausible. To him “nonparticipants also have claims of social justice 
against mistreatment, [such as] for instance, domination, negligence, or 
exclusion.”3 07   
The core idea by means of which James aims to account for the protection of 
the legitimate interests of non-participants is his principle of Due Care. The 
latter states that no one – regardless of whether they are participants in a 
practice – should “be made worse off than they would have been had the 
harmful activity not been undertaken.”3 08  The principle, though, comes with an 
important qualification: “compensation when harm is done requires only 
restoration to this level of well-being.”3 09  The Due Care rule is construed as a 
principle of distributive justice and not as a ban on assault and harming others. 
This is to say that in the above pollution example the waste-spill causes 
conflicting distributive claims among the societies A and B as to the justified use 
of the waters and beaches around the island society B inhabits. So, for James it 
is clear that on the reformed practice perspective the pollution is morally 
                                                                 
306 Aaron James, “Constructing Justice for Existing Practices: Rawls and the Status Quo”, 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 33(3) (2005): pp. 281 -316, p. 309. 
307  Aaron James, ibid.”, p. 310. 
308 Aaron James, “Distributive Justice without Sovereign Rule: The Case of Trade”, p. 543.  The 
principle of Due Care is not explicitly  accepted (or even mentioned) by  other reformist 
writers. However, James’s exposition of the reformed practice v iew (of which  the principle of 
Due Care is a crucial part) presents the most elaborate version of this perspective. His 
principle of Due Care is the most detailed attempt of any  supporter of the reformed practice 
v iew to outline the implications their position has for non-participants. Therefore, the 
principle is important for our evaluation of the reformed practice v iew as a whole (the closest 
James’s fellow reformist colleague Moellendorf comes to formulating something like the 
principle of Due Care is Moellendorf ’s remark that “given the demands of justice, it is […] 
plausible to limit the persons to whom it extends. The limit I believe to be most sensible is 
the border of associations”, see Darrel Moellendorf, “Persons’ Interests, States’ Duties, and 
Global Governance”, p. 149).  
309 Aaron James, ibid., p. 543. 
139 
 
problematic because it makes outsiders worse off than they currently are. But is 
this way of evaluating the pollution case the most plausible one? Does the 
reformed practice view sufficiently take into account the interests of non-
participants? 
Philosophers that do not attach the same kind of fundamental importance to 
existing practices think that the reformed practice view does not and is therefore 
implausible. They argue that, in order for us to adequately consider what 
interests of non-participants have to be respected by the members of 
interactional schemes we have to adopt a less restricted perspective on 
distributive justice, namely a practice-independent view of distributive justice. 
According to the latter, what justice requires and how far it extends does not 
depend on existing practices but on what is feasible and required by relevant 
moral considerations.  
The central idea underlying the practice-independent view is not merely that 
of a fair distribution of benefits and burdens and just background conditions of 
existing practices. As we will see shortly, this perspective also requires us not to 
restrict non-participating others’ equal chances to advantages by the effects of 
our practices that do not directly harm them but relatively lessen their 
opportunities. Therefore, this view is more demanding than James’s principle of 
Due Care since the practice-independent view requires more than not to make 
others worse off than they presently are.  
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8. Steiner’s Left-Libertarianism as an Alternative to the 
Reformed Practice View 
Left-libertarian Hillel Steiner argues for a theory that is an instance of a 
practice-independent view.3 1 0  At the basis of his account lies the idea that all 
people have equal initial claims to the use of the Earth’s resources. 
Steiner argues that justice requires a kind of global distributive equality on 
the basis of negative duties of non-interference alone. Following John Locke, he 
holds that people have initial rights to their bodies and raw natural resources 
that are required to realize their natural freedom. Justice on the Lockean view 
entitles everyone to “acquire no more than an equal portion of such”3 1 1  
necessary external resources. Consequently, if some of us use more than our fair 
share of the Earth’s resources and thereby do not leave “enough, and as good”3 1 2  
of them for others (as is arguably the case in our world in which fifteen percent 
of the world’s population own about eighty percent of all existing wealth3 1 3 ) on 
Steiner’s view they have violated their negative “duties of initial forbearance.”3 1 4  
This over-acquisition of resources generates duties to redistribute resources 
globally so as to restitute the improper appropriation. The basic assumption 
Steiner relies on for his argument is that no one is entitled to the resources she 
has access to as a matter of having been born into a particular community.  
So Steiner holds that the fact that the initial distribution of access to natural 
resources is morally arbitrary has to mean that no one has a natural entitlement 
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to more than an equal share of the value of unimproved natural resources. 
However, reformist writers draw a very different conclusion from the same idea. 
Moellendorf, for instance, thinks that “the natural distribution [of resources 
and, among other things, talents] is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that 
people are born into society at some particular position. These are simply 
natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these 
facts”3 1 5 . James, though, clarifies what practice-dependent theorists understand 
by Rawls’s well-known claim that natural inequalities per se are neither just nor 
unjust: “in the absence of trade (and any further interaction), inequality across 
societies in total economic output, […] is not unfair to members of a worse-off 
society, since no one can claim to have had a hand in creating the social 
advantages realized in a foreign society.”3 1 6  Therefore, on the reformed practice 
view, detrimental inequalities are only of concern from the standpoint of justice 
when: (a) they are the product of human interactions and (b) they occur among 
the persons cooperating for mutual benefit.  
The differing implications of the reformed practice view of distributive 
justice and its practice-independent, left-libertarian rival become clear when we 
take up again our example of the industrial waste pollution washed ashore 
society B’s coast. Here philosophers like Steiner would not simply agree with 
reformists like James that this pollution is unjust as a negative externality of 
existing practices that makes non-participants worse off. Advocates of practice-
independent theories like Steiner would ask the antecedent question whether 
one or both societies currently make use of a fair share of their planet’s 
resources. However, such worries cannot arise from within the reformed 
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practice view according to which a distribution of resources or goods can only be 
just or unjust within the context of existing practices. Thus, for practice-
independent theories the scope of distributive justice is a lot more expansive 
than for any practice-dependent perspective.     
The problem with this way of contrasting various views about the nature and 
scope of justice is that it seems to lead us to a kind of standoff of intuitions: 
some of us think that justice simply is a practice-dependent ideal while others 
believe that by virtue of our humanity everyone is entitled to some equal 
distributive share of the world’s resources. But such external criticism of the 
reformed practice view does not seem to get us to a conclusion. 
 
9. The Quintessential Issue: The Need for Practice-Independent 
Entitlements 
 However, this apparent standoff situation changes as soon as we realize that the 
reformed practice view of distributive justice is not fully consistent, and so can 
be criticized from within. As we will see, there are a number of such internal 
problems we can identify. For the sake of simplicity we can group these issues 
into two categories: (1) the question of the moral relevance of the status quo and 
(2) the problem of diminished opportunities of non-participants in practices. 
Since the principle of Due Care is supposed to explain what participants in 
practices owe to non-participants according to the reformed practice view, the 
latter’s validity to a large extent depends on the cogency of this principle. If 
practices objectionably affect outsiders and the reformed practice view could not 
account for these problems then this would certainly impair its plausibility. To 
recall, according to James the principle of Due Care demands that practices 
make non-participants no worse off than they would be if that practice would 
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not exist. Thus, much hinges on what James can be thought to mean by the 
phrase ‘worse off’. When we ask about the best possible reading of this 
condition, though, we encounter the two aforementioned shortcomings: 
(1) The Question of the Moral Relevance of the Status Quo 
Since the principle of Due Care tells us not to make anyone worse off by our 
practices than they are without the effects of these practices this implies that, on 
the reformed practice view, there is something morally special about the current 
state of affairs or the status quo.  
But we have to ask, what makes the status quo relevant from the perspective 
of distributive justice? To return to our pollution example, what if society A has 
to produce industrially and dump its industrial waste in the sea since this is the 
only way for them to survive on the resources their island offers them? This 
question gets more complicated if we further assume that through the pollution 
of a part of its waters and shores society B would be made somewhat worse off 
but not significantly so. The island of society B might be that large and resource-
rich that to them the washed-on waste is merely a nuisance. Should we not think 
that in such a situation society A has a stronger distributive claim to make use of 
the shores although society B currently benefits from them?  
Furthermore, the importance that the principle of Due Care attributes to the 
status quo allows for non-participants to suffer from forces beyond their control 
in ways that reformist writers consider problematic within existing practices. 
This is shown by the following ‘plague example’. We can imagine that in our two 
island world no one pollutes each other’s shores but instead society B is hit by a 
terrible natural disease. This plague decimates B’s population so that the 
survivors retreat from the island’s shores to re-group inland to form a new 
smaller but stable community. Now the fishing grounds at the island’s shores 
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(that allowed B to grow in numbers and become better off in the past) are no 
longer used by society B. At this point the principle of Due Care would allow for 
society A to avail itself of and even deplete this fish resource that before was 
morally inaccessible for them since it was utilized by society B. If society A 
chooses to make use of these fishing grounds society B will be kept from 
growing and becoming more affluent again in the future.  
The problem the plague example makes us aware of is that the reformed 
practice view’s focus on the status quo permits various kinds of indirect or 
delayed detrimental effects of practices that harm non-participants. Thus, the 
strictly practice-dependent nature that all our distributive entitlements have on 
the reformed practice view does not only accord a dubious moral importance to 
the status quo. This practice-dependence also allows for detrimental effects of 
practices that would seem problematic within existing interactions on the 
reformed practice view itself: within such practices the long-term effects of 
particular distributions of benefits and burdens certainly are factors that matter 
morally for the assessment of these cooperative schemes. However, the plague 
example also points at a second internal shortcoming of this perspective. 
(2) The Problem of Diminished Opportunities of Non-Participants  
We begin to see this second problem when we consider two of James’s 
assertions about the reformed practice view. On the one hand, James argues 
that equality in distribution is a practice-dependent value. On the other hand, 
though, he holds that the reformed practice view includes “principles of 
Collective Exclusion, which prohibit the turning away of refugees, boat people, 
those seeking political asylum, and so on.”3 1 7   
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But what about poor non-participants who would like to join a practice so as 
to benefit from the fruits of cooperation? Here we might, of course, want to 
argue that keeping people from establishing contact (for instance, by building 
border fences) already constitutes a form of interaction that makes 
considerations of distributive justice necessary. However, it seems that we can 
devise other cases in which efforts to thwart contact are so indirect and remote 
that the only aspect that remains of these efforts are the intentions of the non-
participants. In our two island world society B might want to establish contact 
with society A. However, the island that society B inhabits does not supply its 
inhabitants with sufficiently stable wood for building the seafaring ships 
necessary to establish contact. Thus, society B has to hope for driftwood to be 
washed ashore its beaches as it has very seldom happened in the past. Now it 
seems that in this situation the reformed practice view and the principle of Due 
Care permit society A to try to make sure no driftwood reaches the shores of the 
island inhabited by society B. Since in this way A does not make B worse off 
than the latter society currently  is it appears reformist writers have no way to 
criticize be behaviour of A.  
However, as the plague example demonstrates there are also numerous 
conceivable cases in which practices can diminish the opportunities of non-
participants without there being any malevolent motivation involved. We saw 
that with respect to the plague example the shortcoming of the reformed 
practice view is that it cannot account for the fact that society A’s exploiting the 
fishing grounds right off society B’s shores will prevent the latter from 
developing in the future. The problem is that to James and other reformists 
equality of opportunity to gain from natural resources is a value limited to 
existing practices. The reformed practice view is generally unable to find fault 
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with practices that diminish the future opportunities of people who do not take 
part in certain practices. There are plenty of examples by which we can illustrate 
this shortcoming.  
Decisions made in one country in our world often influence at least the 
opportunity costs or entire options of other societies: technology or information 
trading among two countries might affect the options of other countries; a 
country’s repository for nuclear waste might contaminate the soil and ground 
water of a neighbouring state; claims to new or unowned territories or resources 
(such as those in Antarctica, below the Artic, or seabed manganese nodules) 
affect what other societies can claim; the limited absorption capacities of the 
atmosphere of our planet makes it necessary to limit global greenhouse gas 
emissions while poor countries will need to produce such emissions to escape 
poverty.  
The climate change problem is a case that is particularly well suited to 
illustrate the shortcomings of the reformed practice view. Moellendorf 
addresses it in an attempt to defend the reformed practice view.3 1 8  He describes 
the distributive problem with respect to climate change as follows. In order for 
us to prevent an increase of 2°C in the atmospheric temperature humanity has 
to cut back on its industrial emissions. The thought is that a rise in temperature 
of more than these 2°C would have dramatic effects: the ice at the poles could 
melt and cause the sea level to rise, that could lead to the flooding of large areas 
of the world (for the sake of the argument we can ignore the alternative 
assumption that the continuation of high levels of greenhouse gases could 
enable us to produce better technologies that could help us protect ourselves 
from the effects of climate change).  
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However, so far it has mostly been the developed and rich, industrialized 
societies that have used up the absorption capacity of our atmosphere. There are 
therefore reasons to think that it is now the turn of these rich countries to cut 
back on their emissions so that poor countries that haven’t yet contributed 
much to the pollution of the atmosphere get a chance to develop and escape 
their low level of affluence. But on the reformed practice view his idea is only 
available if the current level of atmospheric pollution can be understood as the 
outcome of joint global human activity. Otherwise the absorption capacity of the 
atmosphere and its existing pollution could not be interpreted as benefits and 
burdens that have to be equally distributed among people (which is a necessary 
condition for the application of principles of distributive justice according to the 
reformed practice view). Moellendorf aims to frame the problem in exactly this 
way when he argues that all persons are participants in one global atmospheric 
community.3 1 9  Here he presumably thinks that the former colonies of the first 
developing countries were implied (albeit indirectly) in the first industrial 
revolution by, for example, providing resources that were extracted by the 
colonial rulers.  
However, we might not so readily accept the view that the current 
atmospheric pollution was caused by one single global association or practice. 
To approve of this interpretation it seems that we would have to stretch the 
meaning of certain notions Moellendorf uses in his argument beyond what is 
plausible. For one thing, his characterization of non-voluntariness would have 
to substantially differ from, for instance, Nagel’s use of the term: the colonized 
countries certainly mostly were involuntarily ruled by  their colonial masters. 
But this seems hardly comparable with the non-voluntariness of being a 
                                                                 
31 9 See Darrel Moellendorf, Global Inequality Matters, pp. 110, 111. 
148 
 
member of a state: the latter is a matter of happenstance whereas the former 
was a matter of pure coercion and technological superiority. For another thing, 
the destruction of their cultures meant that for decades many colonized societies 
were unable to utilize technological means of development and contribute to 
atmospheric pollution themselves.  
Thus, it seems more plausible for us to explain the differential burdens 
required for saving the global climate as deriving primarily from historical 
responsibilities. The practice-independent view of justice accordingly takes the 
developed countries not only to have used the advantages they gained from 
polluting the atmosphere to secure their own development and dominance in 
the world. In this way they furthermore unduly limited the underdeveloped 
societies’ opportunities do advance as well and thereby violated their duties of 
non-interference. On the practice-independent view, rectificatory duties of 
distributive justice to restore people’s distributive entitlements can therefore 
arise as a matter of either preventing, or making amends for already caused 
violations of negative obligations. However, issues of the latter kind do not seem 
addressable on the basis of the reformed practice view. Instead they require us 
to assume certain practice-independent distributive entitlements of all people.  
In cases like that of atmospheric pollution or the appropriation of unowned 
natural resources the decisions of one political community will negatively affect 
the opportunities of other people without there being any existing practices 
among the two sides. In general, practice-dependent views lead to counter-
intuitive results when it comes to people’s entitlements to use natural and yet 
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unclaimed resources.3 2 0  It seems that, due to the fact that reformist 
philosophers think of equal distributive entitlements exclusively in terms of a 
practice-dependent value, they have to allow for the acquisition of such natural 
resources to take place on a ‘first come – first serve’ basis. 
We should note that this second shortcoming also casts doubt upon James’s 
attempts to claim Rawls’s theory of justice as an ally of the practice-dependent 
perspective of distributive justice. James holds, for instance, that “Rawls has 
indeed reasoned from existing practices all along”3 2 1  and that “Rawls does 
assume […] that all reasoning about what social justice requires of us begins 
from existing practices.”3 2 2  This leads James to conclude that “Rawls assumes 
what we might call the existence condition: any (fundamental, ideal theory) 
principle of social justice has as a condition of its application the existence of 
some social practice.”3 2 3   
If James could show that Rawls’s theory is an instance of the reformed 
practice view of distributive justice this would at least advance his case amongst 
the many political philosophers who consider the Rawlsian project as 
fundamentally important. However, we have good reasons to believe that, in 
contrast to James, Rawls generally thinks of the diminished opportunities of 
non-participants as a serious problem for any conception of distributive justice. 
This becomes obvious when we consider Rawls’s Just Savings Principle that he 
outlines in A Theory of Justice.3 2 4  Here Rawls introduces the principle to 
address issues of intergenerational justice. The question that concerns him is to 
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what extent we owe it to our successors to leave some of the resources and 
bounty our planet offers for them to use. As Rawls sees it “it is a natural fact that 
generations are spread out in time and actual economic benefits flow only in one 
direction. This situation is unalterable, and so the question of justice does not 
arise. What is just or unjust is how institutions deal with natural limitations and 
the way they are set up to take advantage of historical possibilities.” 3 2 5   
Rawls therefore thinks it is mandatory for us to save up some of our wealth 
and natural resources for the generations to come so they have the opportunity 
to live in a just liberal society. The important aspect for us to note about the Just 
Savings Principle is that with this idea Rawls wants to establish an 
intergenerational practice among persons that cannot cooperate and of which 
most cannot contribute to this practice since they do not yet exist. Thus, what 
Rawls has to assume is that it matters what opportunities people have 
irrespectively whether they participate in practices or not. This does, of course, 
not amount to saying that the Just Savings Principle is an egalitarian one 
demanding equal opportunities for all persons that ever exist. But we should be 
aware that the idea of the Just Savings Principle is an indication that Rawls’s 
theory of distributive justice is not a purely practice-dependent one, as James 
likes to claim.  
However, the problem of the diminished opportunities of non-participants 
also strikes the other way. When we act, we normally cannot help but diminish 
the opportunities of others: the space I occupy cannot be occupied by others, the 
air that I breathe cannot be breathed by someone else, and so on. However, as 
John Stuart Mill points out, we think that many of such instances of closing off 
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opportunities for others are justifiable. In his On Liberty,3 2 6  Mill offers a range 
of examples to sustain this thought, such as competition in a fair market and 
“success in an overcrowded profession.”3 2 7  But if we assume that distributive 
entitlements are fully practice-dependent, yet also hold that closing off 
opportunities of others makes them worse off, practice-dependent thinkers face 
a dilemma. If they want to maintain that it is not permissible for us to 
disadvantage others via the externalities produced by our actions, they only 
have two options.  
First, they can think that we must never disadvantage other people 
whatsoever in the pursuit of our goals. We might read James’s principle of Due 
Care to argue for this claim (to recall, the principle tells us that no one should 
“be made worse off [by a practice] than they would have been had the harmful 
activity not been undertaken”3 2 8). But if we agree with Mill that when acting we 
cannot always avoid negatively affecting others then we need to be able to draw 
a distinction between morally permissible and impermissible negative effects of 
our actions. There is only one alternative to this situation.  
This second option, though, goes beyond what reformist writers are willing 
to admit. It tells us that we need to assume that people possess general, 
practice-independent distributive entitlements of some sort that we must not 
violate either intentionally or through the externalities we produce. Steiner’s 
approach is one possible example of such an idea. In Mill’s case the principle of 
utility provides the details of how to define what makes negative externalities 
justifiable.3 2 9  But the principle of utility, of course, faces its own problems.3 3 0  
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For example, we might think it plausible that the equal moral status of persons 
should somehow also be reflected in the idea of such universal distributive 
entitlements. Thus, a certain level of equality is not to be sacrificed for the sake 
of a gain in overall utility.3 3 1   
However, the point here is not that therefore egalitarian justice ought to 
apply globally. There might be room for Ronzoni’s argument that presently we 
do not have the institutions in place that would trigger egalitarian obligations 
among all people. Maybe what distributive justice requires outside existing 
interactions is that everyone has enough to lead a decent life. The argument 
proposed here is more modest than an endorsement of global egalitarianism.3 3 2  
It rather contains an important reason against a purely practice-dependent 
notion of distributive justice. The argument shows that such conceptions of 
distributive justice are incapable of distinguishing in how far the externalities of 
our actions may influence others (and, in particular, those we do not interact 
with). It is much more plausible to think that, instead, we need to assume that 
everyone has a claim to some equal share of the resources of our planet. This 
point alone seems enough to invalidate a strict understanding of Rawls’s 
distinction between associative and natural duties3 3 3  and to discredit the central 
presuppositions of the reformed practice view of distributive justice. 
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10. Conclusion 
At this point we can summarize the conclusions of our exploration of those 
views that take distributive justice to be an associative or practice-dependent 
ideal that only applies among human beings affected by common practices. We 
found and scrutinized two such associative approaches: the actual practice view 
and the reformed practice view of distributive justice.  
We found the actual practice view of justice and its rejection of the idea of 
global egalitarian justice to be implausible. The service conception of political 
legitimacy shows that the elimination of detrimental inequalities is not even 
mandatory as a way to justify the exercise of domestic coercive authority. We 
saw that, in addition, reformist philosophers (who also advocate another 
practice-dependent understanding of the idea of distributive justice) raise other 
serious doubts about the plausibility of Nagel’s actual practice view.  
Proponents of this reformed practice view argue that what distributive 
justice demands depends on what suitably reconstructed and reformed actual 
practice would look like. At the heart of their critique lies an understanding of 
the purpose of distributive equality and justice that is inspired by Rawls’s 
Theory of Justice, rather than Nagel’s and Dworkin’s authority -focused 
conception of egalitarian justice. Reformists argue that, on the one hand, we 
have to accept that the scope of egalitarian concern extends to all our 
unavoidable interactions. On the other hand, they think we need to establish 
new or reform existing international political authorities charged with the task 
of establishing these just terms and conditions of interaction.  
But we have to be clear about what the call for new and reformed coercive 
international institutions does not aim at. Since historically there exists great 
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aversion of the idea of a world state or government3 3 4  it is important to 
emphasize that the new institutions demanded by reformist writers are not 
supposed to take on such a comprehensive role. Rather we have to imagine 
these new authorities as performing limited tasks and holding clearly delimited 
powers (in accordance with, for instance, Raz’s dependence thesis).  
The idea here is that of a supplementation of existing state authority rather 
than a replacing of it. As Ronzoni puts it, global governance institutions “would 
not substitute the role of states but only guarantee background justice between 
them.”3 3 5  Decisions made by new or reformed international institutions (such as 
a restructured UN general assembly, a UN court of Human Rights with coercive 
powers, the WTO or new institutions regulating the global financial markets or 
efforts against climate change) could, of course, have far-reaching consequences 
for the competences of states. But no single global governance institution would 
have to claim authority over all areas of political decision-making or power over 
decisions that states are capable of making themselves.  
However, in the end we found that also the reformist view faces serious 
objections. What every practice-dependent approach toward distributive justice 
is missing is the notion of practice-independent distributive entitlements of 
people. Without the latter we found we cannot address the problem that many 
of our actions unavoidably limit the options of other people who do not interact 
with us. Since such disadvantaging of others is practically inevitable we have to 
be able to distinguish between morally acceptable and objectionable 
interference with other people’s interest. These are certain practical and 
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theoretical issues (such as climate change and access to unowned resources) 
that pose serious difficulties for every supporter of practice-dependent 
conception of distributive justice. Since the latter limit distributive entitlements 
(and in particular equal concern) to existing interactions they cannot tell us in 
how far our practices can justifiably limit the options of others who do not 
participate in these practices. Instead, making a distinction between permissible 
and impermissible influences presupposes a sense of persons’ general 
distributive entitlements that are definable independently of any actual practice. 
As Steiner’s theory shows, given the equal moral status of persons, such general 
distributive entitlements should bear the mark of equality in some way.  
This also means that (if understood in a strict way ) Rawls’s distinction 
between associative and natural duties in A Theory of Justice (see section two of 
this chapter) is not sustainable: among the natural (practice-independent) 
duties there needs to be an obligation to respect persons’ universal equal 
distributive entitlements. And the latter duty has to presuppose that, as a matter 
of justice, we must all be thought to possess rightful and in some sense equal 
claims to some share of the resources this world offers us. The scope of 
distributive justice is therefore not limited to existing practices. 
In summary, the problem of disadvantaging nonparticipants points us 
toward a practice-independent view of distributive justice so as to enable us to 
account for cases of injustice that occur outside of existing practices as well. 
However, once we accept a practice-independent view, the scope of distributive 
justice extends even further than the advocates of the reformed practice view (or 
any practice-dependent approach) want to allow for. This is nonetheless the 
conclusion of our attempts to apply consistently the reformists’ own standards.  
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Chapter IV: Three Flawed Objections to Global 
Egalitarianism 
 
In the last chapter we found that the actual as well as the reformed practice 
views of distributive justice face serious problems due to their practice-
dependent natures. Advocates of the reformed practice view challenge Thomas 
Nagel’s claim that duties of egalitarian justice arise only within social schemes 
that are regulated by an existing common coercive authority. Reformists like 
Aaron James and Darrel Moellendorf plausibly argue that the scope of 
egalitarian justice has to be thought to extend to all existing human practices 
and interactions of a certain (involuntary or interdependent) kind. However, the 
reformed practice view excludes from considerations of distributive justice all 
those detrimental inequalities that do not occur among participants in mutual 
practices. 
What we also saw in the last chapter, though, is that the reformed practice 
view as well has counter-intuitive implications. These, we diagnosed, are caused 
by its practice-dependent character. Its two main problems we identified are 
that it (1) attributes special moral relevance to the distributive status quo in a 
seemingly unfounded fashion, and that it (2) is unable to account for morally 
objectionable negative externalities of existing practices that diminish the 
opportunities of non-participants in those schemes. These issues can be avoided 
(and our theory of distributive justice made coherent) only if we accept the idea 
that everyone possess certain practice-independent distributive entitlements. 
This is not to say that, therefore, these practice-independent entitlements have 
to be conceived of as equal. However, the generally accepted idea of human 
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beings’ equal moral status, the idea of the Lockean proviso3 3 6  (that, when 
initially acquiring resources, we have to leave as good and as much for others) 
which figures, for example, in Hillel Steiner’s left-libertarian theory of 
distributive justice, indicate that equality has to have some more than formal 
place in a theory of global justice.  
In order to get a better grip on what the idea of practice-independent 
entitlements has to encompass we have to find out what motivates Nagel, 
James, and all other practice-dependent theorists to limit egalitarian justice to 
existing practices. We thus have to ask, what (according to them) is morally 
special about social practices and interaction, so that the latter are thought to 
limit the scope of egalitarian justice. In this chapter we will address this 
question. For this purpose we will assume that justice in fact requires global 
egalitarianism. The latter denotes the view that (on an abstract, theoretical 
level) all detrimental inequalities among human beings are morally 
objectionable – regardless of their associational ties or membership in practices.  
Starting from global egalitarianism is not simply a wild guess. Equality 
figures prominently in many moral theories. And since even practice-dependent 
theorists think that, (at least) within the domestic sphere of states, distributive 
equality is the point of departure from which all inequalities have to be justified, 
an extreme demand for equality is not as such unreasonable. Global 
egalitarianism makes it the duty of all of us to create and use institutional 
schemes to eliminate all detrimental interpersonal disparities on Earth.  
We will describe and consider the three fundamental objections to global 
egalitarianism that practice-dependent thinkers present in their texts. By 
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showing that none of these criticisms is effective we will strengthen the case for 
global egalitarianism. As we shall see in the last chapter, this idea is not the final 
word on what global justice plausibly has to mean. Nonetheless, our debilitation 
of the central three objections to global egalitarianism will establish this idea as 
the fundamental principle from which all our reasoning about distributive 
justice has to begin.  
 
1. Mapping the Territory 
So far the content of the notion of universal distributive shares is very much 
under-specified. Of all the theories we have scrutinized up to this point only 
Hillel Steiner’s embraces the idea that persons are entitled to certain practice-
independent shares of goods and opportunities.3 3 7  This approach, though, is not 
without its own problems and therefore cannot provide us with an 
unobjectionable understanding of what people are due regardless of their 
associational ties.  
Steiner’s argument relies on the idea of “an egalitarian allocation of natural 
resource values.”3 3 8  But his argument, in turn, depends on accepting a Lockean 
theory of property. However, if we do reject the exclusive relevance of the 
Lockean notions of self-ownership and the initial distribution of property for 
justice, we will not be convinced of Steiner’s approach either. Although his view 
includes rather substantive initial egalitarian entitlements, Steiner’s is still an 
example of a libertarian theory. But the latter, as Rawls plausibly criticizes in A 
Theory of Justice, allow for systems of natural liberty in which “the existing 
distribution of income and wealth, say, is the cumulative effect of prior 
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distributions of natural assets.”3 3 9  The fundamental flaw of such ‘starting gate 
theories’ according to Rawls is that they permit “distributive shares to be 
improperly influenced by [social and natural] factors so arbitrary from a moral 
point of view.”3 4 0  If we (as many egalitarians do) object with Rawls to these 
consequences of libertarian theories we will not find Steiner’s answer to the 
question of which detrimental inequalities among people are morally 
objectionable to be a satisfying one.   
At this point we can therefore summarise the state of our discussion as 
follows. None of the approaches toward distributive justice we have discussed so 
far satisfactorily exemplifies and realizes our egalitarian notions that derive 
from the premise of the moral equality of all human beings. These egalitarian 
beliefs at least call for an accommodation of the ideas that (a) all persons are 
entitled to certain distributive shares irrespectively of their membership in 
human associations. In addition they demand that (b) these entitlements must 
not be compromised by morally arbitrary factors. What we have seen instead is 
this: the seemingly uncontroversial assumption of equal moral worth does not 
imply a unique answer to the question which detrimental inequalities we have to 
eliminate as a matter of justice. It is in fact easy to become confused about what 
all the theories we have discussed require us to do in different possible 
situations. Still, in order for us to arrive at a conception of justice that is 
plausible because it can account for all our egalitarian convictions we have to be 
clear on what justice demands of us in various circumstances. 
A good way for us to gain clarity about the different possible answers to the 
question what justice might require in various circumstances is to modify a 
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thought experiment made prominent by Charles Beitz.3 4 1  In this hypothetical 
situation we abstract from the complexities of our real world and imagine a 
planet that only contains two continents within one gigantic ocean. Both islands 
are inhabited by two separate societies that make use of the natural resources 
available to them. We can then change this basic state of affairs to create 
different scenarios so as to find out what features of the different circumstances 
influence our thinking about what distributive justice requires in each situation. 
With the help of this method, which is a common one in political philosophy, we 
can hope to ‘distil’ the requirements of justice in ideal circumstances so that we 
can afterwards apply them to the situation in our real world.  
For our purposes, it seems most useful to distinguish between five scenarios. 
The first one starts out with a situation of strong interconnectedness between 
the two societies. We then relax the degree of interaction in the subsequent 
scenarios.  
- In scenario A, which we can label ‘common institutions’, both societies 
have set up common regulative authorities that enforce the same laws on 
the inhabitants of both islands.  
- In scenario B, which we will refer to as ‘interdependency’, the two island 
societies have not created a common government or law. However, over 
time they have established trade practices of such a quality that neither 
society can end the exchange without significantly setting back their 
development or even without endangering their survival. In the latter 
case both societies might either have (in an effort to increase productivity 
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by specialization and a division of labour) depleted some different vital 
resource on their continent or they never disposed of it in the first place. 
- In another scenario C, ‘optional cooperation’, both island societies have 
established trade practices with each other as well. However, their 
cooperation is voluntary in the sense that neither society requires the 
exchange for their survival or development. Trade might have come 
about either due to mutual curiosity or because it speeds up the process 
of development. 
- In yet a different scenario D, which we can name ‘harmful externalities’, 
there exist no interactions among our two communities. However, some 
practices within both separate groups impact negatively on the other 
community. This category covers the pollution and plague examples we 
encountered in Chapter Three: one society’s factories might produce 
pollution that rains down with the precipitation on the other continent 
while the ocean current transports the industrial waste dumped by the 
other group washes up on the first society’s shores. Alternatively, one 
society’s fishing operations might slowly deplete the ocean’s fish 
population while the other society is currently unable to fish. 
- Finally, in a scenario E, ‘natural inequality’, the two societies neither 
interact, nor do they impact directly on each other’s opportunities 
whatsoever. The only feature noteworthy about this scenario is that – due 
to a naturally unequal distribution of resources on the two continents – 
the members of one society are significantly better off than the people in 
the other community while no one on either of the islands has to live in 
dire straits. 
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2. The Road to Global Egalitarianism 
What does distributive justice require in each scenario?  
For starters, proponents of all the three practice views of distributive justice 
we scrutinized accept a ban on unjustifiable harmful interferences with people 
outside our own associations as they occur in the ‘harmful externalities’ 
scenario D. As was explained before, the need to distinguish acceptable from 
objectionable disadvantages affecting those who do not participate in our 
practices highlights the need to specify some kind of global practice-
independent distributive entitlements.  
Besides these minimal requirements of justice to avoid objectionable 
harmful interference with non-participants philosophers who defend an actual 
practice view (like Thomas Nagel) only accept further duties in scenario A. This 
is because to Nagel distributive equality is a condition of the justification of the 
exercise of political authority – which is only possible in ‘common institutions’ 
situations. Philosophers like Aaron James, Darrel Moellendorf, Miriam 
Ronzoni, and Joshua Cohen who hold reformed practice views of justice, on the 
other hand, also argue for distributive obligations in the scenarios B, 
‘interdependency’, and C, ‘optional cooperation’. They might even be willing to 
concede that the two societies have an obligation to start joint practices in 
scenario D, ‘harmful externalities’, if this is the only way that they can ensure 
that no one unjustly disadvantages the other side.  
But supporters of neither the actual nor the reformed practices views can 
detect any injustice in the ‘natural inequalities’ scenario E. Here the differences 
between the opportunities and wealth of both societies can be entirely traced 
back to the naturally occurring unequal distribution of natural resources. If we 
want to be able to criticize this situation of naturally-caused inequality we have 
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to hold a conception of justice that takes people’s entitlements to be 
independent of their membership in political communities and cooperative 
practices. Only on the basis of such a practice-independent view (as, for 
instance, Hillel Steiner’s) can we argue for more than negative obligations that 
we have toward each other with respect to those goods that make our lives go 
well in Scenario E type situations.  
However, we just saw that practice-independence is not a sufficient criterion 
to accommodate all our central egalitarian beliefs. Theories like Steiner’s allow 
for inequalities that seem problematic. Thus, we really face a twofold task in 
finding a convincing egalitarian conception of justice. Besides the idea (a) that 
considerations of egalitarian justice cannot be limited to existing interactions 
the desired conception also has to do justice to the premise (b) that all people 
possess equal moral status which entitles them to protection from the 
detrimental effects of morally arbitrary factors. By ‘morally arbitrary’ we 
should understand those facts that are not reasons for something else. With 
respect to the distribution of goods that are beneficial to the lives of persons, all 
aspects are morally arbitrary which can influence this distribution but which no 
one can be thought to be entitled to. Rawls for this reason states that “ there is 
no more reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to be settled by 
the distribution of natural assets than by historical and social fortune.”3 4 2   
Thus, since a plausible theory of distributive justice should accommodate all 
our egalitarian notions, we have reasons to think that the scope of justice this 
theory defends must be global in a dual sense. It has to (a) hold that the same 
idea of justice applies to all people wherever they live. And it must (b) accept the 
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claim that all things that are morally arbitrary and influence how well off 
persons are have to be subject to considerations of egalitarian justice.  
So far we have not found arguments (besides the moral equality of persons) 
for anything that would in principle and always be relevant for the distribution 
of goods. We saw that there are no features of states that could limit egalitarian 
justice to their domain. Such features either occur also outside of states (like 
coercion and the reciprocal production of collective goods) or they are not 
sufficient to justify egalitarian duties even within states (like having a common 
coercive authority).  We furthermore saw that claims to an equal share of goods 
(if this includes, as it should, future opportunities) are not confinable to existing 
practices. What has not been disproven, though, is that the equal moral status of 
persons matters for the interpersonal distribution of goods. At this point  it is 
therefore reasonable for us to assume that nothing principally limits persons’ 
entitlement to an equal share of goods. Thus, the scope of our theory of 
distributive justice should in this sense be thought of as universal.  
A principle that accepts this claim is properly called global egalitarianism 
because it holds that “there is nothing to make it just that some are better (or 
worse) off than others.”3 4 3  The implication of this principle is that we all have 
duties to eliminate detrimental inequalities that people everywhere suffer from. 
Global egalitarianism is an intuitively plausible principle that seems to account 
for all of our important egalitarian notions. But can the principle be defended 
against its many critics? 
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3. A Prominent but Unclear Distinction: Relational versus Non-
Relational Views of Distributive Justice 
It is, of course, precisely the notion of the universal scope of justice that those 
philosophers who defend practice-dependent views reject.  As will become clear, 
what ultimately causes the disagreement between global egalitarians and 
practice-dependent approaches is not merely their differing opinion about the 
scope of egalitarian justice. Instead the source of this controversy goes much 
deeper and is based on opposing understandings of the very nature and purpose 
of morality itself.3 4 4   
One re-occurring theme in the arguments of defenders of practice-
dependent views of justice is that “the idea of morality is at bottom 
relational,”3 4 5  that is to say: morality concerns the justifiability of our actions 
toward each other. Andrea Sangiovanni, for instance, argues that “those who 
hold that principles of distributive justice have a relational basis hold that the 
practice-mediated relations in which individuals stand condition the content, 
scope, and justification of those principles.”3 4 6  Practice-dependent thinkers take 
the “relational nature of morality”3 4 7  to show that actual relations among people 
are morally special.  
However, the allusion to the relational nature of morality and distributive 
justice does little for our gaining a clearer understanding of which detrimental 
inequalities are morally objectionable. This is because, as Sangiovanni points 
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out himself, “relational accounts vary regarding both which relations condition 
the content, scope, and justification of those principles as well as how they 
do.”3 4 8  As a consequence, there is hardly any conception of morality that cannot 
be construed as dealing with the justification of the relations people stand in 
with each other. We have scrutinized several views of justice. All of them can be 
interpreted as being based on the relational nature of justice but they include 
variously strong or rich notions of actually existing relations among people. 
We found that proponents of the actual practice view of justice employ a very 
rich notion of interaction as necessary for the application of egalitarian justice. 
Sangiovanni, for instance, argues that distributive equality is justified only 
“among those who support and maintain the state’s capacity to provide […] 
basic collective goods.”3 4 9  Michael Blake3 5 0  and Mathias Risse3 5 1  argue that it is 
the special kind of immediate coercion that exists between a state and its 
citizens that makes egalitarian justice necessary. Nagel’s condition of an 
involvement of the will of the citizens in the legislation of their political 
community refers to a similarly strong notion of interaction that is (supposedly) 
necessary for the application of egalitarian justice.3 5 2  
Defenders of the reformed practice view such as Darrel Moellendorf, Miriam 
Ronzoni, or Arash Abizadeh also have a robust but less strong idea of what kind 
of interaction is morally relevant for distributive justice. They think it is not 
institutionalized coercion but common, organized, and purposive cooperation 
which impacts on the lives of people that triggers duties of (ultimately) 
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egalitarian justice. James on his part employs a contractualist understanding of 
morality. In his view the relations people have to stand in for considerations of 
distributive justice to apply have to be marked by what he calls 
“encounterability.”3 5 3  What he seems to have in mind by this term is that, in 
order to require moral justification, the relations people stand in must in fact 
directly and immediately have effects on others. To James, if the consequences 
of our actions do not make others worse off than they are right now, the 
differences that might exist between us and them are not subject to 
considerations of distributive justice at all.  
So what supporters of practice-dependent views really mean when they talk 
about the ‘relational nature of justice’ is that the scope of this idea is restrained 
to the people participating in actual interactions and cooperative practices. 
Since practice-dependent views employ very strong or at least rich notions of 
interaction, we can therefore refer to them as interactionist accounts of 
morality. 
However, in our discussion we found that also practice-independent views of 
justice can be interpreted as dealing with the relations among people. In our 
evaluation of James’s principle of Due Care we saw that it is problematic if a 
theory of distributive justice cannot criticize long-term or indirect negative 
externalities of actual practice. Thus, we found that the term ‘interaction’ must 
be understood quite broadly if is to capture these morally relevant effects. The 
most radical idea of how indirect interaction that is morally relevant can be is 
presented by Immanuel Kant. For Kant, any appropriation of an object external 
to our bodies equals an exclusion of all others from this object and therefore 
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requires justification.3 5 4  Any person’s claim to something external to her body is 
contestable in a way possession of our bodies is not: external objects could 
always belong to any person.3 5 5  But owning land and property must be also 
justifiable to all others according to Locke’s view of initial acquisition that 
grounds Steiner’s left-libertarianism.3 5 6  The Lockean proviso tells us that we can 
only claim a certain, equal amount of property for ourselves without rendering 
our relations to others impermissible.3 5 7   
 None of these practice-independent views implies that existing relations can 
never be of special importance among persons, or, put another way: that there 
are no agent-relative reasons with respect to distributive justice. What views like 
Kant’s and Steiner’s do claim, though, is that the relational nature of morality 
does not imply that questions of distributive justice can only arise if there are 
actual relations among people. 
But what, then, are the reasons why practice-dependent theorists hold that 
(a) existing interactions or practices are a necessary condition of egalitarian 
justice and that therefore (b) the scope of the latter is confined to such on-going 
interactions? Without such additional reasons it seems the idea of interaction is 
over-inclusive and does not rule out much from becoming subject to 
considerations of distributive justice at all.  
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Defenders of the actual and the reformed practice views actually do present 
arguments to this end. However, since they mostly do not clearly distinguish 
between (or even label) the different arguments it is often difficult to 
understand how they are supposed to work and what plausibility they possess. 
We therefore need to identify and evaluate these arguments to confirm or 
disconfirm practice-dependent philosophers’ criticisms of the principle of global 
egalitarianism.  
However, in doing so it is important for us to keep in mind that, while all 
these reasons aim to limit the scope of justice, their advocates claim to embrace 
the ideal of the moral equality of all people. Therefore, an analysis and 
evaluation of the arguments of defenders of practice-dependent views is also a 
judgment about which interpretation of morality best exemplifies and realizes 
our egalitarian beliefs. The idea of the moral equality of all people constitutes 
the point of departure of any respectable approach toward justice in 
contemporary moral and political philosophy. In order to sort and assess the 
arguments against the idea of the global scope of justice we can distinguish at 
least three main arguments of philosophers who hold interactionist views of 
morality.  
 
4. The First Objection: the Distinction between Doing and 
Allowing Harm  
The first argument that defenders of practice-dependent theories of justice 
present against the idea of the global scope of justice consists of two parts. Their 
proponents claim (a) that only detrimental interpersonal inequalities that are 
(at least in part) created by social institutions are morally objectionable. 
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However, they also hold (b) that these socially -caused inequalities are only a 
matter within the institutional schemes in which they were produced. 
The thought that motivates claim (a) is that the exclusive objects of moral 
evaluation are those aspects of life that are (at least in part) attributable to 
human actions. This means that while I owe you, for instance, an explanation 
for why I did not keep a promise I made to you, no one owes anyone a 
justification for the occurrence of natural facts and their consequences like, for 
example, earthquakes, tsunamis, colour blindness, or differing levels of human 
intelligence. This idea is expressed in one of the central claims Rawls makes in A 
Theory of Justice. Here he says that “the natural distribution is neither just nor 
unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular 
position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that 
institutions deal with these facts.”3 5 8   
For advocates of interactionist accounts like James and Elizabeth Anderson 
the claim that justice is concerned with “the conduct of agents”3 5 9  means that 
justice regards “the terms of our interactions, rather than […] comparisons of 
the amount of some good that different individuals enjoy.”3 6 0  As we previously 
saw, though, restricting the scope of justice to existing interactions is 
conditional on accepting a strong notion of interaction. As of yet we have not 
discovered the reason why practice-dependent philosophers think they are right 
to assume a rich rather than a weak notion of interaction (that could allow for a 
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practice-independent scope of justice). This is to say, we still need a justification 
of claim (b) that inequalities are only objectionable within the institutional 
schemes in which they were produced. 
We can better understand the practice-dependent theorists’ focus on actual 
interactions and their support for claim (b) when we look at James’s and Nagel’s 
justification of this claim. James wants further to illuminate Rawls’s explanation 
of this moral dimension of our reactions to natural facts by connecting it with 
Thomas Scanlon’s characterization of morality. According to Scanlon the latter 
essentially consists in justifying our behaviour toward each other in ways no one 
can reasonably reject.3 6 1  What we thus owe to each other is first and foremost 
the “recognition”3 6 2  of each other as persons. Making a moral judgment on the 
Scanlonian picture is synonymous with the evaluation of our behaviour and the 
effects it has on us and others. As a result, the subject or purpose of morality is 
not to judge the value of natural states of affairs in the world.  
Thus, as James argues with reference to Scanlon’s theory, the reasons we 
base our moral judgments on must be personal ones that “have to do with the 
claims and status of individuals in certain positions.”3 6 3  Alternatively, they can 
be general or generic reasons that “we know people have by generally available 
information.”3 6 4  However, what James thinks cannot count as relevant for our 
moral judgments are impersonal reasons such as the beauty of the Grand 
Canyon or the idea that it would be good if all persons were equally well off. This 
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is because to James such impersonal reasons make “no contribution to [our] 
minimal recognition”3 6 5  of each other as persons.  
James interprets Scanlon’s idea of the personal nature of morality in a 
particular way. To him, personal reasons and what we owe to each other is 
inseparable from our being causally responsible or involved in something. This 
becomes clear when we consider what James calls the ‘Attributability 
Condition.’ According to this condition, “how people stand in the moral relation 
depends only on events that are attributable to one or both of those people.”3 6 6   
This conviction is central to the theories of practice-dependent philosophers, 
such as Nagel, who holds that “injustice and social responsibility are clearer 
when involuntary social differences cause inequality, than when involuntary 
natural differences do.”3 6 7   
This assumed necessary connection between causal involvement and the 
moral relevance of inequality is what justifies accepting claim (b) for practice-
dependent philosophers. The emphasis on causal responsibility can also explain 
the reluctance of interactionist theorists to admit that there is a problem in the 
‘natural inequality’ scenario E. Here it is, of course, the case that both societies 
utilize the resources available to them. In this way natural resources are 
transformed by human actions and interaction into goods that are subject to 
considerations of egalitarian justice. However, the crucial point for practice-
dependent thinkers employing a rich notion of interaction is that the separate 
societies are not causally involved in each other’s transformation of the natural 
resources that are available to them. Thus, James claims that  
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It is only when, given a fair amount of luck and time, meaningful 
patterns of interaction become established between [the] two 
societies or their members that we can begin to consider the extent to 
which the global distribution of goods and opportunities is genuinely 
within their power, and so reflective of or attributable to their social 
relations as opposed to the mere workings of fate.3 6 8  
 
What therefore lies at the heart of practice-dependent interpretations of justice 
is firstly, as Derek Parfit points out, an “analytic link between injustice and 
wrong-doing.”3 6 9  This is signified by claim (a) that only detrimental 
interpersonal inequalities that are (at least in part) created by social institutions 
are morally objectionable.  
Secondly, though, the restriction of justice to existing interactions, which is 
characteristic of practice-dependent views, is caused by interactionists’ 
particular interpretation of interaction as requiring direct causal involvement. 
The latter leads them to accept claim (b) that these socially -caused inequalities 
are only a matter within the institutional schemes in which they were produced. 
Since on this view the realm of distributive justice only includes those aspects of 
the world that are the practice-internal effects of human interference with 
nature, we have an answer to the problem what factors (according to 
interactionist theories) are relevant to the evaluation of our conduct as agents.  
On the interactionist view of morality, distributive justice does not make 
every feasible improvement of the world a duty. Nagel thinks that the reason 
this limitation of the scope of justice is important is that otherwise justice would 
become implausibly demanding on us. If we always would have to aim at 
making better all the things we can change we would have left hardly any 
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resources and time to invest in other things that seem valuable to us.3 7 0  Such a 
demanding conception of justice would leave implausibly little room for private 
prerogatives as well as for values other than justice that also are important to us. 
Nagel presents the following example to demonstrate the force of this 
consideration. He asks us to imagine a society in which a minority of the 
members will come to suffer from “an incurable degenerative condition 
appearing between the ages of thirty and forty, that kill[s] the victim within five 
years.”3 7 1  He then argues that it would be implausible to think that justice can 
demand of us fully to compensate the ones suffering from the disease for their 
shortened life span or to spend large amounts of resources on delaying the 
advancement of the illness if that is possible. While these efforts might improve 
the lot of the affected people such duties, Nagel thinks, would eat up most of a 
society’s resources in exchange for very little gains for very few people.  
This thought resembles the criticism levied against utilitarian positions such 
as, for example, Peter Singer’s famous argument that morality requires us to do 
our utmost to eradicate poverty – even if this means to give up on our personal 
projects.3 7 2  If we consider practice-dependent accounts of justice from this angle 
they appear less restrictive and conservative. Given their presumption of a rich 
notion of interaction that is based on causal responsibility, the plausibility of 
practice-dependent views as a whole is crucially tied up with that of the ‘doing 
versus allowing distinction’. According to this differentiation “people have a 
greater responsibility, in general, for what they do than for what they merely 
allow or fail to prevent.”3 7 3  Thus, it is this distinction (which builds on the 
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difference between natural state of affairs and human involvement in the latter) 
that forms the normative foundation of this first objection to the idea of the 
global scope of justice.   
Of course, if the ‘doing versus allowing distinction’ is morally relevant it 
would also apply within existing practices. However, this would be entirely 
advantageous for supporters of interactionist accounts of justice. We saw that 
these philosophers base their views on a rich notion of interaction or doing. 
Especially the works of James and Moellendorf feature the idea that we are 
morally responsible for the terms and conditions that regulate our purposeful 
practices with others.3 7 4  Practice-dependent philosophers think of these terms 
and conditions as (at least indirectly) imposed in our name. To them, we are 
therefore actively involved in, and can control, the design of the rules that 
distribute the benefits and burdens of our social practices. Accordingly, 
practice-dependent philosophers hold that this sort of activities differs from the 
effects that an earthquake has on the population of a far-away society with 
which we do not causally interfere. In this way, interactionists hope to employ 
the ‘doing versus allowing distinction’ to deny that there is injustice in states of 
affairs like those occurring in the ‘natural inequality’ scenario E. 
 
5.  The Second Objection: “Ought implies Can” 
According to the second objection against the idea of justice as having a global 
scope, while not everything that is feasible must be realized as a matter of 
justice, all that justice can demand must be feasible. ‘Ought’, this well-known 
argument asserts, ‘implies can’ since we cannot be thought to have an obligation 
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to aim for the impossible. As James puts it, “because general conditions of life 
limit what agents can do in practice, they limit what justice could require in 
principle.”3 7 5  
Those who believe that morality regards the terms of our actual interactions 
think that this automatically leads to a limitation of the scope of justice. This is 
because some natural inequalities have causes or effects that we cannot 
compensate for. We cannot make the blind see or everyone happy in proportion 
to their moral merits – even though these would seem desirable goals to many 
of us. James accordingly thinks that the demands of morality must be sensitive 
to our capacities as human beings: “one is only owed something when an agent 
is capable of regulating this or her conduct as regarding that something, given 
what he or she can understand, plan for, and act on.”3 7 6  In this respect, it 
becomes irrelevant if the pursuit of unattainable goals would also be expensive. 
The focus of this second objection lies on the futility of the efforts that aim at 
what is impossible. As Anderson argues, “principles of justice must be feasible, 
in the sense that agents are able to follow them.”3 7 7   
So if we assume that in the ‘natural inequality’ scenario E it would also be 
impossible for the two societies to interact, on the interactionist view of morality 
this fact alone would suffice to prevent the natural differences in resources from 
becoming subject to considerations of justice. This seems consistent with 
Rawls’s claim that if a “situation is unalterable, [then] the question of justice 
does not arise.”3 7 8  The idea behind this second argument against the global 
scope of justice is that we should not be held responsible for what we cannot 
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change: “if nothing can be done, there can be no injustice.”3 7 9  I do not owe you 
an explanation or compensation for the fact that you are less talented than I  am 
because I cannot compensate you for this inequality in talents. What I do owe 
you instead is compensation for your non-voluntary membership in a common 
institutional system that converts these natural differences into differences in 
affluence.  
For practice-dependent views that accept the argument from the ‘ought-
implies-can’ requirement, the scope of distributive justice becomes even more 
limited than it already is due to the ‘doing versus allowing distinction’. This is 
because the ‘ought-implies-can’ rule excludes from considerations of justice 
situations in which we deal with indivisible, man-made goods. The production 
of such goods might be morally demanded but we cannot appropriately reward 
everyone in proportion to the contribution they make it. This is usually the case 
with public goods like the traffic infrastructure or social services. All who can 
contribute to the generation of these goods should do so but not everyone gets 
out of these goods what they put into their creation. However, that is not a 
worry for interactionist views of morality as according to them we cannot be 
thought to have a duty to fairly divide such goods or to feel bad about 
disproportionally benefitting from them: since in these cases a fair division is 
not possible it cannot be mandatory for us. The ‘ought-implies-can’ rule has an 
important consequence for our thinking about what justice can maximally 
demand. It leads to a kind of realism about what is mandatory and restricts 
ideal justice to what is currently possible for us.  
If practice-dependent writers are correct then the ‘ought-implies-can’ rule 
also applies within practices. This would cause the following difference between 
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interactionist and practice-independent theories of justice. If something is 
currently unchangeable we now have no reasons for action to change the 
situation. However, only on the interactionist view, we also lack much reason 
for indignation or hope about presently unchangeable detrimental inequalities. 
Thus, if we can expect that (when we, for instance, keep on conducting research 
the way we do) we will sometime in the future be able to dispose of the means to 
eliminate such inequalities, then, on practice-dependent views, we have no 
reasons of justice to pursue such a development. Of course, also interactionists 
can regret harmful inequalities like natural blindness or accidentally-caused 
paraplegia. However, if they want to argue that we have weighty reasons to 
develop the means that would enable us to treat people suffering from these 
disabilities, they can do so only if they accept a more practice-independent 
notion of justice. After all, such inequalities are natural and furthermore 
currently impossible to remedy. 
 
6. The Third Objection: the Implausibility of Wasteful Demands 
of Justice 
The first two objections voiced by defenders of practice-dependent views of 
morality primarily target the idea that the scope of justice is spatially unlimited. 
However, there is an important third argument that aims to prove that our 
equal moral status cannot establish duties to remove all relative differences 
among us in the first place. Justice, that is, cannot be global in the sense that it 
requires the levelling of all interpersonal inequalities. What this means in turn 
is (as we shall see) that equality cannot be an inherent value because we could 
often only achieve it if we waste things that are beneficial to people.  
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The problematic implications of wasting goods and benefits for the sake of 
equality are forcefully pointed out by Parfit. He has coined the term ‘levelling 
down objection’ to describe the problems that strict egalitarian theories (which 
hold that equality is inherently valuable) run into. According to the ‘levelling 
down objection’ “it would be in one way better if we removed the eyes of the 
sighted, not give them to the blind, but simply make the sighted blind.”3 8 0  This 
is because only thus could we increase interpersonal equality among the blind 
and the sighted. What is problematic and even absurd about this solution is that 
no one would actually benefit from such an increase in interpersonal equality: 
“if we achieve equality by levelling down, there is nothing good about what we 
have done.”3 8 1  But given that we set out to inquire which inequalities should be 
removed because they are detrimental to people, it seems implausible for justice 
to require us to eliminate goodness in the world for the purpose of promoting 
equality. Egalitarians such as Thomas Christiano therefore acknowledge that the 
‘levelling down objection’ poses the most serious challenge to approaches that 
argue for the intrinsic value of equality.3 8 2  
This third objection against the global scope of justice, which in particular 
denies the idea that equality is valuable per se, is invoked not only by 
philosophers who hold the interactionist view of justice. Also Parfit, who does 
think that justice is spatially global,3 8 3  questions the notion that justice demands 
the elimination of all relative disparities.3 8 4  But even though the objection 
against wasteful demands of justice is not a thought exclusive to interactionist 
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theories it is an argument that practice-dependent theorists must hold. This is 
because: 
(1) If interpersonal equality is inherently valuable then 
(2) Existing detrimental inequality is always bad or morally objectionable or 
unjust. 
(3) Consequently, existing interactions and causal responsibility for 
inequality would be (if at all) merely of secondary relevance for 
considerations of justice. 
(4) All inequalities, also of the sort as appears in scenario E, would be 
objectionable for the standpoint of justice. 
(5) The practice-dependent view would be implausible since whether 
interaction exists is negligible for our assessment which inequalities are 
unjust. 
The rejection of the idea of equality as inherently valuable is therefore necessary 
for the cogency of the practice-dependent framework as a whole. Since the 
levelling down objection is the most powerful criticism of the claim that equality 
is intrinsically valuable it is a naturally attractive argument for interactionist 
philosophers to hold. Only if equality is not valuable in itself can appeals to the 
‘doing versus allowing distinction’ and to causal responsibility serve to 
distinguish between morally relevant and irrelevant forms of inequality.  
Thus, it is unsurprising that Moellendorf denies that “equality is intrinsically 
valuable.”3 8 5  And Scanlon, to recall, tell us that “the idea that equality is itself a 
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fundamental value turns out to play a surprisingly limited role”3 8 6  and that “it 
remains unclear exactly what that idea [of inherently valuable equality] would 
be.”3 8 7  Instead, for all practice-dependent philosophers detrimental inequality is 
a goal if and only if it is required to secure something else (from which it derives 
its value). For interactionists, one such primarily important objective is that we 
can justify the direct effects our interactions have on each other.  
Where does the rejection of strict egalitarianism leave us? To Parfit the 
levelling down objection shows that justice is not concerned with the 
comparison of relative interpersonal levels of good at all but instead with 
ensuring that people are well off in absolute terms. Parfit arrives at this 
conclusion by pointing out that it is the absolute levels of goods that people can 
have or lack that we worry about when thinking in terms of justice.3 8 8  He gives 
the example of a mountaineer who has climbed up to an altitude where the air is 
so thin that it becomes increasingly hard to breath. What is important with 
regard to such vital goods as air, Parfit argues, is not how much air we can 
breathe in comparison to other people. What we care about in the distribution 
of these goods is that each of us has enough of it.  The amount of air each of us 
needs can be completely met.  
We can restate the connection between the argument against the intrinsic 
value of equality and the idea of a practice-dependent scope of justice in a 
slightly different way. To interactionist thinkers, the costs of increasing equality 
among people are part of (and thus dependent on) what we need to justify to 
each other. If curing congenital illnesses or other detrimental inequalities would 
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become more affordable, Nagel and like-minded thinkers would hold that this 
changes our duties too. In this case those who are worse off now have a 
weightier claim on the better-off to have such burdens removed. In this case the 
better-off could help them at a much lower cost or might not even have to forgo 
any benefits themselves at all. For defenders of practice-dependent views of 
morality there is thus a definite correlation between the demands of justice on 
the one side and the costliness of increases in interpersonal equality on the 
other side. In their understanding, it is not the badness of states of affairs in the 
world that primarily matters morally. Rather, as Scanlon emphasizes, it is the 
badness of actions that we must worry about.3 8 9  
 
7. The Idea of an Ethics of Distribution and Why it is not 
Sufficiently Egalitarian  
Despite their distinct natures all three objections against the global scope of 
justice point toward one central fundamental distinction that seems capable of 
capturing all crucial differences between interactionist and practice-
independent views of morality. This distinction is drawn by Parfit who 
differentiates between telic and deontic egalitarian views.3 9 0   
Telic egalitarian theories claim that an equal distribution is of non-
instrumental or intrinsic value, and that this value provides at least defeasible 
reasons to promote certain types of outcomes.3 9 1  Thus, they are centrally 
concerned with the promotion of valuable (that is to say: equal) states of affairs. 
Human actions and institutions can also be part of these states but only insofar 
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as they are relevant for the realization of desirable outcomes.3 9 2  Deontic 
egalitarian theories, on the other hand, claim that inequality is bad or unfair 
only insofar as it comes about or persists in certain ways.3 9 3  They hold that 
“when we ought to aim for equality, it is always for some other moral reason 
[than achieving equality as such].”3 9 4  Objectionable ways of causing or 
preserving inequality are, for instance, those that interactionist views of 
morality focus on, like the detrimental effects of practices on participants. Thus, 
for deontic egalitarians, detrimental natural states of affairs are not unjust per 
se: although they may be regrettable they do not trigger duties of justice. 
However, if we accept Parfit’s distinction between telic and deontic 
egalitarian theories, practice-dependent accounts of morality face a difficult 
question. As we saw, advocates of interactionist conceptions of justice insist on a 
strong and limited notion of what counts as morally relevant interaction and 
wrongdoing. They think they are thereby entitled to reserve the terms justice 
and injustice for situations that involve cooperative human interferences with 
nature. Conversely, these philosophers deny that it makes sense for us to speak 
of detrimental but purely natural states of affairs as unjust.  
We might think, though, that there are good reasons to be sceptical about 
such an exclusion of many effects that nature has on persons from the realm of 
morality for one simple but weighty reason. The detrimental effects of certain 
natural phenomena (like blindness, a lack of resources, draughts, or flash 
floods) can be just as harmful or even more devastating to human beings as the 
effects of certain actions and institutions. Parfit surely has such practice-
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independent negative consequences of naturally occurring phenomena in mind 
when he questions the adequacy of a purely deontic egalitarian position.3 9 5   
To become clear on what matters with respect to distributive justice Parfit 
thinks that the right way to think about this issue is for us to adopt the 
perspective of an 
Ethics of distribution. [According to this idea we] consider different 
possible states of affairs, or outcomes, each involving the same set of 
people. We imagine that we know how well off, in these outcomes, 
these people would be. We then ask whether either outcome would be 
better, or would be the outcome that we ought to bring about.3 9 6  
 
Engaging in an ethics of distribution would require that we also consider 
promoting valuable states of affairs (or outcomes) to be a duty of justice and 
not just as bearing on the justifiability of direct or practice-internal effects of 
our actions. According to the telic egalitarian, unequal natural states of affairs 
(like in scenario E) may generate obligations for us irrespectively of how they 
came about. Such a position would make sense given two things are true:  
1. Advocates of interactionist accounts of justice cannot present convincing 
reasons for why justice should regard only the practice- (or-institution-) 
internal effects of human interferences with nature. Interactionists then 
would unfoundedly deny that we have telic (practice-independent, non-
deontic) reasons to improve naturally-occurring states of affairs if it is 
feasible for us to do so.  
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2. As Nagel and Scanlon explain,3 9 7  deontic egalitarians object to intra-
institutional forms of inequality precisely because these are harmful to 
people. Still, they do not want to base their (deontic) objections to such 
practice-internal inequalities on a (telic) requirement to improve the 
value of states of affairs. However, it seems that deontic egalitarians can 
only do without the (telic) duty to improve the value of statues of affairs 
if their rich notion of interaction is correct. But if doing is in principle 
not worse than allowing, if ‘ought’ does not ‘imply can’, or if equality is 
inherently valuable (and thus important irrespective of whether 
interaction exists), then it is not clear what justifies the deontic 
judgements of interactionists. This is because we would not have 
reasons for thinking that inequality is bad only if and because something 
else is the case – because: what should this additional factor be? If the 
three objections (that purport to provide such additional reasons) 
against global egalitarianism fail there is nothing morally special about 
the practice-internal effects of humanly-caused inequality.  
Intuitively, a global egalitarian conception of justice seems to be most apt to 
accommodate all our egalitarian notions. Global egalitarianism surely is a 
version of an ethics of distribution, that is to say: it is concerned (primarily but 
not exclusively) with outcomes. Unlike other theories, though, global 
egalitarianism does not restrict the scope of justice to existing interactions (as 
practice-dependent views do) or inequalities of a certain kind (as Parfit does). 
As such, global egalitarianism will have to argue successfully against two 
claims: firstly, such a view has to demonstrate that natural states of affairs do 
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generally matter for justice. Secondly, it must show that – if natural 
phenomena matter for justice – equality is of intrinsic moral importance in 
both natural and social states of affairs. The first task requires a refutation of 
the first two objections of defenders of practice-dependent views of justice 
against the idea that the scope of justice is global, while the second task 
involves the proof that their third objection is wrong.    
Many advocates of interactionist views of justice offer more than one of the 
three objections we just canvassed in support of their rejection of the idea that 
the scope of justice is global. But while it is the aim of all three arguments to 
curtail the scope of justice, philosophers that make use of these reasons do often 
not clearly distinguish between them. In these cases it is therefore difficult to 
evaluate the cogency of the interactionist views that invoke them. In his essay 
“Justice and Nature”3 9 8  Nagel, for instance, avails himself of the ‘doing versus 
allowing distinction’ and the argument against wasteful obligations of justice. 
But when reading this text it sometimes appears Nagel mixes these two reasons 
for limiting the scope of justice in the following way: it looks like the reason why 
some of the inequalities, that are not man-made, are excluded from demands of 
compensation is that it would be too costly to achieve such offsetting effects.3 9 9  
Anderson and James on their part employ the ‘doing versus allowing 
distinction’ as well as the ‘ought-implies-can’ rule in their efforts to defend their 
interactionist approaches. However, it is quite unclear what role they want the 
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‘ought-implies-can’ rule to play since they largely base their case for a practice-
dependent scope of justice on the ‘doing versus allowing distinction’.  
The problem with conflating any of these three arguments is that each 
requires a separate evaluation and different possible counter-arguments. Thus, 
we need to be clear about what specific objections are invoked by proponents of 
practice-dependent conceptions of morality. The plausibility of the global 
egalitarian view of morality depends on whether we can debilitate the three 
objections against the global scope of justice (global, to recall, means both that 
(a) all persons are entitled to certain distributive shares irrespectively of their 
membership in associations or practices, and that (b) not only absolute, but also 
all relative inequalities matter from the perspective of justice). This is because, if 
the three objections would be inapplicable it would be the case that 
(a)  interactionist theorists could not explain what grounds their deontic 
judgements that limit duties of justice to existing practices,  
(b)  We would thereby show that telic considerations are fundamentally 
important for any plausible theory of distributive justice, and that 
(c)  Equality is inherently valuable, that is to say: inequalities are morally 
relevant as such.  
 
8. Why Doing is not generally Worse than Allowing 
Is the ‘doing versus allowing distinction’ a valid one and does it therefore create 
problems for a global egalitarian understanding of morality and justice? That is 
to say: is a situation in which natural inequality of some sort (like in talents, 
health, or natural resources) negatively affects persons morally less unjust than 
circumstances in which our actions and social institutions generate detrimental 
disparities within practices? 
189 
 
As it turns out, in the literature we find convincing arguments that deny that 
the ‘doing versus allowing distinction’ establishes a normative one-way polarity 
to the effect that actions are always worse than omissions. There is no doubt 
that there are some situations in which doing harm is worse than allowing 
harm. If I walk down the street and see a house on fire with people inside it 
screaming for help it is certainly morally reproachable if I become paralyzed by 
fear and as a result the people trapped in the house perish in the fire. However, 
it is clearly morally worse if I would not be a mere passer-by but the one who lit 
the fire in the first place. Nonetheless, as Shelly Kagan points out, there are 
many situations that indicate that “doing harm […] has no intrinsic moral 
significance, in and of itself.”4 00  He takes up an example by James Rachels in 
which an evil-minded person lets his cousin drown in the bath tub so he can 
inherit his fortune.4 01  Here the distinction clearly does not do the normative 
work it does in the case of the house on fire.  
What Kagan’s example does not show, though, is that the ‘doing versus 
allowing distinction’ is never of relevance. Certain more or less direct but 
purposeful and special relationships (such as family ties, friendships, or even 
citizenship) can well be thought to trigger special obligations. But this does not 
mean that obligations deriving from such ‘active’ relationships always trump 
moral duties that we can be thought to have in general and irrespectively of our 
causal involvements in events or relations. Our special obligations can be 
morally justifiable only if they arise within the context or framework of general 
moral duties (as they are outlined by, for instance, the principle of global 
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egalitarianism) that are not limited to those aspects we are causally responsible 
for.4 02  
As Frances Howard-Snyder explains, when we examine the ‘doing versus 
allowing distinction’ and the objections to it, we find that  
The claim that doing harm is no worse than allowing harm flies in the 
face of powerful intuitions to the contrary. I believe that these 
intuitions can be partially explained away by pointing to other 
morally significant distinctions (distinctions concerning intentions, 
difficulty or ease of avoiding the harm, etc.) that often coincide with 
the distinction between doing and allowing harm.4 03   
 
Thus, Howard-Snyder thinks that the distinction “does not refer uniquely .”4 04  
This, though, is bad news for practice-dependent theories of justice. After all, 
defenders of such views rely on a strong notion of interaction. According to the 
latter, we are actively involved in establishing, maintaining, and participating in 
our own institutional practices in a way that we are not in the institutional 
schemes of others. This is why James believes that “in the absence of trade (and 
any further interaction), inequality across societies in total economic output […] 
is not unfair [/unjust] to members of the worse-off society, since no one can 
claim to have had a hand in creating the social advantages realized in a foreign 
society.”4 05  This is furthermore the reason James completely excludes non-
participants unaffected by a practice from the scope of justice: “those unaffected 
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by a practice have no claim under either [the egalitarian as well as the Due Care] 
principle.”4 06   
Of course there can be circumstances in which counteracting socially-caused 
harm is morally more important than fighting naturally-caused harm. A 
government might, for instance, be faced with the choice of either preventing 
civil war among two groups of its citizens or to help another group to avoid 
starvation caused by a local draught. Here it might be of greater importance that 
a civil war will not break out. Such a conflict not only affects the groups involved 
but also undermines the solidarity within the whole society. Thus, in this 
situation we might have reasons to think the government ought to prioritize 
preventing the socially-caused harm over counteracting the naturally-caused 
threat.4 07   
However, what is crucial to note about this example is that it does not 
establish a principled prioritisation for eliminating socially-caused harm. There 
are many other circumstances in which the balance of reasons might tell us first 
to address a naturally-caused harm due to its extremely damaging effects on 
human beings. Examples like the civil war case therefore do not show that doing 
is per se worse than allowing harm. In fact, we can think of a multitude of cases 
in which natural events as such create strong duties for us. If I see you getting 
hit on the head by a roof tile and am the only one around to assist you then I am 
under a binding obligation to help you or call others who can help. Furthermore, 
this obligation is not an optional one, which is indicated by the fact that if I run 
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away and my omission can be proven I can get legally convicted of not assisting 
a person in danger.4 08   
James, as we saw, motivates the moral primacy of being causally responsible 
for harm by appealing to Scanlon’s contractualist account of morality. To 
Scanlon, only personal and generic, but no impersonal reasons are of direct 
relevance to our thinking about what we owe to one another. James wants to use 
Scanlon’s claim to motivate the thought that only personal and generic reasons 
play a role in our interactions. Impersonal reasons, which James understands to 
be those one cannot invoke as part of a personal (self-referential, agent-relative) 
objection and among which he counts a commitment to equality as such,4 09  
would then not be part of what morality covers. However, Scanlon himself 
accepts the thought that impersonal ideas and values can be morally important 
for us. He explains how he understands the way they influence our thinking by 
pointing out that: 
One possibility is that [the impersonal value] is essentially a moral 
idea (rather than one whose basis lies in a notion of rationality or in a 
conception of value that is independent of ideas of right and wrong). 
On this view it is (at least) part of “what we owe to each other” that 
we must promote certain states of affairs, plausibly called “the 
good”.4 1 0   
 
Therefore, also James’s appeal to the Scanlonian picture of morality cannot 
justify a normative primacy of the detrimental effects of human actions over 
naturally harmful states of affairs.  
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Finally, we should note that the strong notions of interaction that practice-
dependent theories rest on are not self-evident. Such rich notions, to recall, are 
necessary to establish the ‘doing versus allowing distinction’ as a sharp contrast 
between human-caused inequality and purely naturally-occurring inequality. 
For two of the great modern philosophers, Kant and Locke, hold (as we saw) 
that owning objects or appropriating them always presents a case of excluding 
all others from this object, which requires justification.4 1 1  That is to say, by 
acquiring something and excluding others from its use one always makes a 
claim on others to accept their exclusion. From Kant’s and Locke’s perspective, 
acquisition and ownership are not morally neutral acts but have to be morally 
acceptable to everyone else. 
However, if we accept (as most philosophers do) Kant’s or Locke’s view 
about initial acquisition and private property, it is not implausible to think that, 
by owning an object, we much more do something to others, rather than merely 
allowing something to happen to them. Acquiring and owning therefore have a 
sense of activity to them and for Kant and Locke require giving a justification to 
everyone else – not only to one’s fellow participants. This tells us that it is not 
unreasonable for us to think of existing practices as involving doing things to 
others. What that means, though, is that we cannot as neatly square practice-
internal effects of interaction with ‘doing’ and practice-external effects of 
interaction with ‘allowing’ as practice-dependent theorists like to think. This is 
to say that, even if the ‘doing versus allowing distinction’ were correct, it is not 
clear that interactionists are entitled to think that we allow, rather than actively 
                                                                 
41 1  See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (trans. Mary  Gregor) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University  Press, 1996), pp. 7 3, 88, and John Locke, Second Treatise of 
Government (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company , 1980), p. 21 .  
194 
 
uphold, global inequality. We thus have good reasons to dismiss the first 
objection against the idea of the global scope of justice. 
 
9. Why Ought does not imply Can in a Strict Sense 
Is the ‘ought-implies-can’ principle plausible and can it justify the thought that 
we never have duties to work toward improving what is currently unfeasible 
because infeasibility rules out injustice? Or, put differently, does it matter for 
our thinking about morality that we cannot fully change certain states of affairs 
that are detrimental to people? This thesis, as well, has come under attack. 
While philosophers who invoke the ‘ought-implies-can’ requirement 
normally try to object to goals that are impossible to achieve for any person, on 
one interpretation of this demand the rule has an unwelcome, relativistic 
consequence. It certainly makes sense to gear the rules that regulate our social 
practices toward what we are capable of doing. Otherwise such rules could not 
be followed, which would defeat the very purpose of formulating these 
instructions and they would be “an intolerable burden on liberty.”4 1 2  But, as G. 
A. Cohen explains, such “rules of regulation”4 1 3  (that is to say: practical rules we 
adopt to regulate our interactions in light of what we can expect people to be 
able to do4 1 4 ) do not state or incorporate themselves what would be ideally 
morally desirable or just. The necessary control of our on-going interactions and 
the formulation of optimal moral goals (what Cohen calls the “normative 
ultimate”4 1 5 ) are really two separate things.  
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The relativistic reading of ‘ought-implies-can’, in contrast, runs together two 
aspects: (1) what we think should ideally be the case, and (2) what rules we can 
expect people to conform with. James offers a clear example of this kind of 
confusion when he argues that “if the human condition as we know it (on some 
or any plausible specification) precludes the achievement of one of our favoured 
ideals, the realist asks us to conclude not that the world is tragically unjust, but 
that the favoured ideal cannot be justice.”4 1 6   
But our aspirations of what is desirable are precisely not constrained by our 
physical capacities. It always seems possible for us to imagine a way in which 
things could be better. According to a weaker interpretation of the ‘ought-
implies-can’ requirement, such idealized notions are of practical importance for 
our moral thinking. This might seem contradictory when we know that our 
idealized goals are not realizable for us. But there are a number of examples that 
show that there is nothing inconsistent in the thought that unattainable ideals 
can be of practical relevance to us. 
The probably most striking case in defence of the importance of unrealizable 
moral goals is presented by Christiano. He points out that if our actual 
capacities would determine what can be regrettable or not regrettable then a 
mistaken legal verdict would be merely technically inaccurate – but not 
regrettable. “We know that even the best penal system is likely to convict some 
innocent persons and let some guilty persons go free.”4 1 7  In such cases almost all 
of us will not notice the mistake or else we would try to correct such legal errors. 
However, there is at least one person who – if the relativistic sense of ‘ought 
implies-can’ would be correct – would have to accept an absurd conclusion. 
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Imagine you know you are innocent but are wrongly convicted of a crime by 
a juridical system that works as well as humans can achieve. If Anderson and 
James would be correct then you would have to believe that this verdict is 
indeed not only ‘not regrettable’ for you. Given that the verdict is to determine 
what is just you would also have to accept the mistaken verdict to be a just one 
and that justice has been done to you. This, though, seems to deprive the term 
justice of all of the content we normally attribute to it. This thought has at least 
the following practical implication: if we accept that punishing the innocent is 
unjust we have a strong duty to put a lot of efforts into not punishing the 
innocent – even if we know this is something impossible to always achieve. If it 
would be otherwise it would be hard to claim for us that justice is important or 
that it matters whether we achieve it in our judgment. 
Another example Christiano offers to reveal the implausibility of the 
relativistic version of ‘ought-implies-can’ is cases of lumpy goods. In such a 
situation two persons equally contribute to the production of two unequal goods 
with the result that one of them gets the bigger good and thus more for her work 
than the other one.4 1 8  If our actual capacities really would limit what can be just 
or unjust, in case we are the person receiving the less valuable good, we could 
not think that there is something morally regrettable or inappropriate about this 
necessarily unequal distribution. Again, the strong sense of the requirement 
pushes us toward a counter-intuitive result.  
As these cases demonstrate, moral ideals can be of practical relevance even if 
we are unable to completely realize them. A relativistic notion of ‘ought-implies-
can’ and an interpretation that allows for unfeasible goals of justice both include 
the thesis that there are things that we cannot achieve and that it does not make 
                                                                 
41 8 Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality , p. 36. 
197 
 
sense to design rules that command us to make futile efforts toward realizing 
such ends. However, while sharing this idea the two interpretations arrive at 
fundamentally different conclusions about morality and the world. Given the 
counter-intuitive implications of the relativistic sense of the rule, philosophers 
like Christiano hold that the requirement can establish at most that 
blameworthiness and injustice come apart: no one might be at fault for an 
injustice that exists or could not be prevented from coming about. What also 
comes apart on the non-relativist sense of ‘ought-implies-can’ are the ideas of 
duty and injustice: our actual capacities naturally influence what duties we can 
have and what can be our fault. What our human capacities do not influence, 
though, is what we can think to be ideally just or desirable. Thus, contrary to 
Rawls’s, Anderson’s and James’s arguments it can make sense for us to regard 
detrimental natural inequalities as unjust or regrettable – even if we cannot be 
thought to have obligations to change these states as such duties would have to 
be futile. This amounts to a rejection of the relativistic sense of the ‘ought-
implies-can’ requirement and the role practice-dependent accounts of morality 
assign to it: the rule cannot limit the scope of ideal justice.4 1 9  
The fact that the first two objections of interactionist philosophers against 
the idea of the global scope of justice fail has an important consequence. Since 
allowing harm is in principle not less bad than doing harm and since what is just 
is not limited by our actual capacities, natural states of affairs, and not merely 
human interferences with nature, are subject to considerations of justice. If 
some aspect about the world is such that it is bad for people, who did not do 
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anything to deserve to suffer from it, then we are faced with injustice, no matter 
whether its causes are natural or man-made.  
 
10. Why the Value of Equality does not imply Levelling Down 
However, the fact that states of affairs (and not just our actual capacities) can be 
just or unjust does not show that equality is a value that is per se important for 
justice. We saw that Parfit thinks that what matters is that people are as 
absolutely well off as they should be; for instance, that they have enough air to 
breathe and food to eat. What Parfit thinks is less important is how well off 
people are in relative terms, that is to say: in comparison to one another. The 
latter point, though, is argued for by global egalitarianism and partly accounts 
for the principle’s attractiveness.  
The idea that, if there is nothing that would justify that some people are 
better off than others then no one should be better off than anyone else, is an 
essential egalitarian notion. Philosophers focusing on deontic judgments, like 
Nagel, Anderson, and James, reject the thought that equality is inherently 
valuable. According to their practice-dependent interpretations of morality , 
equality does not matter as such but only if it is necessary to justify something 
else, like the laws we impose on each other (Nagel) or the immediate relations in 
which we stand toward each other (James).  
So in order to defend a global egalitarian view of justice we still have to 
determine whether there is a way for strict or telic philosophers (who hold the 
basic egalitarian belief of the intrinsic value of equality) to avoid the levelling-
down objection. Parfit describes the sort of egalitarian approach that could 
overcome this obstacle as a moderate version of egalitarianism that is located 
199 
 
(normatively speaking) in between strict and deontic theories.4 2 0  Such a 
moderate view would stay committed to the core egalitarian claim that 
“something is lost if there is inequality.”4 2 1  But in addition, a moderate 
egalitarianism would acknowledge that equality is not the only value that is 
relevant for justice.  
We can indeed find an example of such a moderate egalitarian account in 
Christiano’s global theory of equality that aims at promoting the value of states 
of affairs in non-wasteful ways. Christiano’s egalitarian approach allows 
considerations other than equality since he thinks that we cannot comprehend 
this ideal when we see it in isolation. Christiano therefore agrees with Parfit 
that, in order to make sense of equality, we need to view it in connection with 
other ends. For this purpose not just any additional goal will do. When we think 
about distributive justice we are not concerned with, for instance, the 
distribution of pebbles at a beach. It simply is not of normative importance, or 
even a matter of justice, in what pattern these stones are dispersed. That, which 
can render equality morally meaningful, has to be important and conducive to 
us as human beings. The other value, which gives meaning to equality in 
Christiano’s theory, is the well-being of persons. To Christiano it is “the 
requirement of justice that the well-being of persons be equally advanced.”4 2 2  
 This is an intuitively plausible thought. Well-being, as Christiano points out, 
is of instrumental as well as intrinsic importance to us. Well-being, on the one 
hand, is good for us while, on the other hand, a person that has well-being 
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flourishes.4 2 3  Since well-being is that crucial there are strong reasons for us to 
think that justice has to do with its advancement.4 2 4  And it is precisely the fact 
that well-being occupies such an important place in Christiano’s theory that 
makes him a moderate (rather than a strict) egalitarian and his view immune to 
the levelling down objection. For Christiano equality (while being inherently 
valuable) is, firstly, not mandatory irrespectively of what is equalized. He 
furthermore holds, secondly, what is to be equalized (well-being) is such that 
having more of it is better than having less of it. Thus, his egalitarian theory 
does not commit him to the claim that equality is a mandatory aim regardless of 
what its achievement costs.  
However, the value of well-being does not by itself explain why distributive 
equality is morally important. To show that equality in distribution is itself 
valuable Christiano points to three other considerations. All of them concern 
aspects that are fundamentally relevant for our thinking about how to distribute 
goods that enable people to achieve well-being in their lives.  
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In the First Chapter of this thesis4 2 5  we already came across the first two 
points. The generic sense of justice demands that we treat like cases alike and 
unlike cases differently. This rule ensures the impartiality that we normally 
associate with the idea of justice. On its own though, it cannot explain why we 
all ought to have our well-being advanced equally. This is because the generic 
principle does not indicate by itself what persons are to be considered alike 
cases. The second consideration Christiano appeals to gives us some material to 
which to apply this principle. 
According to the principle of propriety people should be given their due. The 
latter is determined by their status or a particular quality of theirs.4 2 6  What 
characterizes all of us healthy human beings is our shared humanity that is 
normally taken to establish an equal moral worth or status that all of us possess. 
The question of what exactly justifies this exclusive human moral status is, as 
Christiano admits, extremely difficult to answer.4 2 7  In Kant’s spirit he argues, 
though, that only we humans possess a capacity to see, appreciate, and even 
produce values or things of value in this world. Every one of us, in his words, is 
“a kind of authority in the realm of value.”4 2 8  This is to say that, on the one 
hand, human beings possess the unique capacity to recognise, appreciate, and 
produce values. On the other hand, Christiano holds that the exercise of this 
capacity is itself valuable. For him, these two aspects about human beings 
constitute the unique quality that entitles all of us to a certain respect. However, 
our equal moral status, which indicates that we all present alike cases in some 
respect, is not sufficient either to show that justice requires that we are equally 
treated when it comes to the distribution of what is beneficial for us. Our equal 
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moral worth still leaves open the possibility that there are other aspects about us 
relevant for the determination of our distributive entitlements. 
The final element of Christiano’s case for the intrinsic importance of equality 
is therefore the ‘no-relevant-difference’ thesis. The latter is a core argument of 
strict egalitarian views and says that “there is nothing to make it just that some 
are better (or worse) off than others.”4 2 9  For Christiano, even differences in our 
actual capacities to value things in the world cannot endanger this thesis. 
According to him such inequalities in our abilities are either negligible or they 
are themselves the results of the external circumstances we live in.4 3 0  Thus, we 
are not responsible for them in a sense that could have an effect on the 
determination of what distributive shares of goods we can claim.  
Christiano holds the ‘no-relevant-difference’ thesis since he is in general 
critical of all ideas that other philosophers invoke with the aim of justifying a 
differential treatment of people. He rejects the thought that people are entitled 
to greater distributive shares than others in virtue of what they produce (the 
principle of productivity) or have achieved (the principle of desert). The 
problem of these principles is that “each […] requires that prior conditions be in 
place in order for them to be legitimate.”4 3 1  They need a baseline that ensures a 
level ‘playing field’ for all persons to try to be productive and become deserving. 
At least up to a certain age we normally think none of us is entirely responsible 
for our choices. As a result, we normally think that until we have reached a 
certain level of maturity there are no morally relevant differences between us 
with respect to our distributive entitlements. This situation, Christiano thinks, 
largely stays the same throughout our lives as we always require equal 
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opportunities to merit special praise for our achievements or blame for failing to 
use the options available to us.  
However, as with most egalitarian theories Christiano’s approach is not 
deterministic. His view leaves room for the possibility that we waste or forfeit 
the entitlements that we are normally due as human beings when we, for 
instance, unduly infringe upon what justly belongs to others. Christiano’s 
approach also allows for a situation in which some are worse off because they 
wasted the opportunities and goods that they were initially entitled to. 
Christiano builds his argument for the intrinsic importance of equality in the 
following way: 
(1) If justice is concerned with the advancement of the intrinsic value of well-
being, 
(2) And if it requires us to treat like cases alike, 
(3) When justice furthermore tells us to give people what they are due and 
we all possess the same moral worth, 
(4) And it is also true that, with respect to the distribution of goods, there are 
no morally relevant differences among us in addition to our equal moral 
status,  
(5) Then it follows that the only distribution that can do justice to us and our 
status is an equal one: “there is only one level of well-being that can 
satisfy the generic principle of justice, the fundamental value of well-
being, and the fact of no relevant differences among equals, and that is 
the level at which there is equality of well-being.”4 3 2  
                                                                 
432 Thomas Christiano, “A Foundation for Egalitarianism”, p. 63.  
204 
 
Since it constitutes the only defensible distribution equality has intrinsic value. 
Every state of distributive inequality accordingly presents a case of injustice or 
is morally bad in the sense that the equality that is normatively demanded is 
absent in this situation. So here we have a rather extreme answer to the 
question we started out with at the beginning of our discussion: according to 
Christiano all detrimental inequalities among persons are morally 
objectionable. 
The fact that equality is not the only intrinsic value in Christiano’s theory 
saves it from succumbing to the levelling down objection. The latter, to recall, 
argues that equality is problematic since it favours aiming for an equal state of 
affairs when there is nothing beneficial in achieving this state. But this is not 
what Christiano’s moderate egalitarianism implies. He identifies a crucial gap in 
the levelling down objection that he can exploit because of the role he assigns to 
the value of well-being in his theory: the importance of well-being indicates that 
what is to be equalized as a matter of justice must be of such a quality that it 
must be true that having more of it is better than having less. With respect to 
justice, we saw, we are concerned with what is beneficial to us as human beings 
and not with something negligible like pebbles on a beach. Therefore, Christiano 
argues that  
There is an internal connection between the rationale for equality 
and the value of the relevant fundamental good that is equalized. If it 
were not true that more well-being is better than less, then there 
would be no point in equality. There would be no reason to care 
about equality.4 3 3   
 
So given the importance well-being has for us there can be nothing in the value 
of equality that would suggest that it is better if some people are worse off as a 
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result of our efforts to increase interpersonal equality  if no one is thereby made 
better off.  
 The crucial consequence of this insight is that not every kind of equality is 
better than any sort of inequality.4 3 4  If we take up again the example of blind 
and sighted persons Christiano’s theory does tell us that there is something bad 
about this unequal state. No person has done anything to deserve being blind 
and it thus would be better if no one would be blind because being blind is a 
disadvantage. The fact that some persons are nonetheless blind therefore 
constitutes a (natural) injustice. However, the badness of the inequality between 
blind and sighted people does not call for a form of equality that could only be 
achieved in ways that would be good for no one. The injustice of the blindness of 
some does not require us to make everyone blind so as to restore interpersonal 
equality. Blindness is unjust only because it is detrimental to people. Thus, 
justice (which is concerned with the distribution of what is good for us in 
accordance with our status) cannot call for the mutilation of all sighted people. 
What it would call for, though, is to make blind people see if this would be 
possible for us in ways that does not make everyone significantly worse off due 
to the involved costs.  
 Furthermore, in contrast to interactionist views of morality Christiano’s 
moderate egalitarianism gives us reasons to think that the fact that some people 
cannot be helped and have to be worse off than others is not merely something 
to feel sorry about. If some have to have less well-being through no fault of their 
own this is rather something we ought to deplore like we deplore any other 
instance of injustice.4 3 5  However, this leaves us with the following problems. 
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How can an unjust unequal state be better than some just equal state? And how 
are we to know when inequality is preferable over equality? 
 
11. The Least Unequal Possible Distribution as Justified Injustice 
We need a principled way to determine when inequality can be acceptable 
although it involves injustice. Without such a method we necessarily meet 
conflicts between equality and well-being when distributing a limited amount of 
benefits among persons.  
We encounter such situations all the time. One example is the comparison 
between the blind and the sighted: according to Parfit, equality seems to require 
levelling down but with Christiano we can understand that the importance of 
well-being tells us to not waste benefits like vision. If there would be no rule for 
solving situations in which equality and well-being demand different things 
Christiano’s theory (and with it the kind of egalitarianism that is save from the 
levelling down objection) would be impractical and thus incoherent.  
Christiano offers a rule that helps us to come as close to the ideally just state 
of an equal distribution as is possible in every situation.4 3 6  His “divergence rule 
of approximation”4 3 7  is a complex construct. Fortunately he also names four 
general criteria a standard that is egalitarian but avoids the levelling down 
objection must have.  
(1) The first desideratum accounts for moderate egalitarianism’s 
commitment to the belief that only equality is fully just and that, 
conversely, all detrimental interpersonal inequalities are unjust. It says 
that the optimal state is an equal one and must be realized when feasible. 
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(2) The second criterion limits the first one by stating that we must not aim 
at equality when this means that we have to waste benefits. If for 
bringing about an equal state we have to make some people worse off in a 
way that benefits no one then justice does not demand equality. 
Christiano reminds us that “this aspect of the rule follows from the 
importance of the well-being of all persons that is essential to the 
principle of equality.”4 3 8  
(3) The third constraint on the rule is that it must never aim for average or 
total utility. Since we are concerned with the distribution of well-being as 
a matter of justice it does essentially matter who of us receives how much 
of the available means for our pursuit of well-being. This criterion 
therefore rules out a utilitarian calculus that would want us to maximize 
overall well-being irrespectively of the way it is distributed among 
people. 
(4) The last desideratum for a rule that tells us when unjust inequality is 
better than just equality has the purpose of avoiding an additional 
problem that can arise for moderate versions of egalitarianism. 
According to what Christiano calls “quasi levelling down”4 3 9  equality 
seems to demand that, no matter how great the gains for some, we 
cannot allow them to come about if they would cause others to be a little 
worse off than they would otherwise be. In this way , an egalitarian rule 
that would never allow suchlike gains would effectively prohibit and thus 
“waste” potentially large amounts of benefits that people could have. To 
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avoid this conclusion Christiano wants to allow for distributions that save 
a large amount of benefits at the expense of some persons.4 4 0  
A method that respects these four criteria accounts for the fact that perfect 
justice is often not realizable for us. As we saw in the criticism of the ‘ought-
implies-can’ thesis, our capacities constrain what we can achieve. But this does 
not mean that what is just must not be infeasible. Ideal justice, Christiano holds, 
plays an important role for us as “it serves as an ideal to be  approximated.”4 4 1  
What distributive justice therefore demands of us is to “identify a circumstance 
or situation in terms of the highest level of average utility that is feasible for the 
persons involved.”4 4 2   
 Due to our equal moral status and the lack of relevant differences among us 
justice demands that we distribute the benefits that are available to us equally. 
It does not require us to share in each other ’s misfortune that cannot be 
changed. What we therefore ought to aim at is the least unjust state of affairs 
that often will not be full justice but a case of “justified injustice.”4 4 3  The 
illustration of the divergence rule of approximation concludes Christiano’s 
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argument for equality. With his theory at hand we are now in a position to arrive 
at an answer to what detrimental inequalities are morally objectionable. 
 
12.  Conclusion: the Scope of Justice is Global 
What does Christiano’s account of moderate egalitarianism mean for our 
discussion?  
 We began considering this theory as a possible defence of the idea that 
equality is valuable as such against the charges of Parfit. Parfit’s arguments 
against the idea that equality has inherent value support the case of 
philosophers who think of morality as practice-dependent. Christiano’s view, 
however, shows that it is possible to hold the position of strict egalitarians, that 
there is something bad and unjust about all inequality, without having to accept 
Parfit’s powerful levelling down objection: even though equality is per se 
valuable it does not require us achieve it in ways that are good for no one.  
Since Christiano’s defence of equality seems plausible and successful in 
avoiding Parfit’s objection we can consider the third objection of advocates of 
practice-dependent views of justice to the principle of global egalitarianism 
void. Moderate egalitarianism tells us that the scope of justice is not limited to 
those inequalities that regard absolute levels of well-being. Instead, as soon as 
we have a situation in which goods are not infinite, how much one person has in 
comparison to others does matter morally. Parfit’s example of the mountaineer 
short of breath does not really hit home because air is a good of which we 
normally have enough to satisfy everyone’s needs.  
This is different, though, if we imagine a situation on board a space station 
that has a leak. Assuming that rescue is under way and it therefore still matters 
how the remaining air is used it now matters how much oxygen every astronaut 
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is allowed to use. If we assume that every astronaut needs the same amount of 
air to survive, equal levels intuitively seem to be the only just solution in this 
situation. However, as Christiano’s defence of equality shows, even in case there 
is only enough breathable air to save some of the astronauts moderate 
egalitarianism does not demand that the oxygen is distributed equally so that all 
are left to suffocate. In this situation justice can be thought to demand (cruel as 
this is) to draw lots and in this way to save as many people as possible. Thus, the 
scope of justice is global with respect to the all kinds of detrimental inequality. 
Contrary to Parfit’s assumptions it encompasses relative as well as absolute 
levels of the possession of goods. 
Before we examined Christiano’s view we had already established that the 
scope of justice is global in another respect. The invalidation of the first two 
objections that supporters of practice-dependent accounts of morality advance 
against a universal conception of justice showed that the latter idea is not 
limited to existing interactions. The rejection of the thought that ‘doing versus 
allowing’ constitutes a fundamental moral distinction has the consequence that  
judgments of justice are not reserved for human interferences with nature. We 
can instead also think in terms of justice of purely naturally-occurring states of 
affairs such as the distribution of talents, handicaps, and natural resources.  
As we saw, there are furthermore strong reasons telling against the second 
objection of defenders of interactionist interpretations of morality that is based 
on the thesis that ‘ought-implies-can’. Morality works with ideal, counter-
factual ends and conceptions of value that are not influenced by our physical 
capacities.4 4 4  What we are able to achieve certainly constrains the duties we can 
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be thought to have because instructions we cannot follow are pointless. 
However, this does not mean that the world could not be more just if we could 
improve certain states of affairs that we cannot currently influence. What is 
ideally just or correct or accepted as plausible is, on the other hand, safe from 
our individual limitations or mistakes. Justice therefore does not obey the 
relativistic sense of ‘ought-implies-can’. The invalidation of these first two 
objections indicates that the value of natural states of affairs as well can become 
subject to considerations of justice. Morality, this is to say, is not purely of a 
practice-dependent nature and does not exclusively regard the effects our 
existing interactions have on us and others. 
Taken together the rejection of all three objections against the idea of the 
global scope of justice constitutes a severe blow to advocates of practice-
dependent views of morality such as the actual and reformed practice views of 
justice. Their claim that detrimental inequalities, which are not the result of our 
common practices, are not concerns of justice seems implausible now that we 
determined their objections to be invalid. So even though the detrimental 
inequality in scenario E has purely natural causes we should not believe that 
they are not offensive and unjust to the ones who are disadvantaged by them. 
Consequently, when we think about what justice requires with regard to 
those things that are beneficial to us we have to consider everyone’s claims on 
the planet as equal – which amounts to embracing the global egalitarian 
perspective on justice. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that Christiano sees 
his own theory as an instance of global egalitarianism. As such it “asserts that 
the fundamental norms of justice that ground the legitimacy and justice of the 
political communities of modern states are ones that hold for the whole world 
212 
 
community.”4 4 5  Thus, in contrast to the assumptions of defenders of 
interactionist conceptions of morality the existence of common practices and 
political authority is not a necessary condition of the application of justice. This 
equals saying that the scope of justice is in fact global. As Christiano’s moderate 
egalitarianism shows, everyone’s (practice-independent) distributive 
entitlements are the same, no matter the associations to which we belong. 
  
                                                                 
445 Thomas Christiano, “Immigration, Political Community , and Cosmopolitanism”, San Diego 
Law Review 45(4) (2008): pp. 933-962, p. 933. 
213 
 
Chapter V: The Argument for Coercive Global 
Authorities 
 
In the last chapter we saw that there are weighty reasons to think that the scope 
of distributive justice is global. That is to say that, in general, detrimental 
inequalities and naturally-caused but remediable harm are as much concerns 
from the perspective of distributive justice as are absolute harmful disparities 
among persons and socially-caused harm. The consequence of this view is that, 
due to our equal moral status, every person’s entitlement to a share of what 
enhances human beings’ well-being is generally equal.  
However, it would be premature for us to conclude from this abstract 
universal equality that a plausible account of distributive justice has to demand 
that we aim at actually making everyone everywhere equal with respect to their 
access to (or even possession of) such beneficial goods. The latter as an objective 
can be called complete substantive (in contrast to merely formal) equality in 
distribution. It is important for us to understand what this idea would require of 
us.  
Given the naturally occurring inequalities among persons and the 
difficulties to obtain the information about everything that is relevant for the 
achievement of well-being, we can expect that working toward such an objective 
would take up most of our resources and time. This is, of course, not a decisive 
argument against adopting complete global substantive equality as one of our 
goals if that is what distributive justice does require of us. In the literature on 
distributive justice, though, there are a number of important reasons that tell 
against this conceivable but demanding objective.  
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However, the main focus of this chapter will not be on arguments that 
constrain what duties and goals we can derive from the principle of global 
egalitarianism. Rather, we will centre our attention on defending one particular 
and pivotal obligation that must be entailed by global egalitarianism: the duty to 
establish coercive global authorities that can administer and enforce global 
egalitarian justice. For this purpose we will discuss and invalidate two 
important general reservations about the possibility of institutionalizing 
conceptions of global justice. The chapter will begin, though, with some 
requisite remarks on considerations that can be thought to influence the duties 
and objectives that are justifiable and based on the principle of global 
egalitarianism. 
 
1. Deontic Considerations: Relevant for the Content, not the 
Scope, of Duties of Justice  
It is important to note that the relevant considerations tempering the pursuit of 
complete global substantive equality are not available from within the telic 
structure of the global egalitarian argument (which derives from the idea of the 
global scope of justice).  
As we saw in Chapter Four, Thomas Christiano’s principle of equality (which 
constitutes one of the pillars of the argument for the global scope of justice) 
does allow for certain departures from complete distributive equality. But these 
deviations, as was shown, are concessions to the way our world actually is. They 
are permissible only in circumstances where actual equality is either infeasible 
or would require us to make some people worse off without thereby making 
anyone better off. The arguments against complete global substantive equality 
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we will briefly mention here are of a different, non-telic and non-instrumental 
kind.  
These additional non-telic, non-instrumental reservations against complete 
global distributive equality importantly are of a primarily deontic nature.4 4 6  
Derek Parfit, to recall, defines deontic aspects about justice as those that do not 
derive fundamentally from the value of outcomes but from something else.4 4 7  
Deontic considerations instead are concerned with how outcomes and aims are 
brought about, and in particular with actions.4 4 8  However, contrary to the 
claims of interactionist philosophers (as we saw in Chapter Four) these deontic 
reasons do not affect the scope of distributive justice. Instead, they affect the 
content of our duties of global distributive justice. This role of deontic 
considerations adds a new dimension to our discussion of global egalitarian 
distributive justice and does not simply tell us how best to achieve the ends set 
by this idea.  
 
 
                                                                 
446 There also is another instrumental reason against complete distributive equality  mentioned 
by  Christiano (see Thomas Christiano, “Cohen on Incentives, Inequality, and Egalitarianism” 
in Christi Favor, Gerald F. Gaus, Julian Lamont (eds.), Essays on Philosophy, Politics & 
Economics: Integration and Common Research Projects  (Stanford: Stanford University  
Press, 2010): pp. 173-200). Christiano thinks that the efficient production of distributable 
goods depends on people knowing what their inter ests are and what they  are good at. But 
this “crucial information [about our talents and interests] can only come about when people 
act in their self-interest to some extent. Individuals will only  be able to acquire information 
about these matters if they  focus on their interests and ignore the interests of others, and 
then act on those interests. Otherwise each will be lost in a maze of unmanageable 
considerations” (Thomas Christiano, ibid., p. 192). Christiano thinks that in order for us to 
find out about our talents and inclinations in general we need to explore our interests. And in 
this regard “wage incentives are opportunities for me to discover whether and to what extent 
a job is desirable to me and whether the wage incentive adequately compensates th e burden 
undertaken.” (Thomas Christiano, ibid., p. 195). Therefore, some substantive inequality  in 
distribution seems necessary if we want our society to also be efficient and to not lapse into  
poverty. However, this consideration stays within the telic s tructure of the global egalitarian 
argument and, thus, does not belong to the group of deontic reasons against complete 
equality  which we want to explore at this point.  
447  See Derek Parfit, “Equality  or Priority ?” in Matthew Clay ton, Andrew Williams (eds.) , The 
Ideal of Equality  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002): pp. 81 -125, p. 84. 
448 See Derek Parfit, ibid., p. 90. 
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(1) The Legitimate Pursuit of Justice 
The first deontic reservation with respect to complete substantive global 
equality regards an aspect about the conditions of a legitimate collective 
decision-making process that we already came across in Chapter One.4 4 9  Still, it 
is important for us to understand how this deontic consideration can affect the 
realization of global egalitarianism. 
Global egalitarians like Christiano acknowledge that there is an important 
distinction between abstract ideal justice and social justice as we implement it 
among people. In Christiano’s understanding, social justice denotes “the 
attempt to realize the highly impersonal and abstract conception of justice […] 
in the institutions and interactions among persons.”4 5 0  In contrast to abstract 
philosophical argumentation that follows certain criteria accepted by the 
academic community, social justice has to be acceptable to persons outside 
academia as well who often apply different standards in discussion. Because we 
must not disrespect the opinion of people whose views we cannot disregard as 
obviously false Christiano emphasizes that “social justice requires that justice 
must not only be done, it must be seen to be done.”4 5 1  
Rawls, to recall, thinks that the fact of reasonable pluralism, which is “the 
characteristic work of practical reason over time under enduring free 
institutions,”4 5 2  necessitates two things. Firstly, we have to adopt egalitarian 
collective decision-making procedures (like democratic elections). Secondly, we 
have to respect the outcome of this procedure as long as the result is acceptable 
                                                                 
449 See Chapter One, Section Five. 
450 Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality. Democratic Authority and its Limits  
(Oxford: Oxford University  Press, 2008), p. 46. 
451  Thomas Christiano, ibid., p. 46. 
452 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New Y ork: Columbia University  Press, 1993), p. 135.  
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to those holding what Rawls calls “reasonable comprehensive doctrines” 4 5 3  of 
what is good and just in like. It is therefore possible that people would select 
other, less plausible but not unreasonable, objectives than to aim at complete 
substantive global equality.  
(2) Issues of Complexity Concerning the Implementation of Goals of Justice 
The second deontic reservation that has to be mentioned here is the problem of 
complex variables that might impair our efforts to realize global egalitarianism. 
Jerry Gaus states, for instance, that when trying to realize particular socio-
economic objectives (like forms of distributive equality or an increased interest 
of the population in political issues) we are faced with a highly problematic 
complexity of variables. Referring to the studies of the mathematician Donald 
Saari, Gaus argues that “the level of complexity of economic systems dwarfs that 
of the systems studied by most natural scientists.”4 5 4  This complexity of socio-
economic systems “derives from aggregation out of the unlimited variety of 
preferences, “preferences that define a sufficiently large dimensional domain 
that, when aggregated, can generate all imaginable forms of pathological 
behavior”.”4 5 5  As a result, we are often unable to predict what policy can best 
realize a desired end.4 5 6  
 The problem of lacking the means to achieve distributive justice also worries 
David Hume who argues that  
                                                                 
453 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 58. 
454 Gerald F. Gaus, “Is the Public Incompetent? Compared to Whom? About What?”, Critical 
Review  20(3) (2008): pp. 291 -311, p. 299. 
455 Gerald F. Gaus, “Social Complexity  and Evolved Moral Principles” in Louis Hunt, Peter 
McNamara (eds.), Liberalism, Conservatism, and Hayek’s Idea of Spontaneous Order  
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007 ): pp. 149-17 6, p. 157 . 
456 For Gaus, herein lies a particularly  strong argument for the importance of deontic 
considerations and rules when it comes to realizing telic goals, see Gerald F. Gaus, “Is the 
Public Incompetent? Compared to Whom? About What?”, p. 306. See also John Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  Press, 197 1), p. 7 5.  
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However specious these ideas of perfect equality may seem, they are 
really, at bottom, impracticable; […]. The most rigorous inquisition 
too is requisite to watch every inequality on its first appearance; and 
the most severe jurisdiction, to punish and redress it. But besides, 
that so much authority must soon degenerate into tyranny, and be 
exerted with great partialities; who can possibly be possessed of it?4 5 7  
 
Liberal and global egalitarian philosophers alike acknowledge that abstract 
ideals, like compensation for a lack of natural talents or handicaps, would 
require information that it is hard, impermissible, or impossible to come by. If 
we were, for instance, to try to make everyone completely equally well off we 
would need to know, among other things, how much well-being and satisfaction 
people get out of the work they do.4 5 8  We would also have to be certain about 
how much effort they put into their work that contributes to the production of 
goods that then can be distributed.  
 According to the egalitarian idea if a person is, through no fault of her own, 
less able to produce things of value (for example because she lacks the physical 
conditions, the natural talents, or ambitiousness for this task) then this person 
ought not to have less of those things that can increase persons’ well-being. 
However, if a person is simply lazy and thus chooses to be less productive, or 
wastes the benefits she receives in accordance with the demands of social justice 
then she ought not to be compensated for the losses in distributive benefits she 
thus incurs.4 5 9  This is to say that often we will encounter problems of feasibility 
                                                                 
457  David Hume, “An Enquiry  Concerning the Principles of Morals” in Moral Philosophy  (ed. G. 
Say re-McCord) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company , 2006): pp. 185 -383, p. 205. 
458 For the difficulties that indiv iduals face in comparing their own situation to that of others see 
Andrew Williams, “Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 27 (3) 
(1998): pp. 225-247 . Here Williams points out, for instance, that “ in a large society , it is 
extremely  unlikely  that indiv iduals could obtain reliable information about each other’s 
relative levels of job satisfaction, the extent to which their past  decisions render them 
responsible for inequalities in those levels, and the appropriate amount of financial 
compensation for any  remaining unchosen disadvantages” (see  Andrew Williams, ibid., p. 
239). 
459 Different egalitarian theories disagree about the de gree to which people should be held 
responsible for their own productiv ity . In this respect Rawls’s Theory of Justice  and the 
Difference Principle it advocates are more permissible than, for instance, Ronald Dworkin’s 
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when it comes to implementing goals we accept collectively as those we should 
pursue.  
These two deontic reservations regarding legitimate public decision-
procedures and the realisability of collective goals of justice do not challenge the 
plausibility of the principle of global egalitarianism. They do not affect the scope 
but rather the content of the duties that are derivable from this principle. 
Nonetheless, in the context of this final chapter it was necessary to mention 
these concerns to avoid giving the impression that when we accept global 
egalitarianism we are incapable of taking into account other (possibly 
countervailing) reasons. This would in general be a violation of the idea of 
moderate egalitarianism,4 6 0  of which global egalitarianism is a variant.   
 
2. Justifiable Global Egalitarian Duties 
What global egalitarian goals are justifiable despite these two deontic 
reservations we just considered? Our discussion of global egalitarianism has 
shown that according to this principle we have at the least the following duties. 
Within existing practices we need to ensure background justice (which 
includes the material basis of fair equality of opportunities and compensation 
for undeserved disadvantages) and a fair distribution of the benefits and 
burdens among the participants of such cooperative efforts. These duties 
require quite clearly, for instance, a reform of the existing global governance 
institutions (such as the UN, WTO, IMF, World Bank) and possibly the creation 
of new ones in areas where global interactions are under-regulated.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
conception of ‘equality of resources’.  According to the latter people should alway s bear the 
costs of their cherished preferences.  
460 See Chapter Four, Section Ten.  
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However, according to the principle of global egalitarianism any particular 
practices are only permissible within a larger framework of rules that ensure 
certain procedural and substantive entitlements for everyone. Every human 
being must at least enjoy a socio-economic minimum which is “necessary to 
advancing the interests that are secured by liberal and democratic rights. […] 
Without a basic minimum a person normally cannot successfully exercise the 
liberal and democratic rights.”4 6 1  Therefore, also the deontic reasons 
emphasizing the importance of public processes and justification back this call 
for a socio-economic minimum.4 6 2  Such a goal is certainly a very modest 
demand and we might be able to theoretically justify more extensive global 
distributive duties on the basis of global egalitarianism. In the context of the 
present discussion, though, we are concerned with identifying clearly justifiable 
practical demands that global egalitarians can defend.  
 However, what is important to note is that the global egalitarian position 
does not therefore amount to another version of the well-known sufficiency 
principle. The latter, as Harry Frankfurt explains, tell us that distributive justice 
‘merely’ demands of us to ensure “that each should have enough.”4 6 3  As Paula 
Casal shows, egalitarians (like global egalitarians) also can, and should, accept 
the positive thesis affirmed by the sufficiency principle, namely “that it is 
extremely important to eliminate deprivations.”4 6 4  What distinguishes 
egalitarians form sufficientarians, though, is that the former, but not the latter, 
reject the negative thesis of the sufficiency principle, which claims that beyond 
this sufficiency threshold detrimental inequalities are not a matter of 
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distributive justice.4 6 5  The low key demand for a global socio-economic 
minimum is rather due to our moderate objective to find clearly defendable 
global egalitarian rules and goals. What constitutes the particular nature of 
global egalitarianism is the thought that this decent minimum is an entitlement 
that human beings possess irrespectively of where they live, what resources 
their states controls within its territory, and whether they are participants in any 
particular practice. This is the crucial outcome of the argument for the global 
scope of justice that forms the core of global egalitarianism.    
Furthermore, this principle requires of us that, even if we assume a 
situation in which everyone has enough, it is not enough for us simply to refrain 
from making others worse off than they currently are. The universal importance 
of practice-independent entitlements we identified in Chapter Three also leads 
to the demand that all of us should possess the same opportunities and access to 
the resources available to humankind and that we need to develop and progress. 
This also regards goods and resources that are right now unavailable to us but 
might become accessible in the future. Global egalitarianism cannot allow for a 
usage of currently unused and unclaimed resources on a ‘first-come-first-served’ 
basis. Thus, we see that already these few but (from a global egalitarian 
standpoint) uncontroversial obligations indicate that we have quite extensive 
duties of redistribution and reform on a global scale. 
The obligations we just outlined all point toward one vital obligation: as 
supporters of the principle of global egalitarianism we must endorse the duty to 
reform existing and establish new coercive global authorities. Without these 
institutions, it can be reasonably claimed, no duties of global distributive justice 
are realizable whatsoever. As Thomas Nagel plausibly claims, “justice […] 
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requires government as an enabling condition.”4 6 6  This is because justice 
presupposes “the coordinated conduct of large numbers of people, which cannot 
be achieved without law backed up by a monopoly of force.”4 6 7  On the other 
hand, if there reasons to think that we cannot create the institutions necessary 
to enforce and work toward global justice, Nagel would seem correct in thinking 
that global justice is an idea without application.4 6 8  Thus, we can now turn to 
the main problems this chapter aims to address.  These are issues that generally 
concern the institutionalizability of conceptions of global justice. 
 
3. Democratic Qualms about the Realisability of Global 
Egalitarianism  
In what follows we will consider two important objections to the possibility of 
coercively enforcing global egalitarianism by means of creating global 
governance authorities. One challenge to the idea of coercive global institutions 
is voiced by democratic theorists,4 6 9  another by Kantian philosophers who refer 
to Kant’s rejection of the idea of a world government.4 7 0  We shall start with the 
democratic challenge to global egalitarianism.  
Some democratic theorists take the premise of the moral equality of people 
to imply that everyone needs to have an equal say in the public debate and 
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decision-making process on collective matters (like distributive justice). 
Otherwise, these democrats hold, rule enforcement in these matters is not 
morally acceptable. This is to say that also the global egalitarian account of 
global egalitarian justice must presuppose democratic global institutions so that 
we can arrive at legitimate objectives and rules of global justice.  
However, as Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane point out, the empirical 
conditions for global democratic structures do not currently exist and cannot 
reasonably be expected to develop any time soon.4 7 1  Among the missing social 
and political conditions for international democratic authorities they mention 
are a functioning global democratic structure (like a world parliament, 
executive, and judiciary), an interlinked global demos, and indispensable non-
political democratic institutions like a free global press or an active global civil 
society. Furthermore, Otfried Höffe draws attention to the fact that widespread 
literacy among people is a precondition for both, a free global press to have an 
effect, and for the formation of a global civil society.4 7 2  Thus, establishing global 
democratic structures, within which people could deliberate and decide on the 
details of distributive justice on a global scale, simply seem unfeasible.  
However, what is worse, according to Christiano, is that even if global 
democratic institutions would be feasible the normative conditions for their 
legitimacy are currently unfulfilled. Democratic procedures, Christiano argues, 
are valuable within and only within political contexts in which people have 
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“roughly equal stakes”4 7 3  in the decisions that are collectively made. Within 
modern nation states people decide on, and live by, public rules that profoundly 
influence the ways they can live their lives while they often disagree on what the 
correct rules are. Here democratic decision-making is indispensable since it is 
the only way to give everyone the equal say in public matters that they are 
entitled to by virtue of their equal moral status. Furthermore, democratic 
structures are the most effective way we know of to check the power of political 
authorities and to hold them accountable for their actions.  
Christiano argues, though, that there are good reasons to think that not all 
of us have equal stakes in the exchanges and cooperation that is going on in the 
global sphere. One example of uneven stakes is the different degrees to which 
national economies are involved in international trade. In 2011, a much larger 
part of the gross national product of a national economy like Germany’s is 
generated by (and dependent on) exports than is the case with an economy like 
Mali’s. Thus, Germany currently has a greater stakes in the way international 
markets are regulated than Mali.  
But even in our globalized age it is still true that the closer we are to each 
other the more we affect the way we can live our lives. Nation states simply have 
evolved as the political structures in which we primarily regulate our public lives 
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with common rules. And this is why it matters morally that within these states 
there are democratic procedures to make collective decisions about the rules 
that coordinate our co-existence as citizens. Democratic procedures in a state 
would have less value if it would not be true that states constitute the primary 
contexts within which we intensely affect each other. As citizens of the same 
state we are interdependent to an extent that is not reached in the international 
sphere. Thus, normatively speaking, the jurisdiction for collective decision-
making about social justice is based on the impact we have on each other. As 
Christiano says,  
There must be some kind of equality of stakes in the 
interdependence, where by ‘stake’ I mean the susceptibility of a 
person’s interests or well-being to be advanced or set back by 
realistically possible ways of organizing the interdependent group. If 
one group of persons has a very large stake in a community, in which 
there is interdependence of interests, and another has a fairly small 
stake, it seems unfair to give each an equal say in decision-making 
over this community.4 7 4  
 
But apparently the situation is not quite like this in the global sphere. Here what 
people do at one place does not always or often have an equal impact on all 
others. The magnitude of the impact largely depends on how intensely people 
are connected with each other. For this reason, it seems inappropriate to give 
everyone an equal say in how international trade should be set up. This thought 
leads to the conclusion that currently, and given the way our world is at present, 
there are no normative grounds for establishing global democratic structures for 
all decisions and matters of justice. As Christiano concludes, “we find ourselves 
in the position which usually calls for democratic decision making but without 
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the possibility of global democratic institutions.”4 7 5  For democrats like 
Christiano, we have thus no reasons to hope that a coercive enforcement of 
conceptions of global justice is possible at all. 
Someone might argue that global democracy cold still be a better way to 
promote justice globally than the current system of states which generates so 
much problematic inequality. But given the current lack of the social and 
political as well as the normative conditions of global democratic structures we 
have to assert that it would take enormous efforts and resources to establish 
these necessary elements. It therefore seems more plausible for us to work 
toward some international political order that would rest on a sound normative 
basis in light of how our world currently is. Thus, the objections against global 
democracy are also worries about the feasibility of institutionalizing a global 
discourse about many of the details of social justice. A global discourse and 
decision-making procedures, as we saw in the beginning of the chapter, though, 
might be thought necessary for the legitimate selection of the details of global 
social justice.  
 
4. Kantian Doubts about the Possibility of Global Institutions 
There is of course no space here to outline the whole system of Kant’s legal and 
political philosophy, of which the argument against global institutions is one 
ultimate result. As Arthur Ripstein shows, this legal and political theory rests on 
two controversial assumptions that we rejected in our defence of global 
egalitarianism.4 7 6   
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Firstly, in Kant’s view, while moral duties arise for us in the hypothetical 
authority-free state of nature, duties of justice cannot. This is most clearly 
expressed in Kant’s claim that in this state of nature “men do one another no 
wrong at all when they feud among themselves”4 7 7  about their seized 
possessions. Kant’s position on justice, which is based on his radical view about 
freedom and people’s independence, is thus even more extreme than Nagel’s. 
Kant does not only deny that in the absence of a common coercive authority that 
acts in our name, we have duties of distributive justice toward each other. 
Furthermore, people are allowed to use coercion only for two purposes: to 
protect their bodies in self-defence and (what will concern us shortly) to force 
each other to leave this ungovernable state devoid of a common coercive 
authority. From the perspective of justice, in the state of nature we have no 
obligations but to not interfere with other people’s bodies.  
Secondly, Kant holds that injustice or “a hindrance to freedom”4 7 8  can only 
be caused by being (unjustifiably) coerced by someone else. As Ripstein stresses, 
“Kantian independence can only be compromised by the deeds of others. It is 
not a good to be promoted; it is a constraint on the conduct of others, imposed 
by the fact that each person is entitled to be his or her own master.”4 7 9   
Fortunately, though, it is not necessary for us to discuss Kant’s whole 
political theory or to engage with his two basic and controversial assumptions 
about justice in order to see the reasons why Kant rejects coercive global 
institutions. Instead, what we require for this purpose is an understanding of 
the function and value that Kant accords coercive sovereign authority.  
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The reason why Kant thinks political authority is indispensable for us lies in 
the fact that human beings have to be able to make exclusive use of things 
outside their bodies to exercise their agency and freedom.4 8 0  But this is only 
possible if there is a way for them to be justified in claiming things as their 
property and thus to exclude others from using these objects.4 8 1  For Kant, what 
is therefore necessary is the creation of a common coercive ruler that 
authoritatively resolves our conflicting claims about what is justly ours.4 8 2  As 
Katrin Flikschuh explains, in Kant’s theory, “it is impossible in principle for a 
private person to act as legitimate enforcer of coercive universal laws.”4 8 3  
General rules, such as that everyone has to have enough or the same, are not of 
much help in this respect and do not render political authority superfluous. As 
Ripstein notes, we always encounter problems when trying to apply general 
rules to particular cases as those rules necessarily are underdetermined.4 8 4  This 
need for authoritative regulation is a familiar idea that does not depend upon 
acceptance of Kant’s two controversial claims about justice.4 8 5  Political 
authority, we saw in Chapter Two, is required for social coordination as well as 
the arbitration of conflicts. It is therefore not difficult for us to agree with Kant 
that coercive authority is an indispensable element of coexistence and social 
human life in general.  
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Given this importance of coercive authority, Kant thinks, we “ought to leave 
the state of nature and proceed […] into a rightful condition, that is, a condition 
of distributive justice.”4 8 6  Since we cannot authoritatively resolve our conflicting 
claims without submitting ourselves to an “omnilateral”4 8 7  will (that is to say: to 
a common coercive authority acting in the name of all of us) this situation in 
Kant’s view justifies the use of extreme measures. To him, we are permitted, if 
necessary, even to “impel [each] other by force to leave this state [of nature] and 
enter into a rightful condition.”4 8 8   
However, Kant thinks that not only individuals but also coercive sovereign 
authorities like states have moral obligations toward others states and people.4 8 9  
But – curiously – for him the moral necessity of having a coercive common 
authority does not generalize to the international arena. Quite to the contrary, 
he argues that internationally states should not form one coercive world 
government to adjudicate their conflicts of justice. Instead, they should agree to 
join together in a “particular kind of league”4 9 0, a voluntary association of states. 
The latter contrasts with the coercive authority of states in that “this federation 
does not aim to acquire any power like that of a state, but merely to preserve 
and secure the freedom of each state in itself, […], although this does not mean 
that they need to submit to public laws and to a coercive power which enforces 
them, as do men in a state of nature.”4 9 1   
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Kant’s denial of an involuntarily acquired duty to form coercive global 
authorities for the resolving of conflicting international claims of justice 
prompts an obvious question. Why does Kant diagnose a discontinuity between 
the situations of individuals in the state of nature and nation states that exist in 
what Höffe calls a “residual state of nature”4 9 2  (that is to say: the international 
authority vacuum in which states constitute independent ‘bubbles’ of 
authority)?  
Kantians like Flikschuh point out that within Kant’s system coercive 
international authorities are not merely undesirable. They are rather 
conceptually impossible.4 9 3  This is because, for Kant, sovereign authority must 
be thought of as “indivisible, supreme, and final.”4 9 4  According to this picture, 
states that are subject to coercive international authorities are incapable of 
definitively resolving conflicts of justice as their decisions can be subject to 
further evaluations of supra-state institutions. As Kant puts it, “the idea of an 
international state is contradictory, since every state involves a relationship 
between a superior (the legislator) and an inferior (the people obeying the laws), 
whereas a number of nations forming one state would constitute a single 
nation.”4 9 5  
Consequently, Flikschuh holds, with respect to global justice there arises a 
dilemma within Kant’s political philosophy. The dilemma occurs because  
Kant conceives of Right in general as an inherently coercive morality. 
He designates states as supreme enforcers of Right domestically, yet 
he also thinks of states as bearers of juridical obligations 
internationally. If Right in general is inherently coercive then states, 
in honouring their juridical obligations, should submit under a 
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supra-state juridical authority internationally. Yet if states are 
themselves supreme enforcers of Right, they cannot be juridically 
compelled – the application of Right against them cannot be coercive. 
This is Kant’s sovereignty dilemma.4 9 6  
 
If unavoidable, this dilemma would have the following implications for our 
defence of global egalitarianism. Since the authoritative power of states is 
required for definitely resolving conflicting claims of individuals there is no 
conceivable reason that could justify the empowerment of coercive international 
authorities. This would also be true for obligations of distributive justice that 
derive from the principle of global egalitarianism. States simply could not be 
forced to work toward greater global equality. States’ compliance with the 
demands of global egalitarianism would be (albeit for other reasons than in 
Christiano’s view) dependent on their voluntary acceptance of these duties.  
 
5. A Problematic Suggestion: a Voluntary Association of States 
Given these two objections we seem to face a “deliberative impasse”4 9 7  with 
respect to realizing conceptions of global justice like global egalitarianism.  
 On the one hand, our moral reasoning tells us that the scope of justice is 
global and that we have duties of distributive justice that ought to be 
implemented worldwide. On the other hand, we cannot set up the coercive 
global institutions required for deliberating about and enforcing the details of 
global justice. This is because either the necessary normative preconditions for 
these institutions are not fulfilled or the conceptual impossibility of such 
institutions would make global justice unenforceable.  
We have seen that both Christiano and Kant, albeit for different reasons, 
suggest focusing our efforts for making the world more just on arguing for the 
                                                                 
496 Katrin Flikschuh, “Kant’s Sovereignty  Dilemma: A Contemporary  Analy sis”, p. 47 1. 
497  Thomas Christiano, “Is Democratic Legitimacy  Possible for International Institutions?”  
232 
 
voluntary formation of some non-coercive association of states. However, 
resolving the impasse by means of a voluntary association is dissatisfying: the 
demands of distributive justice established by the principle of global 
egalitarianism thus would be answered by the idea of a merely voluntary 
fulfilment of these obligations on the part of states. The option of a voluntary 
association is unsatisfactory since we have overwhelming reasons to look for 
further identifiable duties and goals that derive from the argument for the 
global scope of justice. After all, in the previous chapters we found important 
reasons (provided by the argument for equality, the importance of practice-
independent entitlement, and the lack of a moral difference between socially 
versus naturally-caused detrimental inequalities) to promote distributive 
equality on a global scale.  
The solution of creating a voluntary association of states, on the other hand, 
tells us to accept that when states fail to form such an association (and thereby 
also leave a range of rules and objectives of global justice undetermined) they 
merely commit a reproachable moral failure. There would, then, be no way of 
justifying the coercive implementation of duties of global justice on states. 
Global egalitarianism would be unenforceable and Nagel’s conclusion about the 
realisability of global justice would again be imminent – despite the validity of 
global egalitarianism. We therefore have to find an answer to these two 
challenges to the institutionalizability of conceptions of global justice. 
 
6. Answering the Kantian Challenge 
We will start by addressing the Kantian objection to global institutions since it is 
the more fundamental one. As it turns out, the core of Kant’s idea of political 
authority – the notion of sovereignty as indivisible – also presents its greatest 
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weakness. This shortcoming opens up a way for us to defuse the charge of the 
conceptual impossibility of coercive global authorities. 
 Philosophers like Thomas Pogge reject the idea of sovereignty as 
necessarily indivisible.4 9 8  For Pogge, the question whether a sovereign authority 
can be subject to the coercive rule of another authority while remaining capable 
of authoritatively resolving conflicts among its subjects is an empirical question 
rather than a matter of logic.4 9 9  And when we consider our practical experience, 
Pogge holds, we find that, for one thing, the purpose of the very idea of 
indivisible sovereignty is infeasible: it is impossible for us to have a complete 
authoritative conflict-resolution mechanism. Drawing on this assumption, both 
Pogge and Höffe believe that Kant’s theory actually supports the case for 
coercive global authority and does not deny its possibility. So how does their 
argument work? 
(1) The Impossibility of a Complete Conflict-Resolution Mechanism 
Kant actually endorses the idea of coercive global authorities as the way to 
overcome the authority vacuum in the international sphere. He tell us that  
There is only one rational way in which states coexisting with other 
states can emerge from the lawless condition of pure warfare. Just 
like individual men, they must renounce their savage and lawless 
freedom, adapt themselves to public coercive laws, and thus form an 
international state (civitas gentium), which would necessarily 
continue to grow until it embraced all the peoples of the earth.5 00  
 
We learned, though, that such a world state is not conceivable within Kant’s 
system as it would render states subject to the power of other authorities. Kant, 
in contrast, thinks that in a democratic state the ultimate, indivisible authority 
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rests with the legislative branch government.5 01  It can appoint and dismiss the 
executive officials of government and it produces the laws to which the state’s 
judicial institutions appeal to adjudicate conflicts.  
However, what works in theory does not always function in practice. Pogge 
points out that there always have been examples of cases in which one of the 
three branches of a democratic state engaged in an “all-out power struggle”5 02  
trying to negate the power of the other ones. Furthermore, Christiano points out 
that also within democratic theory a moral justification can be given for the 
power of constitutional courts to overturn democratically made decisions of the 
legislature. If constitutional courts do a fine job of overturning only unjust laws 
then they have to be considered legitimate.5 03  This is because the democratic 
legislature cannot be thought to be justified in passing unjust laws. By doing so 
it would negate the reason it is vested with power in the first place and overst ep 
its authority. Thus, there are even strong moral reasons against the conceptual 
claim that the sovereignty of political authorities must be undivided to be 
effective at all. Complete authoritative conflict-resolution mechanisms therefore 
are infeasible and morally undesirable. Pogge consequently concludes that 
“Kant – quite understandably, of course, in light of the more limited historical 
experience available to him – is operating with a false dichotomy”5 04 : he thinks 
there can either be undivided sovereignty or anarchy.  
(2) The Desirability of Divided Forms of Sovereign Power 
However, Pogge does not only argue that the checks and balances of divided 
democratic authorities provide good instruments for preventing the latter from 
turning into anarchy. He also argues that in circumstances like the ones we 
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currently face in our world of only voluntarily regulated states, divided and 
vertically dispersed authority is also desirable.  
In such a possible multi-layered authoritative world order “there would 
indeed be a world government with central agencies that fulfil certain 
legislative, executive, and juridical functions. But there would also be smaller 
political units […] whose governmental agency would also have some ultimate 
authority over the unit’s internal affairs.”5 05  There are various benefits from 
such a dispersal of authority that are unavailable on the model of indivisible 
sovereignty. For Pogge, a multi-layered world order is our best hope of a 
peaceful resolution of conflicts among states. The checks and balances the 
different levels of authority would exert on one another could also reduce the 
likelihood of oppression. Furthermore, what is crucial from the perspective of 
global egalitarianism, global authorities could enable us to promote global 
socio-economic justice and work toward greater global distributive equality. 
Another benefit of global vertically divided authority would be that it is likely to 
foster democracy and environmental protection worldwide: the different 
authorities connect people and can prevent them from producing environmental 
hazards whose effects they do not suffer directly or at all themselves.  5 06   
However, once we discard the idea that political authority must be 
undivided in order to be effective the Kantian argument for the duty to leave the 
state of nature (as Kant acknowledges himself) translates to the global sphere as 
well. If we follow Höffe, we can interpret the existing states as forming ‘bubbles 
of sovereignty’ within which they enforce justice and embody the omnilateral 
will of their citizens. Outside these sovereignty bubbles, though, there is “an 
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international state of nature”5 07  in which no lawful condition is possible. And 
just as individuals are under a moral duty to leave the state of nature, exiting the 
global “secondary state of nature”5 08  is something that states have an obligation 
to do and “may ‘demand’ from each other.”5 09  This means that, if Pogge’s 
critique of the idea of sovereignty as necessarily undivided is plausible, Kant’s 
political theory is not an obstacle, but lends support, to the duty to create 
coercive global authorities that are charged with the pursuit of justice. 
Höffe’s idea of what such an international order would have to look like is 
unsurprisingly quite similar to Pogge’s. The global authorities Höffe envisages 
do not have the task of replacing the existing sovereignty of states. They are 
rather supposed to exercise supplementary authority that is effective where 
states have no authority themselves and face global coordination and arbitration 
problems: “within the framework of the legal-moral fundamental task of 
arbitrating conflicts without the rule of force, the international legal community 
has only the remaining responsibility of overcoming the residual state of 
nature.”5 1 0  What is required for establishing supplemental global authorities, 
though, is that states (like individuals in the state of nature) yield some of their 
sovereignty and powers to these supra-institutions.5 1 1   
 This conclusion is also far from unavailable to Kantian sceptics about global 
authority like Flikschuh. Elsewhere, Flikschuh acknowledges that for Kant the 
creation of states is but a step to a morally required complete global legal 
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condition: “Kant envisages the gradual but steady transformation of provisional 
into peremptory Right as a process of reform which will eventually encompass 
the spherical surface of the earth as a whole.”5 1 2  In support of this interpretation 
of Kant Flikschuh cites Karlfriedrich Herb and Bernd Ludwig, who state that  
With Kant's account, the conception of the individual state as the 
paradigm of civil society and of peremptory mine-thine relations 
begins to lose its importance. For Kant the individual state 
constitutes a transitional phase in the development towards global 
relations of Right. While the individual state appears like a status 
civilis from the confined local perspective, it remains a condition of 
merely provisional mine and thine from the enlarged global 
perspective.5 1 3  
 
This is to say that the jurisdiction states claim cannot be final until it is approved 
by some competent authority to be consistent with the demands of justice. 
These demands are prior to the existence of states themselves and the only 
competent authorities are those that are in a position to impartially and 
authoritatively adjudicate conflicts among states. We earlier saw that Miriam 
Ronzoni plausibly points out that this is only possible for global authorities.5 1 4  
However, if this is the case then for Kant there exists no real sovereignty 
dilemma in the global sphere of the kind Flikschuh affirms.5 1 5  The sovereignty of 
states and their powers to determine their subjects’ just entitlements are merely 
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provisional and do not have ultimate binding force for all other states (just as 
the latter’s claims to external objects are not decisive either). This does, of 
course, not mean that states are morally allowed to go and take whatever they 
consider theirs. Quite to the contrary, this means that states can never 
ultimately be conclusively sure what is rightly theirs and their subjects’.  
The decisive points to be taken from Pogge’s and Höffe’s critique of Kant’s 
political theory and his assumption of the indivisibility of authority is that, 
morally speaking, forming global authorities is not merely an option for states. 
It is a necessity that arises from the demands of distributive justice that do not 
stop at the borders of states. Vertically dispersed global authority is not an 
impossible construct. It is rather a morally mandatory project. Thus, we can 
even plausibly hold that Kant’s legal and political theory supports, rather than 
negates, the central global egalitarian demand to establish global authorities 
that enable and enforce obligations and rules of global egalitarian justice.  
 
7. Rebutting Democratic Qualms about Global Institutions 
How damaging is Christiano’s democratic challenge to coercive global 
institutions? His argument is that institutions must be democratic to be 
legitimate but that globally people have unequal stakes in the cooperative 
practices that require authoritative regulation. Therefore, even if democratic 
global institutions would be possible (which is currently unlikely), they would 
not be desirable. Thus, he thinks we have no way of institutionalizing global 
egalitarianism.  
To start with, we have to notice two issues about Christiano’s claim that 
people currently have unequal stakes in global interactions. Firstly, these 
unequal stakes might be the result of injustice. It might be the case that certain 
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national economies are not given equal access to the global markets for 
unjustifiable reasons.5 1 6  If such injustice is the cause of unequal stakes then the 
latter are themselves a problem and not a reason to think there is no moral basis 
for democratic global institutions.  
Secondly, though, Christiano’s notion of stakes might track the wrong 
factors. The citizens of countries with weak economies might have small stakes 
in the actual global trade relations. However, they might be particularly 
vulnerable to changes in the rules and regulation of these international 
practices.5 1 7  For this reason the stakes the poor have in the organization and 
regulation of global markets are much more elemental and urgent than those of 
richer people who try to make profits in global trading. From this point of view, 
as well, unequal stakes do not seem like a hindrance but rather as a reason to 
establish international authorities that enforce rules of justice globally. 
However, the main reason for us to dismiss the democratic challenge to 
coercive global authorities is the service conception of authority that we 
encountered in Chapter Two. The service conception, to recall, tells us that we 
have weighty moral duties to subject ourselves to the commands of an authority 
if the latter makes us better conform with reasons that already apply to us 
independently of authoritative commands. In the preceding chapters we saw 
that there are a number of such morally mandatory reasons that lead to the 
conclusion that the states in this world should empower and subject themselves 
to the authority of certain global institutions. Among those reasons are the need 
to ensure background justice within existing international practices, the 
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demands of the global egalitarian principle to promote distributive equality 
among all persons, and the fact that we have to solve global collective action 
problems like preventing the destruction of our environment. In fact, as the 
proponents of the reformed-practice view of distributive justice and defenders 
of practice-independent conceptions like Buchanan show, the existing system of 
sovereign states does quite a bad job at complying with the reasons that apply to 
them. 
While there is insufficient space for restating the arguments of these two 
perspectives we can recapitulate that the multitude of existing sovereign states 
minimally face assurance and coordination problems in the international 
sphere. So if it is true that  
-   Existing international trade relations are under-regulated, and that  
-  Even democratic states pursue their global interests in objectionable 
ways and to the detriment of others (due to, as Buchanan diagnosed, a 
structural bias pro its own citizens), and 
-  Existing global governance institutions (like the UN, WTO, IMF, World 
Bank) are not adequately designed for being reliable enforcers of duties 
of justice,  
 
Then there is some plausibility to Buchanan’s thesis that states risk their 
legitimacy if they do not design and transfer authority to institutions that can 
enforce salient goals and obligations of distributive justice on these states.5 1 8   
But why do these institutions that should regulate and aid states be global 
ones? Could states not simply agree on common rules for regulating their global 
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exchanges and promoting goals of global egalitarian justice? The problem with 
this solution is that it does not offer a secure way authoritatively to resolve 
conflicts between states. We might think that in cases of such disputes the 
disagreeing states could decide on a third party to function as an impartial 
mediator whose judgment they will accept. But the issue here, it appears, is that 
such mediation only works as long as the clashing parties both accept the 
authority of the impartial arbiter. If they refuse, then there is no one to ensure 
that the disputants really settle their disagreement in a morally permissible way. 
Another problem with the voluntary third-party arbitration model is that 
there might be no unbiased party available that does not have a stake in the 
decision itself. If two states argue, for instance, about the ownership of a small 
territory that is rich in natural resources (which would be beneficial for the 
people in all states) and which no one has a privileged claim to then on the state 
level, there will not be a single party who could function as an unbiased 
mediator between the two states. 
The service conception of authority explains that and why in the light of the 
currently unfulfilled obligations of justice we can be thought to have stringent 
moral duties to create authoritative global institutions. The fact that these global 
authorities cannot be democratic is of secondary importance. It is certainly the 
case that it would be ultimately desirable that the coercive rule enforcement on 
the global level does not only happen in the interests of those subject to these 
regulations. Ideally, the subjects are also (where appropriate) involved in the 
decision-making process and have their moral equality publicly expressed in the 
exercise of global political authority.  
However, according to the service conception the democratic kind of 
authority is not the primary notion of political authority. In light of the results of 
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the previous chapters, we have strong reasons to hold that authoritative 
coordination and conflict-solutions currently take precedence over the 
desirability of a democratic set-up of international institutions. Such coercive 
global authorities without doubt are morally preferable to the voluntary 
association of democratic states Christiano suggest, for the following reasons. 
Firstly, as we saw earlier, Buchanan points out that “there is an inherent 
structural bias in democracy toward excessive partiality”5 1 9  in favour of the 
members of the democratic entity. Decisions made in democratic states often 
neglect or completely ignore the interests of outsiders. Politicians are only 
accountable to their own citizens. The latter, of course, can be thought to have a 
moral duty do consider the effects their collective choices have on foreigners. 
However, in our evermore interdependent world it seems quite impossible for 
individual democratic voters to be fully aware of all the consequences of their 
political choice. The problem for a voluntary association of states is that there is 
no one who can regulate the choices of democratic citizens if they choose not to 
become members of this association. Also, contracts like those a voluntary 
association would be based on can run out and it must be at least possible for 
member states to withdraw their membership again. This is to say that on the 
basis of the idea of a voluntary association of democratic states there is no 
guarantee that democratic citizens are prevented from making choices whose 
effects are not justifiable to foreigners.  
Secondly, some appeal of the idea of the solution of a voluntary global 
association of states might derive from the ‘democratic peace thesis’. The latter 
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(traceable to Kant’s essay On Perpetual Peace520) says that citizens of 
democratic states rarely, if ever, wage war on each other. Since they have to 
carry the burdens of war and can decide themselves on whether to avoid these 
costs they are thought to have overwhelming incentives to not pursue a violent 
path.  
However, Höffe presents a hypothetical case in which this rule could 
become invalid. The situation he has in mind is one in which a democratic 
society (1) possesses weapons, which make it unnecessary to risk the lives of a 
great number of their own soldiers, (2) uses only voluntary troops, (3) attacks a 
much weaker democracy, (4) has the advantage of a surprise attack, (5) has a 
major interest in power and wealth, and (6) recoups the material costs of the 
war from weaker allies or the subdued opponent. This is certainly not a very 
common situation and involves a democratic people that has little regard for 
moral considerations. But no matter how realistic the scenario appears, Höffe’s 
point is that the “self-interest [of a democratic society] in no way speaks against 
all wars.”5 2 1  Although the democratic peace thesis seems widely accepted today 
among academics the situation Höffe describes at least shows that the 
contingent validity of this thesis cannot replace the services and security 
coercive global authorities can provide. 
Thus, in response to the democratic objection to the duty to establish 
coercive global institutions we can assert that (1) the service conception of 
political authority generally debilitates worries about the legitimacy of non-
                                                                 
520 See Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical  Sketch”, p. 100. Here Kant writes that 
the democratic “constitution […] offers a prospect of attaining the desired result, i.e. a 
perpetual peace, and the reason for this is as follows. If, as is inev itably  the case under this 
constitution, the consent of the citizens is required to decide on whether or not war is to be 
declared, it is very natural that they will have great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous 
an enterprise. For this would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries of war.”  
521  Otfried Höffe, Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace , p. 186. 
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democratic global institutions. (2), though, we have also seen reasons contra the 
idea that a voluntary association of democratic states could administer and 
enforce duties of global justice as likely and effectively as such coercive supra-
state authorities. (3), Christiano’s normative basis for rejecting the idea of global 
democratic structures, the inequality of stakes in global matters, might put the 
cart before the horse: this inequality might be the result of injustice and another 
reason to aspire toward global democratic institutions, not a normative reason 
against them.  
 
8. The Global Egalitarian Duty to Create Coercive Global 
Authorities Confirmed 
In summary, we have seen that neither the Kantian objection nor the 
democratic challenge to the duty to create global authorities are convincing. 
Once we drop Kant’s idea that sovereign rule is necessarily indivisible we find 
that his theory actually offers reasons to think that we should establish global 
institutions to overcome the residual international state of nature. And also the 
democratic challenge to global authorities becomes implausible in light of the 
service conception of authority. In addition, the voluntary association of states 
that both Kant and Christiano suggest as a solution to the problems we face on a 
global scale seems quite unpromising on empirical and normative grounds.  
There are numerous sound arguments in favour of an obligation to create a 
multi-layered scheme of political authorities around the globe that has the aim 
to promote egalitarian justice and to ensure the universally valid entitlements of 
everyone. We therefore can consider this duty, which is pivotal to the 
practicality and effectiveness of the principle of global egalitarianism, as 
justified. 
245 
 
9. ‘Who Guards the Guardians?’ and Mandatory Epistemic 
Virtues of Global Authorities 
There are, of course, many follow-up questions to the global egalitarian 
argument for the duty to create global service authorities, such as: who guards 
these guardians and how can we fill in the gaps with respect to the details of 
global justice?  
Our discussion in this chapter has the main purpose to demonstrate the 
plausibility of the duty to create international coordinating authorities. 
However, at the end of this thesis it is necessary to briefly address these 
subsequent questions so as to round off the idea of mandatory and feasible 
global governance institutions. For this purpose, it is helpful to take a look at 
Buchanan’s and Keohane’s pioneering work on the structural requirements such 
institutions have to fulfil to meet various criticisms.5 2 2  When we consider their 
suggestions we find that Buchanan and Keohane do not make a case against but 
rather for global egalitarianism. 
 Buchanan’s and Keohane’s main thesis is that  “to be legitimate a global 
governance institution must possess certain epistemic virtues that facilitate the 
ongoing critical revision of its goals, through interaction with agents and 
organizations outside the institution.”5 2 3  Their emphasis on these epistemic 
virtues of supra-state authorities is instructive for the question how it is possible 
to control these institutions. Buchanan and Keohane assert that there are 
certain identifiable minimal conditions that global service authorities and their 
officials must fulfil if they should be considered legitimate. Among these 
conditions are the “minimal moral acceptability requirement, understood as 
                                                                 
522 Allen Buchanan, Robert O. Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions” in 
Allen Buchanan, Human Rights, Legitimacy , and the Use of Force (Oxford: Oxford 
University  Press, 2010): pp. 105-133. 
523 Allen Buchanan, Robert O. Keohane, ibid., p. 106. 
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refraining from violations of the least controversial human rights,”5 2 4  which we 
can for our purposes read as referring to universal distributive entitlements. In 
addition, supra-state authorities (just as constitutional courts5 2 5 ) have to clearly 
yield comparative benefits as to a situation in which they do not exist. This 
means that “the legitimacy of an institution is called into question if there is an 
institutional alternative, providing significantly greater benefits, that is feasible, 
accessible without excessive transition costs, and meets the minimal moral 
acceptability criterion.”5 2 6  Finally, Buchanan and Keohane mention that supra-
state authorities and their officials are clearly illegitimate if they do not possess 
or ensure the institutional integrity of their agency. This is to say that “an 
institution should be presumed to be illegitimate if its practices or procedures 
predictably undermine the pursuit of the very goals in terms of which it justifies 
its existence.”5 2 7   
 If none of these conditions are obviously violated (which can itself be a 
matter of dispute and source of problems) then it seems the subjects of global 
governance authorities (states and their subjects as well as business 
corporations) should accept the latter’s decisions – even if they do not agree 
with them. In case these institutions do breach these conditions it is helpful to 
keep in mind that the global egalitarian argument for international service 
authorities does not include a call for giving them command over military 
power. The coercive force of these institutions rather derives from the 
acceptance of their rulings by their subjects who require their services (similarly 
to the way the WTO is able to instruct its members without disposing over an 
                                                                 
524 Allen Buchanan, Robert O. Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions” , p. 
118. 
525 see Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality , p. 280. 
526 Allen Buchanan, Robert O. Keohane, ibid., p. 118. 
527  Allen Buchanan, Robert O. Keohane, ibid., p. 119.  
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army). Ultimately, it can be up to the members themselves to enforce the rules 
issued by a global authority. While such enforcement and compliance is a matter 
of justice when the authority is justified, states would not have to fight the army 
of a despotic institution if the authority should become illegitimate.   
 It is exactly for the purpose of trying to make supra-state authorities’ 
decisions as transparent and comprehensible as possible for its subjects that 
Buchanan and Keohane stress the importance of the epistemic virtues they 
should exhibit, of which they mention three.5 2 8  The crucial aspect of Buchanan’s 
and Keohane’s suggestion about how to structure global service authorities and 
how to make them accountable is that their ideas only make sense if we accept 
something like the global egalitarian principle. Ultimately, they think it is the 
task of these international authorities to enable and facilitate more local debates 
about the details of social justice. Thus, with respect to the exemplary question 
of what the idea of a general right to health care has to encompass Buchanan 
points at the need for local implementations of this idea. He proposes a 
regarding two-level model of sovereignty in which the final details about rights, 
entitlements, and justice are made within democratic processes.5 2 9  However, 
there is still a crucial task for global institutions in this model as they have to 
ensure the framework within which such local deliberation can take place.  With 
respect to the universal right to health care Buchanan argues that  
                                                                 
528 Buchanan and Keohane mention that global governance institutions must, firstly , generate 
and make publicly available information about their serv ices. Secondly  the must aim to be 
transparent by supplying their accountability-holders (which can include non-governmental 
organizations) with accurate information about how the institution works. Third, they  need 
to be open for discussion and input about rev ising the terms of their own accountability : 
there must be possible public discussion about and influence on the aims of global justice 
and the means global authorities are allowed to use to achieve these tasks (see Allen 
Buchanan, Robert O. Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions”, pp. 123, 
124). 
529 See Allen Buchanan, Kristen Hessler, “Specifying the Content of the Human Right to Health 
Care” in Allen Buchanan, Justice and Health Care. Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University  Press, 2009): pp. 203-218. 
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The role of international institutions should be limited to two 
functions. First, they should specify minimal conditions for effective 
democratic procedures within states. […] Second, international 
institutions should review national healthcare situations and point 
out any obviously inadequate policies.5 3 0   
 
That is to say that coercive global authorities have to function as the guarantors 
of global justice. Buchanan’s proposal aligns with the global egalitarian principle 
at least in two ways. Firstly, it confirms the crucial role that global service 
authorities must play in a just world. Furthermore, though, his two-level-model 
of sovereignty is based on the idea of people’s universally valid “moral claims 
grounded in basic human interests [and] equal consideration for all persons.”5 3 1   
Thus, also for Buchanan a just world is  not possible without global 
governance authorities that secure the equally important essential interests of 
everyone to some kind of equal protection from harm and shares of beneficial 
goods. More importantly, though, Buchanan’s work confirms what we have seen 
in the last five chapters, namely, that and why a plausible conception of 
distributive justice has to be practice-independent and has to affirm something 
like the global egalitarian principle.5 3 2  The plausibility of this principle is not 
obvious from the fundamental premise of the moral equality of human beings as 
such. However, after our examination of various opposing arguments we can 
confirm that this basic premise has to lead to the conclusion that many, if not 
most, of the detrimental interpersonal inequalities that exist on the 
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532 A case in point is Charles Beitz’s attempt to dev ise a practice -dependent account of human 
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international level are objectionable from the perspective of distributive justice. 
These disparities are problematic to the extent that they are not beneficial to 
everyone, threaten the legitimacy of the actual system of power relations in our 
world, and make demands on all of us to change the current global situation.   
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Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to decide how to evaluate global inequality. We 
ultimately found that the principle, which best accommodates our egalitarian 
notions (such as the equal moral status of persons and the thought that no one’s 
chances in life should be determined by morally arbitrary factors), is practice-
independent global egalitarianism.  
 According to this principle many, if not most, of the detrimental inequalities 
that exist on the planet are unjust. This is not to say that we should aim for 
complete substantive global equality in the distribution of goods. However, the 
principle demands that we at least (1) eliminate grossly unjust distributions of 
power and influence in the global sphere that rest on contingencies and not on 
morally relevant differences, (2) ensure a global socio-economic minimum that 
includes resources for all to take part in their local political decision-making 
processes about the details of social justice, and (3) create and empower the 
global institutions that are needed to achieve and enforce these goals. The 
following summary of the previous five chapters restates how we arrived at the 
idea of global egalitarianism. 
 
1. Summarizing the Results of Chapters One to Five 
In the first chapter, we began our discussion of which inequalities are 
objectionable from the perspective of justice by looking for justifications of the 
distinction between domestic and international interpersonal disparities. After 
dismissing the attempts of Andrea Sangiovanni and Michael Blake to base this 
distinction on particular features of states, we found that Thomas Nagel offers a 
more complex defence of the status quo in the world. Our discussion of Nagel’s 
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argument against global justice showed that Nagel makes a strong case for the 
idea that we can non-voluntarily acquire duties of distributive justice in 
situations in which we limit the legitimate options of others (for instance by 
enforcing a certain regime of rules). In addition, Nagel is in agreement with 
John Rawls that sovereign government or coercive authority is a necessary 
enabling condition of all forms of justice. However, Nagel takes the lack of 
authorities that act in our name in the global sphere as a reason to limit the 
demands of justice to existing nation states. We identified his approach as an 
actual practice view of justice according to which what justice demands and 
how far it extends depends on particular actual social practices. Egalitarian 
concern, for Nagel, only applies as part of justifying the exercise of coercive 
political authority. 
 In the Second Chapter we found Nagel’s and Ronald Dworkin’s claim that 
the legitimate exercise of coercive power requires the authority to display equal 
concern for its subjects to be wanting. We found evidence for the view that the 
primary standard of political legitimacy is not that of democratic authority but 
that of the service conception of authority as having moral powers to command 
its subjects grounded in enhancing their conformity with reasons applying 
independently of those commands. On this view one of the main reasons the 
claim to possess political authority is sound is that we cannot do without the 
social coordination that authorities provide. This is true for public issues that 
are either caused by a lack of reasons or by an overabundance of reasons to 
believe that certain goals and actions are required. Thus, the main conclusion of 
Chapter Two was that, on the basis of his actual practice view of justice, Nagel 
cannot even justify egalitarian justice within states.   
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 In Chapter Three we looked for another normative foundation of egalitarian 
duties of justice. Such a justification is offered by proponents of what we 
identified as the reformed practice view of justice. According to the latter, what 
distributive justice requires and how far it extends depends on what suitably 
reconstructed actual practices would look like. The adherents of this perspective 
employ (in contrast to Nagel) a more Rawlsian approach to egalitarian justice 
that focuses on the distribution of the benefits and burdens of cooperation. As a 
result, reformist writers acknowledge egalitarian duties also beyond states, 
namely, wherever we entertain non-optional interdependent practices that have 
pervasive effects on the lives of people. Such practice, reformists plausibly 
argue, these days extend well beyond the borders of individual nation states. 
 However, we found that in the end also the reformed practice view is 
implausible since it cannot adequately accommodate the justified interests and 
entitlements of non-participants in common good practices. This shortcoming, 
it turned out, is due to the practice-dependent nature of the reformed practice 
view which causes it to object to detrimental inequalities only insofar as (and 
because) they are the product of human cooperation of a non-voluntary kind. As 
such, practice-dependent approaches are generally incapable of addressing 
many urgent issues we encounter in our world, like the need to fairly share the 
burdens of preventing climate change or the idea that we should provide for the 
ones who will live after us. 
 In Chapter Four, we evaluated three arguments that practice-dependent 
approaches are founded on and that pose objections to the idea that all 
detrimental inequalities any person suffers from present problems of 
distributive justice. These arguments were the idea that doing harm is worse 
than allowing harm, the ‘ought-implies-can’ rule, and the levelling down 
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objection to the inherent value of equality. By debilitating these three arguments 
we confirmed the inherent value of interpersonal distributive equality. As a 
result, we concluded that the scope of justice is global in the sense that it also 
encompasses naturally-caused harm (such as those resulting from earthquakes 
and by nature unequally distributed natural resources) and detrimental 
inequalities that are not absolute. In this way we established the plausibility of 
the principle of global egalitarianism. This principle importantly rests on telic 
reasons that require the improvement of states of affairs and not centrally (like 
practice-dependent approaches) on deontic egalitarian concern. We also saw 
that global egalitarianism is a version of a practice-independent view of 
distributive justice according to which what justice requires and how far it 
extends does not depend on existing practices but on what is feasible and 
required by relevant moral considerations.  As such it is the idea that best aligns 
with our fundamental egalitarian convictions about human beings.  
 In the last chapter, we tried to determine what concrete duties and goals can 
be thought to derive from the principle of global egalitarianism and how these 
can help us avoid problems other approaches to global justice run into. We 
scrutinized a number of deontic considerations that regard the legitimate 
implementation of objectives and duties of justice as well as the possibility to 
establish the global authorities necessary for realizing global egalitarianism. We 
found that the fact that global egalitarianism embraces the service conception of 
political legitimacy enables it to call for international institutions that can 
administer global justice even if they are not democratic. We also identified a 
number of salient goals that the principle of global egalitarianism can justify 
and that do amount to much more than a minimalist theory or a denial of global 
justice. We found that in particular the duty to establish global governance 
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institutions can be supported by approaches (like Kant’s legal theory) which, at 
first sight, seem to speak against the general possibility of having global 
authorities.  
 Of course, many questions about the principle of global egalitarianism 
remain unanswered: since a thesis like this one is a limited project this is an 
inevitable incompleteness. However, what we can claim to have achieved in this 
thesis is to have casted serious doubts on a currently prominent perspective on 
global justice, namely the one that makes global distributive obligations 
conditional upon the existence of contingent human practices. The thesis 
furthermore has generated support for accepting the principle of global 
egalitarianism. The latter not only presents a more consistent and cogent idea 
than popular practice-dependent theories. It also best reflects the ideas that we 
are all morally equal and that none of us should fare worse in life due to factors 
that are arbitrary from the moral point of view.  
 
2. Final Remark on the Practical Convergence of Practice-
Dependent Views and Global Egalitarianism 
One thing must be stressed with respect to the debate between adherents of 
practice-dependent approaches and practice-independent views about global 
justice (as, for instance, global egalitarianism). Philosophers like Simon Caney 
note, that – given the global interdependence that already exists on our planet 
today – this “philosophical distinction does not make any practical 
difference.”5 3 3  This is also reflected in the arguments of practice-dependent 
theorists like Darrel Moellendorf who holds that we are all part of the same 
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“global economic association”5 3 4  and who therefore supports the idea of “global 
equality of opportunity.”5 3 5  Such notions are clearly also part of the global 
egalitarian position. Some readers might therefore worry that the whole debate 
between, for instance, proponents of the reformed practice view like James and 
Moellendorf and global egalitarians like Christiano is not of much importance or 
of little consequence.  
 However, we should not overstate the relevance of this convergence 
between certain practice-dependent views and global egalitarianism. First of all, 
as Caney points out, it is important for us to have a plausible and sound theory 
of global justice5 3 6  and it is unlikely that both perspectives are equally plausible. 
But there are also practical ramifications of accepting either a practice-
dependent or a global egalitarian position on global justice and detrimental 
inequalities. If we accept global egalitarianism we surely still face questions as 
to whether the idea is practicable at all or whether there is enough moral insight 
and motivation within humankind for this idea ever to be realized. Defenders of 
practice-dependent theories, though, face at least one further problem if they 
care about and want to argue for eliminating global detrimental inequalities. 
Since their argument for global justice depends on contingent empirical facts 
they always have to show first that their theory of global justice really applies in 
this world. 
Empirical debates about the applicability of a normative theory can be 
extensive and weaken the appeal of a theory significantly. One example of such a 
debate is the argument among philosophers about the accuracy of Thomas 
Pogge’s idea that we have intermediate, remedial duties of global distributive 
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justice since our current world order is harming the poor.5 3 7  Pogge’s argument 
for global distributive justice is attractive because it is based on fulfilling 
negative duties of non-harming – obligations that are widely recognized. But 
Pogge’s approach is dependent on the accuracy of the empirical assumption that 
the rich globally violate their negative duties toward the poor by enforcing a 
global order on them which is unjust and harmful. And this empirical 
assumption can be and has been questioned by many of Pogge’s critics.  
When we are convinced of the plausibility of global egalitarianism we do not 
face any such troubles. Since global equality is a demand that applies 
independently from the existence of contingent empirical facts (like on-going 
practices of a certain kind) the only matters of debate are how to best achieve 
these goals. This gives a practical advantage to global egalitarianism over its 
practice-dependent rivals. 
Ultimately, though, the main support for the principle of global 
egalitarianism derives from the way it accommodates our egalitarian notions. 
On the basis of global egalitarianism, everyone’s moral equality is finally worth 
something concrete – independently of whether other factors apply. This is a 
great step forward from the current situation in the world where people’s fates 
are often seen to be justly predetermined to a large extent by the arbitrary fact 
of where they are born. On practice-dependent views like Nagel’s (which reflect 
the current status quo in the world) we are left to wonder how it can be the case 
that our moral equality demands of us to keep our compatriots from suffering 
from factors beyond their control, while people abroad are dying by the 
thousands every day due to such influences. Global egalitarianism has an 
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answer to this puzzle. It tells us that it is not morally acceptable but unjust to 
not support those people who happen to be born into poverty and a lack of 
opportunities. If we are really all moral equals, no one’s life should be worth 
more than anyone else’s and global egalitarianism is the plausible normative 
response to this idea.  
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